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Bowles

REFLECTIONS

ON

THE POLITICAL AND MORAL STATE

OF

SOCIETY,

AT THE

CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

BY JOHN BOWLES, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL STATE OF SOCIETY AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1800, &c. &c.

Ætas parentum pejor avis tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitioſorem. HOR.

"We are capable of moral Improvement by Diſcipline, and how much we "want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted with the great "Wickedneſs of Mankind."

BUTLER'S ANALOGY.

LONDON:

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IN the Title of this Publication, it is taken for granted that the 19th Century will commence with the year 1801. This opinion (of the correctneſs of which the Author is, after much conſideration, convinced) is ſo generally prevalent, that the above aſſumption, it is truſted, will not appear diſreſpectful to thoſe who entertain a different ſentiment. But the accuracy of the above opinion is immaterial with regard to the object, for the ſake of which an alluſion is here made to a change of Century. That the period of ſuch a change is arrived, is admitted by all, with only a difference of very trifling amount, when compared with the portion of time, of which it deſignates the concluſion on the one hand, and the commencement on the other. And, ſurely, no one will deny, that ſo rare and ſolemn an occurence ſhould diſpoſe the mind to the moſt ſerious reflection; particularly when it is diſtinguiſhed by a Criſis, the moſt awful and alarming, which the World has ever beheld.

Williams Books

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ERRATA.

Page 5. l. 4. for "but if that the immenſe," read but that if," &c.

P. 32. note †, l. 8. for "preſent Lord-Mayor" read "*late* Lord-Mayor."

P. 37. note, for "nuès irons voir dans la Turquie," read "*nous* irons voir," &c.

P. 41. l. 11, for "the name of a Republic which" read "the name of a republic, and that which,"

P. 62. l. 11. for "exceed" read exceeds."

P. 83. l. 19. for "we had even done," read "than we had ever done."

P. 113. l. 29. for "Stateſmen of the day" read "many Stateſmen of the day."

P. 114. l. 16 from bottom, for "attention of Foreign Powers," read "attention of the reſt of Europe."

P. 123. l. 26. for "practical exertion, read "practicable exertion."

P. 134. l. 8. "But though while the great cauſes," *dele* "while."

P. 146. l. 11. for "in the minds," read "in the mind."

P. 155. l. 14. for "and his coadju," read "for his coadjutors."

P. 161. l. 7. for "ture," read "true."

P. 165. laſt line, but one, of note, for "news-napers," read "news-papers."

P. 171. l. 2. for "he triumphs," read "he is ſure to triumph."

P. 171. l. 3. for "Louis the Fourteenth," read "Louis the Sixteenth."

P. 172. l. 16 from the bottom, for "Viſition," read "Viſitation."

P. 174. l. 10. for ſignalized by," read "ſignalized for."

REFLECTIONS, &c.

AS the tranſition from the calamities of war to the bleſſings of ſecure and honourable peace is the happieſt change which can take place in human affairs, ſo a propoſal, which has for its object to produce an accommodation between belligerent powers, is at once the moſt pleaſing and the moſt important that can occur in the various communications of mankind. Such a propoſal, indeed, excites ſo many grateful emotions in the mind, that the inconſiderate part of the world will at all times be diſpoſed to condemn its rejection, and to think themſelves thereby deprived of a chance, at leaſt, of again enjoying the ſweets of tranquillity. And if that rejection happens to be followed by diſaſters, it will be viewed in a ſtill more unfavourable light, and regarded as the cauſe of every calamity which may have enſued.

The queſtion, therefore, reſpecting the propriety of the rejection of the overtures for negociation, which were made by Buonaparte to the Britiſh Government at the commencement of the preſent year, important as it was at the moment, derives additional conſequence from the reverſes which have ſince attended the combined arms. Thoſe perſons whoſe conſtant

object it is to render adminiſtration unpopular, will not neglect ſo favourable an opportunity of making it appear reſponſible for all the misfortunes which have ſince occurred, and, indeed, for the preſent awful ſituation of Europe. While others, and a much larger party too, will readily join in condemning the Britiſh Government for refuſing to liſten to the invitation to negociate, who would have extolled that refuſal to the ſkies, if the preſent campaign had been brilliant and ſucceſsful like the laſt.

To guard againſt this *ex poſt facto* wiſdom, it is neceſſary to bear in mind the manner of the overture, and the circumſtances under which it was made. For no one will venture to contend, in direct terms, that a propoſal to negociate ought at all times, and under all circumſtances, to be accepted; though ſuch a propoſition ſeems to be implied in the argument which has on this occaſion been chiefly relied on as a ground of cenſure—that we ſhould at leaſt have waited to learn on what terms our enemy was diſpoſed to make peace. Whoever argues in this way, muſt ſurely forget that pacific overtures may originate in other motives than a deſire to terminate hoſtilities, on juſt and reaſonable terms—that their real object may be, not to reſtore peace, but to render war more deſtructive, and ruin more complete—that they may be ſuggeſted by artifice and perfidy—that they may be intended to enſnare confidence, to interrupt preparation, to favour intrigue, or to diſſolve a formidable confederacy. It is alſo poſſible that the party offering to treat may be ſo deſtitute of ſtable and permanent authority, as to be incapable of enſuring the performance of his ſtipulations.

It muſt therefore be allowed that it would be imprudent in the extreme to accede to overtures for negociation, without a due conſideration of the probable motives in which they may be ſuppoſed to originate, and of the ability, as well as diſpoſition of the

the enemy, to give effect to his engagements. Negociation is not one of thoſe experiments, if any ſuch there be, which may at all times be made without danger, and which, if they do no good, can produce no harm. It may be as injurious as it can be beneficial. It may prove a more fatal enemy to peace than even war itſelf. To accept the advances of an enemy for the ſake of knowing what terms he is diſpoſed to offer, and in the blind hope that, ſome how or other, the reſult may be a deliverance from the calamities of war, would be ſcarcely leſs abſurd and frantic than to run a ſhip upon a rock in order to preſerve her from the waves.

If the ſubject be examined in this light, it will be found impoſſible to deny that every circumſtance, which can render negociation dangerous and unadviſable, concurred to induce an inſtant rejection of the overtures made by Buonaparte.—The moſt formidable confederacy that had exiſted during the whole war, was then preparing to follow up the ſevere blow, which had been given to the French Republic in the preceding campaign, and with the moſt brilliant proſpect of delivering the world from the grievous ſcourge, by which it had for ſo many years been afflicted. A negociation, at ſuch a moment, would have inevitably defeated the expectation of ſo deſirable an event. It muſt have been attended with the immediate defection of one of the allies from the confederacy—an ally whoſe recent ſervices had revived the hopes of the civilized world, and whoſe zeal in the cauſe had excited the admiration, as well as the gratitude, of every friend of ſocial order. This illuſtrious Prince had declared, in the moſt explicit terms, that his object in the war was "to reſtore "Royalty in France, and to cruſh the monſter which "threatened to deſtroy all legal authority." To enter into negociation with that monſter would, therefore, have been to reject the further aſſiſtance of the great Northern Potentate, on whom, under Heaven, our

principal reliance, at that time, was placed. Deprived of ſuch aid, the confederacy, in a weakened ſtate, and under the greateſt diſadvantage, would have been expoſed to the artifices of the moſt ſubtle of all the rulers of Republican France, who has ſhewn that negociations and ſeparate pacifications are his grand inſtruments of miſchief. This expert intriguer would have had an opportunity of practiſing thoſe arts, in which he is known ſo eminently to excel, in order to excite jealouſies, and to ſow diviſions among the remaining confederates, and to render them ſuſpicious of each others deſigns. Under ſuch circumſtances, a confidential connection could ſcarcely have been preſerved; and judging from preceding events during the war, it is moſt likely that Auſtria would have been drawn into a ſeparate peace, and that Great Britain would, once more, have been left alone in the conteſt.

It is no anſwer to this reaſoning now to ſay that, notwithſtanding the rejection of the overtures, our Northern ally has ſeceded from the confederacy, and thereby expoſed it to diſaſters, as dreadful as any which could have reſulted from negociation. For unleſs that inexpreſſibly great misfortune could have been foreſeen, it could have no effect upon our conduct. It is neceſſary to act according to the circumſtances of the moment; and the ſubſequent occurrence of unexpected events cannot operate in condemnation of meaſures, framed with a due regard to thoſe circumſtances. Our judgment of futurity can be founded only upon our knowledge of the preſent and the paſt; and, though not ſecure againſt misfortune, we are free from blame, if we make that knowledge the rule of our conduct. There was not a man in Europe, who, at the beginning of the preſent year, would not have thought us mad, if we had voluntarily loſt the aſſiſtance of Ruſſia in the war. And when we reflect, that in the battle which has, unfortunately, decided the fate of the campaign, the Auſtrian arms, without ſuch aid,

were on the point * of obtaining a victory, which would have made the First Conſul appear as little, as thoſe who judge by events now think him great, it is not to be doubted but if that the immenſe weight of the Ruſſian force had not been withdrawn, the ſcale muſt have decidedly turned in favour of the Allied Powers. But we ſhould have inevitably loſt the aſſiſtance of Ruſſia if we had acceded to the propoſal of the Firſt Conſul of France. And our rejection of that propoſal having been therefore indiſputably right at the time, it is not poſſible for ſubſequent events—it is not poſſible even for the battle of Marengo—to make it wrong.

It being ſo evident that the direct tendency of the negociation propoſed by Buonaparte was to effect a diſſolution of the confederacy, it was fair to preſume that the propoſal was made with that intent:—for every agent muſt be ſuppoſed to intend whatever his acts have an obvious tendency to produce. To have accepted, therefore, his invitation, would have been to run, with our eyes open, into the ſnare which was laid for us, when prudence bade us remember how fatal that ſnare had proved to other countries—when prudence bade us remember, that, to a reliance on the pacific profeſſions of the French Republic, more ſtates had been indebted for their ruin, than to the operation of her arms—that under the maſk of friendſhip, and of a peaceable diſpoſition, ſhe had acquired poſſeſſion of the Swiſs Cantons, Piedmont, Rome, Tuſcany, Venice, Genoa, and almoſt the whole of Italy—while America had been preſerved from a like fate only, by the intervention of the Atlantic—that not a treaty had been made by her which ſhe had not violated—that there was not a neutral ſtate which ſhe had not inſulted and abuſed.

* So deſperate at one moment was the ſtate of the French army, that the firſt intelligence which reached Paris from the plains of Marengo, announced the diſcomfiture of the hero of Italy; and his own expreſs only arrived in time to prevent the new revolutionrary movement, which his enemies, profiting by his defeat, were beginning to excite.

The ſituation and character of the individual, who offered to treat, were alſo conſiderations of very great importance. Numerous and rapid fluctuations had proved that the governing Powers in France had not, during the whole Revolution, been poſſeſſed of ſufficient ſtability to enſure the performance of their engagements, and this truth had juſt before been confirmed in the ſtrongeſt manner, by the acknowledgment of one who had the confidence of the Firſt Conſul, and who had declared that "the Republic "was ſo deſtitute of permanence with reſpect both to "men and things, that ſhe found it difficult to "ſtipulate conditions of peace, and ſtill more ſo to "preſerve them"—and "that the treaties which ſhe "had actually made, were only the ſource of a new "war, ſtill more deſperate and bloody than the "former †". Such a ſtate of inſtability could ſcarcely be ſaid to be terminated by a new Revolution, which had juſt placed the chief authority in the hands of a ſingle individual, and that individual a foreigner. The character, too, of the man who had thus obtained the ſupremacy, and the firſt act of whoſe reign was this overture for negociation, ought ſurely to be attended to. It could not be forgotten, at once, that he had had a very large ſhare in the moſt atrocious of the acts of his predeceſſors; nay, that the moſt flagitious of thoſe acts, the ſubverſion of the Governments of Genoa and Venice, were excluſively his own, for which he could not plead even the authority of his maſters—that he had effected moſt of thoſe treaties of peace which had proved fatal to the ſtates with which they were made—that he had manifeſted an extraordinary degree of ardour in promoting the revolutionary plans of France—that his diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic, in all theſe tranſactions, was perfidy—that he had diſplayed a peculiar animoſity againſt Great Britain, and that,

† Speech of Boulay de la Meurthe to the remnant of the Council of Five Hundred.—See Reflections on the Political State of Society at the Commencement of the Year 1800, p. 135.

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moreover, his immediate agent Monge had juſt before declared " that the Government of England and the " French Republic could not exiſt together."

The above conſiderations were ſurely more than ſufficient to induce even the moſt credulous to ſuſpect that in pretending to hold out the olive branch, Buonaparte, in reality, only tendered a bough of the poiſonous tree of liberty. If, however, in ſpite of ſo many reaſons to induce a contrary opinion, he had really been actuated by a wiſh to reſtore to mankind the bleſſings of peace—if it was indeed his intention to ſuffer Europe to enjoy ſecurity and independence, it was eaſy, and it would have been natural for him, in the letters which contained his overtures, to preſent ſuch proſpects to the view, He muſt have known both the ſuſpicion which was attached to his ſituation, as the head of a Republic which had excited the terror of the world, and the additional alarm and diſtruſt which accompanied the mention of his own name: conſequently, if his views had been truly pacific, he would have endeavoured to inſpire Europe with confidence, by an expreſs renunciation of the foreign ſyſtem of France—and by an aſſurance that, as a ruler, he meant to obſerve the long eſtabliſhed principles of civil ſociety, to which, as a general, he had ſhewn himſelf ſo dangerous and determined an enemy, and that he was willing to reſtore the Balance of Europe, which was eſſential to the general ſecurity, on condition only that he ſhould be allowed to retain the Gallic Sceptre. Some intimations of this nature were the leaſt that could be expected from him, in caſe his views were really favourable to the general tranquillity. But in his overtures to the Britiſh Government, nothing of the kind is to be found. Thoſe overtures, indeed, abound with the moſt pathetic lamentations on the ravages of war, and with animated deſcriptions of the benefits and glory of peace. But they do not go beyond ſome inflated *phraſes* of that deſcription. They do not afford the leaſt ground to hope that the

First Conſul intended any change of ſyſtem—that it was his inclination to reſpect the authority of other Governments, and the independence of other States—that under his reign ſociety would ceaſe to have any thing to apprehend from the diſorganizing principles of the French Republic—that the Decrees of Fraternity would at length be repealed—that, governed by him, France would confine her attention to her own affairs, without intermeddling with the domeſtic concerns of other countries—that ſhe would again recognize the Laws of Nations—and that ſhe would be ſatisfied, if peace could be made on ſuch terms, with limits which might be compatible with that Balance of Power, for the formation and preſervation of which Europe had ſuſtained ſo many conteſts. The total neglect of Buonaparte to give any ſuch aſſurances, muſt convince every impartial mind that his profeſſions of a deſire for peace were fraudulent—that he meant to adhere to the known ſyſtem of the Republic—that the ſame revolutionary zeal inſpired the Firſt Conſul, as had animated the conqueror of Italy and the invader of Egypt.

But it is not by negative proof alone, however ſtrong and concluſive, that the pacific profeſſions of the new Government of France are ſhewn to be perfidious. The letters, which were addreſſed to the Britiſh Government, contain internal evidence, of the moſt poſitive and unequivocal kind, that nothing was farther from the mind of Buonaparte than a deſire to be the means of reſtoring Peace to the world. The avowed object of the overture, as explained in the firſt of thoſe letters, was *a general pacification*. Now when a number of Powers are confederated in war, againſt either a ſingle Power, or another confederacy, the natural, the obvious, the accuſtomed mode of effecting a general pacification, is a *general Congreſs*. We ſhould look, therefore, to the diſpatches of Buonaparte, for a propoſition of that ſort as a matter of courſe, if he really deſired a general pacification. But

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in his letters on this occaſion there is not the moſt diſtant alluſion to the only meaſure calculated for the attainment of the end, which he profeſſed to have in view. This is doubtleſs, very ſuſpicious. But ſuſpicion is exchanged for certainty, when we read the ſubſequent letter of Talleyrand. For in that letter the Miniſter waves all idea of the *general* Pacification, which his Maſter had declared to be the object of his overture, and without even noticing either the Allies, with which his Britannic Majeſty was known to be in cloſe union, or the Spaniſh Monarch with whom he was at war, propoſes "to put an immediate end "to hoſtilities by agreeing to a ſuſpenſion of arms, "and naming Plenipotentiaries on each ſide, who "ſhould repair to Dunkirk, or any other town ad- "vantageouſly ſituated for the quickneſs of reſpec- "tive communications, and who ſhould apply them- "ſelves, without any delay, to effect the re-eſtabliſh- "ment of Peace and good underſtanding *between the* "*French Republic and England.*"

Such is the inconſiſtency between the Firſt Conſul and his miniſter. The former talks, though in the moſt indefinite terms, of a *general Pacification*—the latter propoſes a *ſeparate negociation*, than which, nothing could be more unfavourable to a *general* peace, and an immediate armiſtice, of which, conſidering the comparative ſtate of the naval force, and of the commerce of the two countries, the whole benefit would have remained with France, and which would have been productive of the greateſt diſadvantage to Great Britain*. Such evident marks of

* The very important circumſtance, that an immediate Naval Armiſtice, was one of the propoſitions contained in the overture of the Firſt Conſul, has not been noticed as it deſerves. With a recollection of that circumſtance, let the people of this country judge of the ſincerity of the pacific profeſſions of Buonaparte, and of the propriety of the conduct of the Britiſh Government in rejecting his advances. They will be the better able to form their opinion on thoſe ſubjects in conſequence of the attention they have recently paid to the *diſtinct* queſtion of a Naval Armiſtice.

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duplicity prove, to demonſtration, the propriety of the rejection of the firſt overture, and the neceſſity there was of rejecting the ſecond. When men convict themſelves of contradiction and falſehood, it would be madneſs to confide in their profeſſions, or to comply with their deſires. But the letter of Citizen Talleyrand, beſides containing, when viewed in conjunction with the previous diſpatch, undoubted marks of a treacherous purpoſe, unfolded the real deſigns of France, and ſuggeſted that her views, in offering to negociate, were really inimical to the peace and ſecurity of Europe. An attempt to engage the different Powers, with which ſhe was at war, in ſeparate negociations, (for a like offer was made to Auſtria), inſtead of leading to a general peace, could only be the reſult of a plan to break the confederacy, to draw off, if poſſible, ſome one of the allies from the league, in order to overpower the others, and ultimately to accompliſh thoſe ſchemes of univerſal ambition and ſubverſion, which had been ſo long purſued. The perſeverance with which the endeavour to draw the Court of Vienna into a negociation was perſiſted in, evinced the greateſt anxiety to detach that Power from the coalition. While the little care that was taken to give the pacific diſpatches, addreſſed to the Britiſh Government, an appearance either of ſincerity or conſiſtency, proves that they were intended rather to afford the Engliſh *Fructidorians** an opportunity of labouring in their vocation, by raiſing a factious clamour about Peace, than to produce an accommodation with this country.

It is probable, indeed, that Buonaparte thought it impoſſible for the Britiſh Miniſtry to venture upon a rejection of his overtures—that he did not ſuppoſe them poſſeſſed of ſufficient reſolution to encounter the

* For an authentic definition of this term, ſee Reflections, &c. p. 133.

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reproach which was ſure to be brought againſt them, not only by the factious, but by the unreflecting, of refuſing even to hear the terms which he might have to offer. Such a reproach, has, indeed, been made, by well-affected perſons; who do not conſider that it was not only poſſible, but highly probable that, like ſome of his predeceſſors, the Firſt Conſul would have availed himſelf of the opportunity which negociation was calculated to afford him, of drawing from them their propoſitions, without advancing, on his part, any of a ſpecific nature. It is alſo forgotten, by the perſons who advance this cenſure, that, in order to have an opportunity of learning the terms which the enemy was inclined to propoſe, the negociation muſt have been fully accepted, and that its acceptance would have been inſtantly attended with the conſequences which have been already deſcribed.

It ſhould not eſcape notice that the propoſal of Talleyrand to treat for a ſeparate peace, followed directly an intimation, on the part of Lord Grenville, that his Britannic Majeſty would only treat, whenever an opportunity ſhould offer, *in concert with his allies*. To propoſe, therefore, a ſeparate treaty, was to propoſe what it was known would not be acceded to, and afforded a ſtrong additional proof that no ſerious thoughts of peace were entertained. Indeed, the omiſſion of all mention of a General Congreſs, when a wiſh for General Pacification was expreſſed, and the offer of Separate Negociation, when it had been declared, by the other party, that no treaty would be entered into but in concert with allies, evinced, not only a deſire to obtain falſe credit for a pacific diſpoſition, but a ſtudious endeavour to avoid any diſtinct or practicable propoſition leading to negociation, leſt, by poſſibility, it ſhould be accepted.

Nor are the overtures of Buonaparte deſtitute of evidence of his adherence to the Jacobinical principles and practices of the French Republic. Of this, a more convincing, and, indeed, a more inſulting

proof

proof can ſcarcely be conceived than that oſtentatious and unneceſſary diſplay of Jacobinical forms, which appears at the head of his epiſtle to the Britiſh Monarch. Fearful, as it were, leſt a doubt ſhould exiſt reſpecting the character which he meant to aſſume—leſt ſome hope ſhould ariſe that, in the exerciſe of his new authority, he might conform to the principles of ſocial order—he prefixed to that epiſtle, in the moſt conſpicuous manner, the Jacobinical Inſignia of the "Sovereignty of the People—Liberty, Equality!" What more ſolemn pledge could he give of a fixed determination to adhere to the revolutionary ſyſtem of France? How could he more clearly diſplay his inveterate hoſtility to all eſtabliſhed Government, than by ſuch an avowal of principles, which had been inſtruments of deſtruction to half the Governments of Europe, and which were at open and irreconcileable enmity with all legitimate authority? It was not a *domeſtic* concern in which he was then engaged. He was addreſſing his firſt public act to a *Foreign* Power! He was making an OVERTURE FOR PEACE! Could any thing prove more ſtrongly that it was a *Jacobinical* Peace which he had in contemplation, than his taking ſuch an opportunity of diſplaying the *Jacobinical* banners of the Republic? Nay, he did not content himſelf with exhibiting, on thoſe banners, the ordinary emblems of Republican France: he choſe, in honour no doubt to his Acceſſion, to blazon her Eſcutcheon with a new Quartering, and to ornament her Shield with the Device of "THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE!"—the moſt Jacobinical of all Jacobinical ſymbols—which, though it had been the fundamental principle of her Revolutionary Code, had not, till then, been entered upon her Armorial Bearings.

Having thus announced himſelf as a Jacobinical Ruler, he maintains that character, throughout the correſpondence, with a conſiſtency, which ſhews that it was perfectly congenial with his diſpoſition and habits.

Who

Who but an adept in Jacobiniſm would have thought of ſo inſidious an attack upon the eſtabliſhed Forms of intercourſe between States, as that which is contained in his mode of addreſs? Any but a *Jacobinical* Uſurper would have rejoiced in being able to ſhelter himſelf behind thoſe Forms—to have been allowed to participate in them—to have been permitted to correſpond, through his Miniſters, and, by official communications, with Sovereign Princes. Not ſo the Firſt Conſul. He muſt diſplay his independence on Forms, and his contempt of rule and uſage, by addreſſing himſelf *perſonally* to the King of Great Britain. But that is not all. Not content with ſetting himſelf above all eſtabliſhed *Forms*, he dares to tell the King, whom he has the audacity thus to addreſs, and whoſe confidence he preſumes to aſk, that if his Majeſty, inſtead of following his example, ſhould continue to adhere to ſuch Forms, he would do ſo *only* for the purpoſes of deception. He has the temerity, in addreſſing himſelf to the Monarch who wears the moſt ancient Crown now remaining in Europe, to ſay of the Forms which the anceſtors of that Monarch have obſerved for centuries, that though "neceſſary, perhaps, to diſguiſe the dependence of weak States," they "prove only in "thoſe which are ſtrong *the mutual deſire of deceiving* "*each other.*" Who does not feel that the faggot of the common hangman would have been a much fitter reply to this unparalleled inſolence, than the official and dignified diſpatch of the Secretary of State? It is to ſuch inſolence, however, that Mr. Whitbread is reported to have given the epithet of *reſpectful*.—Oh Shame, where is thy bluſh!

But the Firſt Conſul ſeems to have been aware, that he could not adequately ſuſtain his appropriate character without the aid of falſehood. He therefore introduces himſelf to the notice of his Majeſty by one of the moſt bare-faced lies, that ever came from the mouth of profligacy: "Called," ſays he, "by the wiſhes of "the

" the French Nation, to occupy the Firſt Magiſtracy " of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into " office, to make a direct communication of it to " your Majeſty." This lie was perfectly Jacobinical, as it borrowed the name of the people, in whoſe name it is the peculiar privilege of Jacobiniſm to do or ſay any thing. But it was not the leſs a groſs and palpable falſehood, exhibiting the moſt perfect and notorious contraſt to the real fact that could poſſibly be conceived. Who does not know that the French people, inſtead of calling the Firſt Conſul to his new office, had no more idea of honouring him with ſuch an elevation, than the Chineſe or the Mahrattas?—that he had forced himſelf upon them by the moſt flagrant military uſurpation, which had taken place ſince the time of Cromwell?—that he had, by the bayonet, driven out their repreſentatives, and overturned the conſtitution, which they and *he* had often ſworn to obſerve? Was ſuch a falſehood, placed at the very beginning of his overtures, the beſt pledge that Buonaparte could give of the *ſincerity* of his pacific profeſſions?—Was it the beſt expedient he could deviſe to open a friendly and confidential communication with the Britiſh Court, in order to bring the war to a ſpeedy and happy termination? or rather, was it not an inſulting mockery of an illuſtrious Monarch, and, through him, of all legitimate authority?

After ſuch a diſplay of Jacobinical principles, inſolence and falſehood, it ſeems impoſſible that the pacific overtures of the Firſt Conſul ſhould be miſunderſtood. Leſt, however, conjecture, or the dazzling luſtre of the word Peace, ſhould miſlead any one in his judgment reſpecting the real nature and drift of thoſe overtures, Buonaparte has himſelf ſubjected them to an infallible teſt—the teſt of actual experience. He refers to the treaty of *Campo Formio*, as a ſpecimen of his talents and ſervices as a negociator—as a pledge of his ſincere and ardent deſire for a general pacification.—The reference is certainly apt; and it is calculated to convey

convey a very accurate idea of the benefits which may be expected to reſult from his pacificatory endeavours. On the occaſion referred to, a treaty of peace was concluded with the King of Hungary and Bohemia; and conferences were holden at Raſtadt, for the purpoſe of terminating all differences between the German Empire and the French Republic. But his Majeſty was not able to obtain even a confirmation of the preliminary terms, which Buonaparte had *ſolemnly* engaged ſhould form the baſis of the treaty; and the conferences at Raſtadt afforded a complete ſpecimen of Jacobin negociation. Not only did France, pending theſe amicable communications, violate her neutrality with the King of Pruſſia, who was a party in the diſcuſſion—not only did ſhe infringe the line of demarcation, which had been *agreed* upon, *ad interim*—not only did ſhe, on her part, continue hoſtilities by the capture of Mayence and Ehrenbreitſtein—but the very negociation itſelf was made by her an inſtrument to undermine, ſtep by ſtep, the civil and Religious conſtitution of the German Empire, and to reduce it to ſuch a ſtate of diſunion, weakneſs and diſ-arrangement, that Peace would have ſerved only to render it an eaſy prey to the machinations of the Republic. At length, the effect of theſe inſidious conferences became ſo alarming, and their deſign ſo obvious, that no other chance remained for the preſervation of Germany, than to break them off, and to renew the war with increaſed vigour; and thus, as Boulay de la Meurthe has emphatically obſerved, "The Treaties and Diplomatic "conferences" of France, "appear to have been the "ſource of a new war, ſtill more deſperate and bloody "than the former."

In the mean time, however, the great work of *general Pacification* was purſued, in the true French manner, by the overthrow of the Papal Government, and by the ſubverſion of the neutral Republics of Venice and Genoa—by the conqueſt of Switzerland, another neutral ſtate—by proſecuting the war with unprecedented

fury

fury againſt Great Britain—by a rejection of her overtures for Peace at Liſle, and a diſmiſſion of her Ambaſſador, becauſe he was not authorized to reſtore, as a *Preliminary* to negociation, and without any compenſation, "all the poſſeſſions which, ſince the beginning of the war, had paſſed into the hands of the Engliſh," allowing France, at the ſame time, to retain the whole of her immenſe conqueſts—by the formation of the army of England, which was to carry "the Genius of Liberty" into "Great Britain," to wreak vengeance "on the Cabinet of St. James*, to "crown the glorious life of Buonaparte," its commander, "by a conqueſt which the Great Nation owed "to its inſulted dignity †," and to "puniſh Albion "for its long catalogue of crimes againſt humanity ‡"—by the moſt indefatigable and too-ſucceſsful endeavours to ſtir up a rebellion in Ireland—by the *preliminary* attempt at an invaſion of England, under the direction of Colonel Tate §;—and finally, by the

* See the Proclamation of the Directory of the 26th October, 1797, the day on which it was decreed that "there ſhould be aſſembled "without delay, on the coaſts of the ocean, an army which ſhould be "called the Army of England."

† Speech of the Preſident of the Directory, *addreſſed to Buonaparte*, General of the Army of England, *on his proſecuting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with the Emperor of Germany.*

‡ Speech of Jean de Brie in the Council of Five Hundred, when the merchants of Paris offered a Loan to be employed in the expedition againſt England.

§ This expedition, according to the well-authenticated inſtructions given to its leader, had for its objects, 1ſt, to raiſe an inſurrection, "by exciting the poor," who, it is ſaid in thoſe inſtructions, are "in "all countries the claſs moſt prone to inſurrection," and to plunder "the public ſtores and magazines," and "the property of the rich, "whoſe affluence is the natural ſubject of envy to the poor."—2dly, "to deſtroy the commerce of the country, at its very ſources, by breaking down the bridges, cutting dykes, ruining cauſeways, plundering convoys of ſubſiſtence, public ſtages and waggons, and even "private carriages, cutting off ſupplies from the principal towns, "burning all veſſels and boats on the rivers and canals, deſtroying magazines, ſetting fire to arſenals, docks, and coal-yards, rope "walks, great manufactories;" &c. by which means (it was obſerved) "a crowd of artiſans would be thrown out of employment." 3dly, to "prepare and facilitate the way for deſcent, by diſtracting the "attention of the Engliſh Government"

expedition

expedition to Egypt, which, in its comprehenſive deſign, embraced the vaſt objects of the ſubverſion of the neutral and unoffending Empire of the Ottomans, and the deſtruction of the Britiſh Eſtabliſhments in the Eaſt. Such is the precedent referred to by Buonaparte, in illuſtration of his "ſincere de-"ſire to contribute efficaciouſly, *for the ſecond time*, "to a general Pacification*." A precedent which he contributed more than any one elſe to eſtabliſh, but which, if he had had no part in it, yet, being ſelected and quoted by him, muſt be conſidered as affording juſt criterion of the nature of his views in propoſing a negociation.

To the letter of the Firſt Conſul, Lord Grenville *officially* replied, in a manner which evinced a ſincere deſire, on the part of the Britiſh Government, for the return of ſafe and ſubſtantial Peace. His Lordſhip judiciouſly refers to the cauſes which, not only produced the War, but have hitherto prevented its termination, and which, while they continue to exiſt, muſt operate in the ſame manner; and he infers, that until their removal, it would be vain to expect any real advantage from Negociation. He inſiſts on the frequent proofs which his Majeſty has given of a ſincere deſire for the re-eſtabliſhment of ſecure and permanent tranquillity, as well as on the juſtice and inexpreſſible importance of the objects for which he has been obliged to contend againſt an unprovoked attack. The Britiſh Miniſter further points out the unprecedented and almoſt inconceivable miſchiefs and dangers, which have reſulted from the ſyſtem originally adopted and invariably purſued by the French Republic, and he clearly ſhews that the relinquiſhment of that ſyſtem muſt neceſſarily precede the return of general repoſe and ſecurity. He mentions the Reſtoration of the Hereditary Line of Princes in France as an event, which would at once remove all obſtacles in the way of negociation, as it would give to all

* Letter from the Firſt Conſul to His Majeſty.

the other Nations of Europe that ſecurity, in tranquillity and peace, which they are now compelled to ſeek by other means. But though his Lordſhip alludes to ſuch an event as beſt calculated to reſtore general quiet and ſafety, he diſclaims, on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, all pretenſions or wiſhes to interfere in the domeſtic affairs of France, and he declares that his Majeſty will always be ready to concert, with his Allies, the means of general Pacification, whenever that ſecurity, for which alone he is contending, can in *any* manner be attained.

A reply to this Letter was ſoon tranſmitted from France, and the Firſt Conſul deigned to deſcend from that eminence, on which he had attempted to place himſelf above all the lawful Sovereigns of Europe, and to adopt the accuſtomed forms of communication which thoſe Sovereigns invariably obſerve in their public intercourſe with each other. This condeſcenſion was conſidered by ſome perſons as an auſpicious ſymptom of a pacific diſpoſition; but if he really entertained ſuch a diſpoſition, it is natural to look for ſolid and concluſive proofs of its exiſtence, in the official letter of his Miniſter, Talleyrand.

If a ſincere deſire for Peace had been the inducement with Buonaparte thus to continue the correſpondence, it is impoſſible that he ſhould not have endeavoured to ſhew, that the obſtacles, which Lord Grenville had repreſented as precluding all hope of real advantage from Negociation, did not really exiſt —that the ſyſtem of deſtruction by which the French Republic had excited ſo much alarm, was no longer purſued—that Europe had nothing to fear from the principles of the new Government of France—and that the authority of the Firſt Conſul was as compatible with the ſecurity of Great Britain and her Allies as that of the Line of Princes, the Reſtoration of which Lord Grenville had ſtated to be the moſt certain and ſpeedy means of re-eſtabliſhing general tranquillity.

But

But the reply of the Ex-Biſhop is of a very different nature. It is, in fact, a complete and a laboured demonſtration that all the impediments to Peace, which had been enumerated by Lord Grenville, continued in full force. In that reply, the new Government of France takes eſpecial care to identify itſelf with all the factions which, during the whole Revolution, have tyrannized over France, and moleſted the reſt of Europe. By attempting to juſtify, it avows its approbation of the conduct of thoſe factions, and it adopts and repeats the various pretexts by which they had endeavoured to deceive other States—it even preſumes to boaſt of the early Proclamation made by them, on the part of the Republic, of *a love of peace*—of *a diſinclination for conqueſt*—of *a reſpect for the independence of all Governments*—and this at a time when every quarter of the Globe has been convinced, by direful experience, that perfidy alone dictated thoſe declarations—nay, it dares to aſſert that France was *occupied entirely with her own affairs*, and that ſhe was *diſpoſed to avoid taking part in thoſe of Europe*, in ſpite of the accumulated evidence by which it is demonſtrated that it was the fundamental principle of her Revolution to propagate, over the whole Earth, her principles of licentiouſneſs and anarchy, to excite the people of every country to revolt; and to ſubvert all eſtabliſhed Authority, and all the Inſtitutions of Society.

The repetition of ſuch audacious falſehoods, after the events which have occurred, is marked, if poſſible, with ſtill blacker characters of atrocity, than their firſt promulgation. Such a repetition is an inſult to the underſtanding and feelings of mankind, and it denotes *that* confirmed and matured depravity, which can only be produced by the habitual perpetration of the groſſeſt crimes. If Buonaparte had appeared, on this occaſion, for the firſt time, on the Theatre of the French Republic—if he had been, till then, altogether unknown on the Stage of the French Revolution, it would be much more

than ſufficient to preclude all doubt reſpecting his real character and deſigns, to find him inſiſting, in the year 1800, that the diſpoſition of Republican France had been pacific, unambitious, orderly, reſpectful towards other States, and that her attention had been directed ſolely to her own affairs. The open and voluntary defenders of known criminals, muſt be conſidered, either as partakers of their guilt, or as wanting nothing but occaſion, at leaſt, to equal them in atrocity. In this point of view the reply of the Renegado Biſhop may be conſidered as a valuable hiſtorical document; proving that no change has taken place in conſequence of the laſt Revolution in the foreign politics of the French Republic, and containing an inſtructive warning to mankind, to be on their guard againſt thoſe wiles, which have already been ſo injurious to the general repoſe and ſecurity.

But the French Conſul diſplays, on this occaſion, an extraordinary degree of anxiety to vindicate France from the charge, which had been brought againſt her by Lord Grenville, of being the author of the war. He will not ſuffer the Republic, to whoſe rights he has ſucceeded, and in whoſe criminality he ſeems determined to participate, to be accuſed of the crime of original aggreſſion, without undertaking her defence. He might, indeed, without implicating himſelf, have paſſed over in ſilence the alluſion made by Lord Grenville to the origin of the War; he might even have diſavowed the conduct of France at a time, when he had no influence on her proceedings. But he was aware that the human mind, notwithſtanding the corrupting influence of the French Revolution, ſtill retained a *moral ſenſe*, which rendered the *original* juſtice of a war, a conſideration of inexpreſſible importance during the whole of its continuance, and of great influence upon its ultimate ſucceſs. He felt, moreover, that the numerous acts of unexampled atrocity, which, on the part of France, had accompanied the progreſs of the War, would, in a great degree, be ſcreened from the indignation of mankind, if

it

it could be made to appear that they were the conſequences of the aggreſſion of her enemies; and that, whatever cauſe thoſe enemies might have to complain of her ſubſequent violence, cruelty and perfidy, their complaints would make but little impreſſion, if the world could be induced to believe that they drew all their misfortunes upon themſelves, by their own ambition or injuſtice. He therefore endeavours, by the pen of his Miniſter, to retort the charge of aggreſſion, and to make it appear that the "evils which have "afflicted Europe," are to be imputed "to the "projects of ſubjection, diſſolution and diſmember-"ment, which were prepared againſt France."

This charge has been repeatedly repelled, and proved to have no other foundation than calumny. If ever there was a queſtion ſo fully diſcuſſed, as to preclude all poſſibility of doubt, it is the queſtion of aggreſſion. That queſtion has indeed been principally conſidered by Engliſh Writers, who naturally directed their chief attention to the intereſt which their own country had in it; and though they could not refrain from noticing the aggreſſive conduct of France towards other States, yet they were chiefly ſolicitous to expoſe her injurious deſigns againſt Great Britain. But it is equally demonſtrable that France was the aggreſſor in the Continental War, which broke out almoſt a year before ſhe commenced hoſtilities againſt this country: and conſidering that it is a common cauſe in which ſo many nations have been engaged—nay, that *all* nations, whether they think ſo or not, have a common intereſt in this War—it is of more importance to trace it from its origin, in order thence to follow it through its courſe, and thus to preſerve its unity unbroken, than to examine ſeparate and diſtinct parts of its progreſs. This, therefore, ſhall be done; and there is an additional reaſon for thus purſuing the enquiry, as, beſides the natural and indiſſoluble connection which exiſts between all the parts of this ſtrange and unprecedented conteſt, the deſperate malice of Oppoſition has even gone the length of attributing the War on

the Continent to this Country, although the French rulers, leſs deſperately malicious, have declared that Great Britain obſerved a ſtrict neutrality until a period long ſubſequent to the breaking out of that War. As the propoſed diſcuſſion will neceſſarily be drawn into ſome length—and as it relates to a ſubject on which the generality of readers have completely made uptheir minds, though, at the ſame time of ſuch importance, that nothing ſhould be left undone to remove the doubts of thoſe, who are not ſo fully ſatisfied reſpecting the juſtice of the cauſe of the Continental Powers as of that of Great Britain —for theſe reaſons it ſhall be reſerved for diſtinct notice, in the latter part of this publication, after a conſideration of thoſe topics which preſs more cloſely at the preſent moment.

The ſubject of aggreſſion, as it particularly regards this country, has been exhauſted by repeated diſcuſſions; and in a recent publication, entitled "The Hiſtory of the Politics of Great Britain and France, by Herbert Marſh, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge," that ſubject has been ſo fully, ſo minutely, and ſo methodically conſidered, and with ſo perfect an arrangement of facts, dates and documents, as not only to afford the moſt ample ſatisfaction to the impartial enquirer, but to furniſh a maſterly ſpecimen of important hiſtory. The author of this truly valuable work, has judiciouſly availed himſelf of all the ſources of information and elucidation, which have been augmenting down to the late period at which he wrote; and he has, thereby, as well as by confining his attention to the ſingle queſtion of aggreſſion as it concerns this country, been enabled to preſent to the public a more perfect diſquiſition on that queſtion than could have been produced at an earlier period. This hiſtory is highly deſerving the peruſal even of the beſt informed perſons; but it more particularly merits the attention of thoſe who have the misfortune (for a misfortune at leaſt it muſt be conſidered), to think their country the aggreſſor in the moſt bloody war, in which it

it has ever been engaged. The gentlemen of Oppoſition declare, in ſpite of all the endeavours which have hitherto been made to open their eyes, that they ſtill labour under this misfortune. If that be really the caſe, they may, by peruſing the work in queſtion, be freed from all the gloom and dejection which they have ſo long ſuffered on that account, and recover their natural ſerenity of mind. Such an expectation, at leaſt, is warranted by the effect which the work has produced in Germany, where it was firſt publiſhed—and in the language of which country it was written, as the author ſays, under the impulſe of a deſire to reſcue his native country "from the calumnies of ſome German Journaliſts, who contend, like ſome Engliſh writers, that the French rulers were ſolicitous for Peace, but that the Miniſters of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the New Republic, had reſolved at all events to commence hoſtilities." Theſe aſſertions, he ſays, were confidently repeated during ſeveral years, till, at length, they were received in almoſt every part of Germany as indiſputable truths. But Mr. Marſh's publication had not long appeared, "when" (he ſays) "the firſt literary Reviews in Germany pronounced that the "Britiſh Government was completely reſcued from the "charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin "as well as the continuance of the war muſt be wholly "and ſolely aſcribed to the mad ambition of the French "rulers."

It cannot be ſuppoſed that Britons are leſs open to conviction, in matters which involve the character of their native country, than foreigners; and of courſe the gentlemen of Oppoſition may be expected to enjoy, by the aid of this publication, the inexpreſſible ſatisfaction of thinking the cauſe in which Great Britain is engaged, juſt, and the exertions which ſhe has, for years, been making, neceſſary for her ſecurity, againſt the attacks of an ambitious and unprincipled foe. But it behoves other perſons, beſides thoſe who take an active or an oſtenſible part in political queſtions, to weigh very deliberately and fully the evidence relating

to the origin of the war, before they pronounce their country guilty of the enormous crime of aggreſſion. Although the Britiſh people at large are firmly convinced of the juſtice of their cauſe, (an indiſputable proof, after ſo long and burdenſome a conteſt, that it is moſt clearly and manifeſtly juſt) there are nevertheleſs conſiderable numbers, and among them individuals of great worth and reſpectability, who have taken up a different opinion, which they reſolutely maintain, without thinking it incumbent upon them to inveſtigate the documents that are adduced againſt it. If ſuch perſons were to examine their own hearts, they would find that they formed their ſentiments upon this important ſubject, with an impreſſion on their minds that it affected only the character of Adminiſtration—and having, whether juſtly or not, preconceived an unfavourable idea of his Majeſty's Miniſters, that they very willingly, and therefore haſtily, adopted an opinion, which gratified the feelings they were diſpoſed to indulge. They would alſo find that they have ſince liſtened with avidity to every aſſertion, however unſupported by proof, which tended to confirm the ſentiments they had thus ſuffered to take poſſeſſion of their minds—that on this account they have tolerated and even approved of publications, which teemed with ſedition, treaſon and blaſphemy*, and which, otherwiſe, they would never have ſuffered to appear in their families—that they have diſdainfully ſpurned every publication which had an oppoſite tendency, believing, or chooſing to believe, that it was under the bias of a corrupt influence†—until at length

* Such is the power of prejudice, that many perſons, who abhor treaſon and deteſt blaſphemy, have regularly ſubmitted to peruſe papers which, for years, have abounded in both, and which, though really *anti-conſtitutional*, *anti-ſocial*, and *anti-religious*, they deſcribe by the ſoft name of *anti-miniſterial* papers, until both their loyalty and their religion have been laid ſo faſt aſleep, that they are, at length, able to peruſe the moſt execrable paragraphs, with at leaſt a ſtoical indifference.

† It is one of the main artifices employed by faction to repreſent all perſons, who, by defending the cauſe in which Government is engaged, ſupport, as far as they are able, Government itſelf, as acting ſolely under the impulſe of Miniſterial influence. This kind of ſweeping

length they are not more firmly convinced of their own exiſtence, than of the injuſtice of the preſent War, on part of Great Britain.

ſweeping anſwer the Author of theſe pages has frequently received, in lieu of all examination of the truth of the facts, or the juſtneſs of the reaſonings, which he had adduced. Such replies he ſhould, however, think beneath his notice, if the reſpectable channel of parliamentary debate had not been employed to convey a ſuggeſtion of this nature, in reſpect of his laſt publication*, which was ſtated to be the production of a perſon *in the pay of Government*. It cannot ſurely be neceſſary to point out the unfairneſs of the concluſion, that to occupy a ſtation of public truſt and confidence, (and moſt perſons who occupy ſuch ſtations may be literally ſaid to be in the pay of Government), implies dependence of mind or ſervility of ſentiment—or that ſuch a ſituation authoriſes the inference which the Gentleman in queſtion deduced on the occaſion alluded to, that a perfect coincidence of opinion, on a particular topic, might be preſumed between Miniſters and the Writer. But it is due to the public to take this opportunity of ſhewing the fallacy of ſuch concluſions, by obſerving, that the publication which was thus brought forward, as a criterion of the views of Miniſters, was written *without the ſmalleſt communication*, on the ſubject, with any Member or Agent of Adminiſtration; and a ſimilar obſervation might, if circumſtances required it, be applied on the preſent occaſion.

If the perſons who oppoſe Government (no particular alluſion is here intended) do really believe that all who take a different ſide from them on the great political queſtions of the preſent day, are under the influence of ſiniſter motives, they ſurely judge of others from themſelves. It is true, Charity itſelf cannot ſuppoſe it poſſible for men to be impelled by virtuous, loyal, or patriotic feelings, to aſſiſt the cauſe of *Atheiſm* and *Anarchy*—but does it therefore follow, that no one can from pure, diſintereſted and honourable motives, ſupport the cauſe of *Religion, regular Government*, and *ſocial Order?* Becauſe it happens that the ſtations of all who exerciſe lawful authority are involved in the fate of that cauſe, muſt its active adherents neceſſarily be the tools of men in power? Is it not poſſible for the ſoul to be ſo engroſſed by the immenſe intereſts which depend on the iſſue of the preſent conteſt—is it not poſſible for the heart to be ſo penetrated with a ſenſe of the dangers to which all civilized ſociety is now expoſed, and ſo inflamed with a deſire of contributing towards its eſcape from the awful ruin with which it is menaced—as to make a man look down, with comparative indifference, on the favour of Miniſters, and on the ſmiles of Princes? When the raging tempeſt expoſes the labouring bark to the moſt imminent peril—when the boiſterous deep yawns every moment to ſwallow it up in an unfathomable abyſs—when the ſtill more dangerous rock, ſurrounded by fragments of many a wreck, preſents an awful warning of approaching deſtruction—how inſignificant and contemptible muſt appear all the purſuits, which ordinarily engage the ſolicitude of mankind! What favour can thoſe, who have the direction of the veſſel, beſtow on the meaneſt individual on board, comparable with that of bringing him ſafe into port?

* See Parliamentary Debates in the laſt Seſſion by Debrett and Woodfall.

Admitting it to be true, that the character of Miniſters is the only intereſt which is involved in the charge of aggreſſion, ſurely it is incumbent upon every one, before he accuſes them of having unjuſtly plunged their country in the horrors of war, to ſee that there are good grounds for the accuſation. No one will diſpute that it involves a very high degree of criminality to admit lightly, and to avow without due inveſtigation, a belief, that a private individual is guilty of an atrocious crime; particularly when means of aſcertaining the truth or falſhood of the charge are within reach. Are Miniſters, then, alone deſtitute of the right, common to all their fellow-creatures, to have their conduct examined before it is condemned? May their reputation be wantonly ſported with, *becauſe* they are in office, *becauſe* they fill high departments in the State? Is it juſtifiable to ſlander them, *becauſe* they are ſervants of the Crown? Is it meritorious to criminate them, *becauſe* they enjoy the confidence of their Sovereign? That their conduct ſhould be cloſely watched, and ſtrictly ſcrutinized, is undoubtedly a great conſtitutional principle: though reaſon ſeems to require, that, while this principle is, as it is ſure always to be, rigidly enforced againſt them, due allowance ſhould be made in the public mind for the embarraſſments which its exerciſe tends to create; and it ſhould be remembered, that their conſtant accuſers are their rivals, whoſe intereſt it is to render them unpopular, and, if poſſible, odious. No ſuch conſiderations, however, are now urged in their behalf. Nothing is now claimed for them but a full and fair enquiry. They aſk no other favour than that their fellow-ſubjects ſhould judge for *themſelves*, inſtead of taking up their opinion from the ſtatements of party, and of courſe intereſted writers, reſpecting the real cauſes of the preſent conteſt, and that they may not be charged with ſo atrocious a crime as that of wantonly involving their country in the horrors of war, without a due inveſtigation of *facts*. Who that has the ſmalleſt regard for juſtice—who that ever liſtens, in the moſt ſacred place, to the ſolemn

ſolemn injunction, "thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſs "againſt thy neighbour," will venture, without a complete and impartial examination, to charge them with ſo foul an offence againſt God and Man?

But the merits of the queſtion of aggreſſion, far from being confined to Miniſters, who have no claim but to our impartiality, affects the reputation of one who is inexpreſſibly dear to us all. They involve the Religious and moral, as well as the political character of our gracious Sovereign. Although, for the ſake of freedom of debate, the acts of a King of England are conſidered in Parliament as the acts of his Miniſters, and legal reſponſibility, for the wiſeſt reaſons, attaches only upon them, yet in the eye of reaſon, in the view of hiſtory, at the tribunal of conſcience in this world, and at a ſtill more dread tribunal in the next, he muſt, as well as every other *real* Monarch, be conſidered as reſponſible for the great meaſures of his Government. By the fundamental principles of the Conſtitution, he has the abſolute and uncontrollable choice of his ſervants, and the indiſputable right of diſmiſſing them at pleaſure. Beſides, therefore, the preſumed ſanction which is implied in his ſelecting them as the objects of his confidence, their continuance in office denotes a *ſubſequent* approbation of their conduct, and amounts, indeed, to an expreſs adoption of thoſe meaſures, which, in the firſt inſtance, he permitted to paſs under his name. Let then thoſe perſons, who, without examination, have ſuffered themſelves to take up the opinion that the preſent war is unjuſt, conſider how deeply that opinion affects the character of a Prince, whoſe virtues command the veneration of his People. Let them reflect that, whenever they avow ſuch an opinion, they charge their beloved Sovereign with every drop of blood which has been ſhed in the conteſt! that, for every life which has been loſt in it, they declare him guilty of a moſt atrocious murder! Be it remembered, however, that this ſtatement, ſerious as it is, is not meant to bias the judgment of a ſingle individual in favour of the war—that its object is not

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to *create* but to *remove* prejudice, by promoting the inveſtigation of a ſubject which many perſons have neglected to examine, becauſe they were not aware of the extent of its importance.

But ſtill deeper intereſts are involved in the opinion of individuals, upon this important ſubject, than even the perſonal character of a beloved Monarch. The public is compoſed of individuals; and on the opinion of the Britiſh public, reſpecting the juſtice of the war, depends, according to all human calculation, *the iſſue of this great conteſt.* Unleſs the nation be convinced that its cauſe is equitable, how can it be expected to exert that vigour and energy, which are indiſpenſably neceſſary in ſo arduous a conflict? How can it be expected to face danger with intrepidity, to ſupport diſaſter, if diſaſter ſhould be its lot, with fortitude, and reſolutely to perſevere in the ſtruggle until its eſſential intereſts may be ſecured upon a ſolid and permanent baſis? The nation, indeed, with which we are at war, beſides having attained, by a long courſe of unexampled wickedneſs, that ſtate of hardened profligacy, which is proof againſt the feelings of compunction, and the checks of remorſe, is the blind and ſervile inſtrument of the moſt abandoned criminals—whoſe hearts are rendered ſo callous by guilt, as to be impenetrable to the ſtings of conſcience. Such a people will be only inflamed with a more deſperate fury by their ſenſe of the extreme badneſs of their cauſe. But Britons, thank Heaven! have not yet loſt their moral feelings. The energy of their exertions depends on the approbation of their own minds. With a conſciouſneſs of rectitude they are invincible. But their ſtrength and their ſpirit would ſoon fail them in a conteſt, in which their hearts did not inform them that their motives were juſt, and their views upright. They are alſo a free people, and the vigour of their Government depends upon the ſupport of its ſubjects. Their opinion, therefore, of the juſtice of the preſent war, involves the immenſe intereſts which are attached to the fate of their arms—intereſts of no leſs magnitude than the preſervation of

lawful Government—the continuance of ſocial Order—as well as their own exiſtence as a Nation. Happily, a vaſt majority of them are firmly convinced that the ſword was never drawn in a more righteous cauſe than that, in which they are now engaged; and that, from the moment they were compelled to enter upon hoſtilities, they have been fighting in defence of their Religion, their laws, their independence, and, indeed, of every thing that is valuable in ſociety. Theſe are truths for which they know that they can appeal not only to the great Searcher of hearts, but to evidence, as clear and as ſtrong as the bright radiance of the vertical Sun.

If theſe truths were duly acknowledged and felt by *all* whom they concern, Great Britain might ſafely defy the utmoſt malice of her enemies. But, ſtrange as it may appear, her boſom is torn with contentions, which conſtitute her principal danger, and which derive their chief force from a difference of opinion reſpecting the point of aggreſſion. This point is the hinge upon which, at preſent, all her domeſtic diſputes turn. As the war involves all the intereſts of the State, ſo the queſtion of its merits ſwallows up all ſubordinate queſtions. Of this any one may be convinced, by conſidering how much, at this time, the effect of Oppoſition eloquence depends upon the aſſumption, on which it is invariably founded, that Miniſters wantonly and unneceſſarily plunged the country into the war. How vapid would be the ſevereſt attack upon Adminiſtration, if it were accompanied with an acknowledgment that the war was unavoidable! How harmleſs would the moſt furious Jacobinical Print become, if it were to place at the head of its inflammatory columns this ſingle propoſition —"the war is juſt*." The univerſal admiſſion of this truth would deprive faction of its ſting, and would neutralize the venom of ſedition it-

* It would tend much to leſſen the miſchief produced by theſe prints, if every perſon were to ſuppoſe the above indiſputable truths to be prefixed to their political paragraphs.

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ſelf*. The unnatural Sons of Britain, who endeavour to accompliſh her deſtruction, can only hope to effect their patricidal purpoſe by accuſing her of the worſt of crimes—an unjuſt and unneceſſary war—and by ſtifling her exertions under a heavy load of conſcious guilt: and though they cannot ſhake the opinion of the public at large reſpecting the goodneſs of its cauſe, they induce numbers by dint of repetition to give credit to the charge of unjuſt aggreſſion; they embarraſs by their cabals the meaſures of Government; and they relax the vigour of the country, by inſpiring it with a well-founded alarm, leſt, for want of unanimity, it may not continue equal to ſo arduous a conflict.

As an opinion that the war is unjuſt, even though it prevail only in a ſmall portion of the Community, is fraught with incalculable miſchief to the country and the world—and as the ſentiments of every individual on that ſubject are of ſuch importance—how deeply criminal is every one, who ſuffers that opinion to take poſſeſſion of his mind, and to iſſue from his mouth, without the moſt deliberate and candid inveſtigation! It is no exculpation in ſuch a caſe to be able to plead ſincerity of conviction, or confidence in the ſtatements and aſſurances of others. Every one is perſonally anſwerable for his own conduct, and is bound to examine for himſelf. A Deiſt will be dreadfully diſappointed, if he expect to be abſolved, becauſe he has been miſled by a Voltaire or an Helvetius.

* No one, who pays the leaſt attention to public affairs, can deny that the injuſtice of the war forms the corner ſtone—nay, even the groundwork of all the declamation which is employed to embarraſs the operations of Government. Whether a motion is made in Parliament to recommend a negociation to aſcertain the objects of the war, or to propoſe an enquiry into the State of the Nation—whether an inflammatory ſpeech iſſues from the Whig Club, or a petition for peace is obtained from a Common Hall—the whole queſtion reſolves itſelf into the juſtice of the war, and all the topics which are inſiſted on derive their whole efficacy from the egregiouſly abſurd ſuppoſition, which is invariably taken for granted, that the Miniſter, by his fondneſs for a war, which could not but materially interfere with thoſe plans of finance, on which his reputation was ſtaked, has brought the country to the brink of deſtruction.

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As little will the names of a Fox or an Erſkine be able to afford refuge to thoſe, whom they have perſuaded to believe, in contradiction to the truth, that the Britiſh Government provoked the war. If, indeed, thoſe Gentlemen, themſelves the dupes of party zeal, have led others into an error on this queſtion, they will, in that reſpect, have an account to render, which no one who believes in a future retribution would for thouſands of worlds take off their hands. But all perſons, who have ſuffered themſelves to be thus miſled, are, nevertheleſs, reſponſible on their own account, for an error, which it was in their power to avoid. Such perſons, it is to be feared, have already much to anſwer for; but they are in great danger of being reſponſible for conſequences, the very idea of which ſhould make them ſhudder. It imports them much to weigh this matter very ſeriouſly and very ſpeedily; that if, upon mature conſideration, they find themſelves to have been wrong, they may, by bearing teſtimony to the truth, make all poſſible atonement for the paſt, as well as preſerve themſelves from future guilt. It will doubtleſsly be very grating to forego opinions which they have ſtrenuouſly maintained, and on which, perhaps, their political character is committed. But this penance, however ſevere, is a duty to themſelves, to their country, to the whole human race. For the purpoſe of aſcertaining whether their opinion is true or falſe, no mode can be depended on but a candid examination of undoubted facts, evidenced by authentic documents; and a better help in ſuch an undertaking it is not poſſible to obtain than Mr. Marſh's work; which contains a regular and methodical ſtatement of every fact which has occurred, with a reference to original documents, moſt of which are taken from the regiſters of the enemy. No one has attempted to charge this author with a ſingle miſrepreſentation, with an important omiſſion, or with an unfair comment. Indeed, ſo ſatisfactory and convincing are his ſtatements, that it would exceed even Mr. Fox's daring to ſtand up

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in Parliament, with this hiſtory in his hand, and declare the preſent war to be unjuſt*.

It has been already ſhewn, that the pacific overtures which were made at the commencement of the preſent year by the new Revolutionary Rulers of France to the Britiſh Government, contained, upon the face of them, concluſive evidence that they did not originate in a deſire of Peace. But although the inſtant rejection of theſe overtures was for that, as well as for other reaſons, preſcribed by wiſdom demanded by prudence, and approved by the nation†, ſtill the party in oppoſition to Government thought it afforded them a fair opportunity of emerging from that retreat, technically denominated a ſeceſſion, to which they had conſigned

* In paying this tribute to Mr. Marſh's work, it is but juſtice to obſerve that in Rivington's Annual Regiſter for the year 1792, the aggreſſion of France has been moſt ably demonſtrated; Mr. Marſh's Hiſtory, however, from being confined to the inveſtigation of a ſingle queſtion, derives an advantage, with regard to that queſtion, which no work, embracing a great variety of topics, can poſſibly poſſeſs.

† Of this a ſtronger proof could not exiſt than the failure of the endeavours of Oppoſition to procure petitions for immediate negociation. A fairer opportunity for procuring ſuch petitions could never be expected to recur, than when an offer made by the enemy to treat had been inſtantly rejected, and the diſpoſition of the Gentlemen who oppoſe Government, to improve ſuch an opportunity to the utmoſt, cannot be doubted. Nor was the occaſion neglected. The City of London, under the auſpices of its preſent Lord Mayor, was deſtined to take the lead, and to give the pacific impulſe to the reſt of the Country. But alas! a Petition in favour of immediate Peace, which had been paſſed by a dubious majority at a Common Hall, where the clamours of faction drowned the voice of reaſon, and which the Livery were appriſed by public advertiſement ſhould lie open at the office of the Town Clerk, to receive their ſignatures, was preſented (not to the King, whoſe Prerogative alone it is to make War and Peace but) to the Houſe of Commons, with the ſubſcription of only 56 names; while a Counter Petition, expreſſive of an entire confidence in the Government, was at the ſame time preſented, having the ſignatures of 1619 perſons of the greateſt wealth and reſpectability of the Livery of London; among whom many of the moſt eminent merchants of that City, (who, unfortunately for the public intereſts, are not of the Livery) could not appear. After ſuch a diſcomfiture, the party in oppoſition have deemed it prudent to abandon their undoubted project of covering the table of the Houſe of Commons with Petitions for Peace. Not another attempt of the kind have they made. And they thereby give their ſilent though moſt expreſſive teſtimony, that they found the people of this country fully convinced, that no ſecure and honourable peace could be expected from any treaty with Buonaparte, and that to enſure ſo deſirable an object, alike the wiſh of Government and people, it was neceſſary to reſolve on the vigorous proſecution of the War.

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themſelves in contempt of their engagements to their conſtituents, and of their duty to their country.

The grounds on which theſe Gentlemen cenſured in Parliament the Britiſh Government for refuſing to negociate, are not ſubject to general controverſy; but the reports of their ſpeeches are certainly open to animadverſion. For thoſe reports, though connived at on condition of their being given with fidelity, are not, like the ſpeeches themſelves, within the protection of Parliamentary privilege, which extends only to what paſſes in Parliament. Every individual is, therefore, at full liberty to comment, with abſolute freedom, (though certainly not without perfect fairneſs) not upon the *debates in Parliament*, but upon the unauthoriſed reports of thoſe debates, whatever ſhape they may aſſume. And it is much to be deſired, while theſe reports are permitted, that writers ſhould exerciſe this right without ſcruple. For if, in future times, a wicked and deſperate faction ſhould find its way into Parliament, and knowing that whatever paſſes there will be inſtantly communicated, by a thouſand channels, to the public, ſhould make ſpeeches, not with a view to any effect they may produce upon the audience to which they are apparently addreſſed, but in order to pervert the public mind—to damp the public ſpirit—to give currency to the groſſeſt and moſt miſchievous miſrepreſentations—to ſerve the cauſe of the enemies of the country—to excite the people to diſaffection—to ſtimulate the diſaffected to ſedition, treaſon, and inſurrection—the only way to defeat the deſign of ſuch ſpeeches, will be to attack and expoſe the reports of them without reſerve: and this may unqueſtionably be done with perfect ſafety, unleſs the abſurd and ſlaviſh doctrine be admitted, that the contents of a common newſpaper may be entitled to privilege of Parliament.

It might eaſily be ſhewn that the reported ſpeeches which were publiſhed on the above occaſion, are a flimſy tiſſue of miſrepreſentation and ſophiſtry. This, however, is unneceſſary, on account of the complete refutation

which the ſpeeches received at the time of their delivery, and which has ſince been made public. But there are ſome topics, forming a diſtinguiſhed feature in the reaſoning attributed to theſe gentlemen, and eſpecially in that aſcribed to Mr. Fox and Mr. Erſkine, which deſerve particular notice, not ſo much on account of their relation to the queſtion of negociation, as becauſe they have a very cloſe connection with the origin and nature of the preſent conteſt, and conſequently with *the general politics of Europe*, and *the ſtate of Society*, at this momentous juncture.

It muſt be in the recollection of every one, that both previouſly and ſubſequently to the commencement of the war, it was the uniform practice of the gentlemen above mentioned, and of all who acted with them, to contend ſtrenuouſly, that we had nothing to apprehend from the events which were paſſing in a neighbouring country—that we had no intereſt in thoſe events otherwiſe than as friends of freedom, and of the human race—that, in ſhort, the French revolution inſtead of being in any degree a ſource of danger, was a ſubject for general exultation, as it tended to promote the ſocial happineſs and even the tranquillity of the world. The fallacy of ſuch ſtatements, which for a time had no ſmall effect upon the public mind, has been ſo completely demonſtrated by experience, that it would be conſidered as a proof of inſanity to repeat them at this moment. Still, however, as they were made the occaſion of abuſe and even of ridicule againſt every one, who, though he could not foreſee a thouſandth part of the miſchief which was then brooding over the earth, thought he ſaw enough to convince him that there was cauſe for the utmoſt alarm—and as, which is far worſe, they have been converted into a moſt copious ſource of miſrepreſentation reſpecting the cauſes of the war—it is no ſmall ſatisfaction to know, that they are, at length, formally diſavowed by the perſons who were moſt inſtrumental in their promulgation. This appears to have been done, in the moſt explicit manner, by Mr. Erſkine, on the occaſion above mentioned, when he is re-

reported to have fully confirmed the opinion of thoſe who were contemptuouſly termed Alarmiſts, by acknowledging that "the French Revolution was undoubtedly in its beginning a great and awful event, "which could not but extend its influence more or leſs "to other nations. So mighty a fabric of deſpotiſm "and ſuperſtition (as he is ſtill pleaſed to call the ancient and lawful government of France) after having "endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concuſſion which the whole world would feel *;" and again, "So mighty an event as the French Revolution could not but affect and agitate the human "mind on the ſubject of government every where †." And with regard to our own ſituation, the ſame gentleman, in alluſion to the cloſe of the year 1795, is ſtated to have ſaid, with an evident caution and reſerve of language, but with an irreſiſtible weight of teſtimony, that "the ſpirit of Democracy, which had been made "the pretext of all our clamours, and of the incapacity "of France as a ſocial government, was yet at its "height." He adds ſoon afterwards, "the nation too "was ſtated to be full of plots"—this is as much, perhaps, as can be expected on the ſubject of *plots*, from the advocate of the plotters, and one of the ſworn vouchers for O'Connor's loyalty—but the ſenator does not heſitate to allow that "Ireland was known to "be on the brink of deſtruction."

Such teſtimony can require no corroboration. Yet it is due to the cauſe to obſerve that the dangers, to which all nations have been expoſed by the French Revolution, are ſo notorious, that an admiſſion both of their reality and magnitude, eſcapes ſometimes from the mouth even of its Gallic friends. The Republicans of France have, from time to time, convicted themſelves of the worſt charges which have been advanced againſt them. They have confeſſed the atrocious motives which induced them to commence the war—motives no leſs

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, No. 98, p. 290.
† Ib. p. 296.

atrocious than *the deſtruction of Royalty firſt in France, and then all over the world**. They have acknowledged, that, to the commencement of the preſent year, the Republic was incapable of the relations of peace†. At length they admit, with Mr. Erſkine, that the French Revolution convulſed and endangered the whole fabric of ſociety, and afforded to other countries a reaſonable pretext for war; no leſs than this was openly and explicitly avowed, in the *Tribunate* of Buonaparte, on the 7th of March in the preſent year, by Girardin, who ſaid, "Yes, doubtleſs, "*when anarchy from the boſom of France threatened* "*the tranquillity of the univerſe*, the foreign govern- "ments had a plauſible pretext for the continuance of "war."

What a lively picture do ſuch admiſſions exhibit of the arduous nature of the preſent conteſt—of the difficulties and dangers we have had to encounter at home, during a moſt ſevere and perilous conflict abroad! How do they eſtabliſh, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the neceſſity of thoſe precautions, which had for their object the preſervation of our internal tranquillity! And how ſevere a condemnation do they paſs upon the perſons who took occaſion, from thoſe precautions, to ſound the trumpet of inſurrection, and to declare openly that obedience was become a queſtion, not of morality, but of prudence! As *the agitation which the French Revolution could not but produce every where*, on the ſubject of Government, was unavoidably much favoured by the freedom enjoyed in this country, we have more reaſon to wonder that our Government could be preſerved by the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act, and by the new laws againſt treaſon and ſedition, than to complain of the reſtrictions impoſed by thoſe ſalutary meaſures. Who will conſider the impoſition of ſuch reſtraints as a hardſhip, when they were neceſſary to preſerve us from the *Anarchy which, from the boſom of France, threatened*

* Briſſot, Louvet and others. † Boulay de la Meurthe.

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the tranquillity of the univerſe, and to enable us to contend with the moſt furious ſpirit that can be let-loose upon the face of the earth: *the ſpirit of democracy*, which for years continued *at its height*, and which brought Ireland to *the brink of deſtruction*—at a time too when the entire fabrick of ſociety was convulſed by *a great and awful revolution, which could not but extend its influence, more or leſs, to other nations*; which *could not but affect and agitate the human mind every where on the ſubject of government*, and which *produced a conculſion* which was neceſſarily felt by *the whole earth*.*

In order, however, to diminiſh the effect of ſuch conceſſions, ſome perſons reſort to an abſurdity ſo groſs as fully to evince the weakneſs of the cauſe in which it is employed. They pretend that the turbulent character of the French Revolution is to be aſcribed, not to its own natural diſpoſition, but to the provocations which it received from foreign powers. As if the truly virtuous man could be provoked to become a robber, an

* The above admiſſions, however ſtriking, are very far from conveying an adequate idea of the danger to which all countries were betimes expoſed by the French Revolution; for they are ſilent reſpecting one great ſource of that danger, the ſyſtem of univerſal ſubverſion which was adopted by the French Revolutioniſts, and their unceaſing endeavours, by public declarations and by private machinations, to excite every people under Heaven to revolt againſt their government. Theſe attempts are now univerſally known; but it may not be amiſs to quote, in illuſtration of the truth, which was betimes avowed by the Republicans of France—that they embraced the whole world in their ſyſtem of Fraternity, a ſong with which they amuſed themſelves in the year 1792—

"Nuos irons voir dans la Turquie
"Le deſciple de Mahomet;
"Il faut qu'il ſoit de la partie,
"Nous lui dirons notre ſecret:
"S'il prette ſon ferment civique,
"Et s'il renonce a l'Alcoran,
"Nous lui donnerons, au lieu d'un Turban,
"Le Bonnet de la Republique."

After peruſing theſe early effuſions of French Republicaniſm, the ſurprize which has been excited by the exhibition of ſuch characters as *Ali* Buonaparte and *Abdallah* Menou, muſt be conſiderably diminiſhed.

aſſaſſin and an incendiary. But recent hiſtory moſt completely expoſes this pitiful ſubterfuge, by ſhewing that, in point of fact, the French Revolution diſplayed from the firſt a diſpoſition to intermeddle with the internal affairs of other countries, and to invade the peace of the whole world—that it actually, and indeed, as Mr. Erſkine obſerves, *neceſſarily* produced an univerſal agitation of mind on the ſubject of government—that other countries, inſtead of being chargeable with an improper interference, were guilty of ſuffering this inſtrument of general moleſtation to become formidable, and even to diſturb their repoſe, without taking any ſteps to check its progreſs; until, at length, they were attacked by open force, and obliged to draw the ſword in their own defence. Their fault evidently lay on the ſide of forbearance. And it is a truth, of which dreadful experience now affords the moſt melancholy demonſtration—not only that a timely and effectual interference, to repel a danger which aſſumed ſo threatening an aſpect, would, on their part, have been fully juſtifiable—but that they were bound, by the all-paramount duty of ſelf-preſervation, to cruſh the cockatrice in the egg, rather than ſuffer it to be hatched, and even foſtered into maturity.

In the courſe of the debate which produced ſuch important and ſuch candid conceſſions from Mr Erſkine, reſpecting the original character and tendency of the French Revolution, Mr. Fox is reported to have made conceſſions, no leſs important and candid, reſpecting the actual conduct of the French Republic. At length the moral ſenſe ſeems to have gained a partial triumph, in Mr. Fox's mind, over the perverting influence of party zeal, and to have convinced him that the behaviour of the republican rulers of France has been flagitious in the extreme. In the ſpeech attributed to him on the above occaſion, he is reported to have ſaid, in alluſion to the tyrants who have in ſucceſſion oppreſſed the French people, that " they have been as bad and as " execrable in various inſtances, as any of the moſt " deſpotic and unprincipled Governments that the

world ever ſaw *." But the advocates of republican France, though incapable any longer of juſtifying her conduct, do not deſert her cauſe. Unable to plead *not guilty* in her behalf to the charge of ambition, injuſtice, rapacity, perfidy, cruelty, and, indeed, of every crime which a ſtate can commit againſt the peace, order, and ſecurity of the world, they bring forward a plea *in abatement*, for want of parties —they alledge that the charge ſhould not be brought againſt France alone, becauſe it is equally applicable to other powers—they endeavour to eſtabliſh a ſet off in infamy, by contending that the atrocities of the new Republic do not exceed thoſe of regular Governments and of lawful Sovereigns. Thus Mr. Fox inſiſts on *the reſtleſs ambition, the inſatiable ſpirit of conqueſt and aggrandizement of the Houſe of Bourbon*, in order to counterbalance the iniquitous exceſſes of its uſurping ſucceſſor. According to him, if the Revolutioniſts of France have over-run countries and ravaged them, they have, in doing ſo, "acted upon Bourbon principles." If they have ruined and dethroned Sovereigns, it is entirely "after "the Bourbon manner." If they have even fraternized with the people of foreign countries, and pretended to make their cauſe their own, they have only "faithfully followed the Bourbon example—They have "conſtantly had *Louis* the *grand monarque* in their "eye—Their ſeizure of Savoy was a moſt Bourbon "like act—Their phraſe of '*convenances phyſiques, et* "*morales*,' is a moſt "Bourbon like phraſe." In ſhort, their rapacity, their thirſt for conqueſt, their perfidy, their reſtleſs ſpirit, are qualities which they acquired *in the ſchool of the Bourbons* †.

What a teſtimony is here in favour of Revolutionary France! How different from that erſt given by the ſame witneſs, when he repreſented her as exhibiting to the world "a glorious and ſtupendous edifice of wiſ-

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, 4th Seſſ. of 18th Parl. p. 354
† See Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, ib. p. 354.

dom and integrity!" But ſuch, in the courſe of a few years, have been her abominations—ſuch her deeds of horror, that the very mouth which then dignified her with ſo enthuſiaſtic an eulogy, can now find no better excuſe for her conduct, than that it does not exceed, in atrocity, the moſt unjuſtifiable tranſactions which are imputable to the French monarchy—It muſt be acknowledged that all the accuſations, which have been brought againſt the Republic of France, are vapid and feeble when compared with ſuch a defence from ſuch a mouth. What an inſtructive leſſon does it afford, to ſee Mr. Fox thus pulling down, with his own hands, "that glorious "and ſtupendous edifice of wiſdom and integrity," which he himſelf had reared in honour of the French Revolution! to hear him confeſs that the brilliant ſyſtem of liberty, equality and the rights of man, which promiſed to ameliorate, beyond *all* powers of deſcription, the condition of humanity, inſtead of leading to virtue and happineſs, has produced crimes which its moſt ſanguine admirer, its moſt zealous advocate, acknowledges to be equal, in moral turpitude, to what he conſiders the vileſt tranſactions recorded in hiſtory!

This compariſon, however, which affords the only remaining plea, even of a mitigatory kind, for the French Republic, leads to a concluſion very different from that which Mr. Fox is reported to have deduced from it. That Gentleman is made to infer, that "as "we never ſcrupled to treat with the Princes of the "Houſe of Bourbon, ſo ought we not to refuſe to treat "with their Republican imitators*." But if the French Republic has made ſo rapid a progreſs in vice and depravity—if, at the very commencement of her exiſtence, ſhe has attained ſuch a maturity of wickedneſs—if, in the ſhort ſpace of ten years, ſhe has committed crimes which are not ſurpaſſed by the recorded

* Ibid p. 356,

infamy

infamy of ages, what muſt be expected from her when her natural character ſhall be confirmed by time, habit and experience? Surely we ought to ponder before we admit ſuch a Republic into the communion of civilized States.

But notwithſtanding this attempt to divert the indignation of mankind from the crimes of Revolutionary France, by comparing them with thoſe of former ages, no two things can be more diſſimilar than the ſyſtem which ſhe endeavours to eſtabliſh, under the name of a Republic which, under a variety of forms, has hitherto prevailed in civil ſociety. So diametrically oppoſite are theſe ſyſtems, that light and darkneſs, good and evil, do not exhibit a greater contraſt. The latter, which is properly termed the *Social* ſyſtem, is founded upon Religion, Morality and Law. Its tendency is to reſtrain the paſſions and controul the vices of mankind, and to counteract the evil propenſities of human nature. It endeavours to regulate the conduct of individuals by the rules of virtue. It preſcribes to ſtates, in their mutual intercourſe, the obſervance of equity, good faith and moderation. Its objects, in ſhort, are order, juſtice, peace, ſecurity, and the profection of all the bleſſings, which conſtitute the happineſs of human life. On the other hand, the *Revolutionary* ſyſtem tends to the ſubverſion of Religion, Morality and Law, the ancient foundations of ſociety. Inſtead of correcting or controuling, it gives a full ſcope to human depravity. It releaſes the paſſions from all reſtraint, and encourages both individuals and ſtates to diſregard every rule, which has been wont to keep them within the bounds of rectitude or moderation. It is incorporated with a new ſcheme of philoſophy, of which the tendency is to corrupt the heart, and to dry up the very ſources of virtue. Its object, in ſhort, is to diſſolve the bands of ſociety, and to introduce diſcord, oppreſſion, licentiouſneſs and anarchy.

It is true, the Social ſyſtem cannot prevent the commiſſion of great crimes—it cannot entirely reſtrain either individuals or ſtates, from acting injuriouſly and

flagitiouſly. While man is an imperfect being, ſubject to paſſion, and expoſed to temptation, he will, at times, be a diſgrace to his ſpecies, and a juſt object of divine and human vengeance. But this ſyſtem, though it cannot render him perfect, has hitherto confined his *depravity* within ſuch bounds as are eſſential, not merely to the exiſtence, but to the general well-being of ſociety. It operates as a never-ceaſing check upon human wickedneſs. It places Religion, Morality, Law, habit, opinion, diſgrace, in ſhort, the whole force of the Social machine in oppoſition to the violence of temptation and the influence of corruption. Every crime is an infringement of its rules. It is impoſſible to conceive an act, injurious either to a community or an individual, which is not a violation of its principles. Under ſuch a ſyſtem the moſt abandoned characters meet, on all ſides, with obſtacles to the gratification of their depraved propenſities, and although it is impoſſible for it to ſuppreſs fraud, perfidy, ambition and injuſtice, ſtill it takes precautions to guard againſt their effects, and to check the evils, which cannot be entirely prevented. In proportion to the ſtrength of this ſyſtem, and to the influence of the principles on which it is founded, virtue and happineſs muſt prevail in the world; and it is from the decay of its authority, and the neglect of its rules, that flow thoſe diſorders, which embitter human life and diſturb the general tranquillity.

If the monſters of the French Revolution had been under the controul of ſuch a ſyſtem, they could never have exhibited ſuch ſhocking ſpectacles of unexampled depravity. They would, doubtleſs, have been peſts to ſociety; but they would have been deſtitute of thoſe means of boundleſs miſchief, by which they have been enabled infinitely to ſurpaſs all the monſters of former times. Buonaparte himſelf might perhaps have paſſed as an ordinary villain—or if, impelled by the matchleſs atrocity of his diſpoſition, he had exceeded the uſual bounds of wickedneſs, ſtill he would have wanted an opportunity of ſhewing what dread-

dreadful and aſtoniſhing lengths of iniquity human nature can go, when releaſed from thoſe reſtraints, legal, moral and Religious, to which, in every preceding period of the world, mankind have, more or leſs, been ſubject.

The Revolutionary ſyſtem, on the contrary, is a nurſery of vice, a hot bed of corruption. The fouleſt and moſt deſtructive crimes grow out of its principles, and are in conformity with its rules. It diſſolves every reſtraint upon human depravity. It preſents every temptation to human infirmity. It makes crime the only road to ſucceſs, the only path to exaltation. Its means of attaining power are tumult, ſedition, treaſon, rebellion and regicide. Its means of preſerving authority are oppreſſion, tyranny, confiſcation, judicial murder, war and univerſal excitement to revolt. It calls into action whatever is corrupt or evil-diſpoſed in ſociety. By perfidious but ſpecious promiſes of liberty and happineſs, it unſettles the minds of men, it diſturbs their feelings and their habits, and it ſeduces their affections from inſtitutions which they have been accuſtomed to love and revere. It diffuſes a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs, it poiſons the fountains of virtue, it withdraws from paſſion its moſt powerful reſtraint, the proſpect of a future ſtate, and by thus corrupting the morals of mankind, it renders them an eaſy prey to its deſtructive fury. It gives a new, an indelible taint to the human heart, and a deeper dye to every ſpecies of guilt. It renders diſaffection more extenſive, faction more deſperate, ſedition more active, conſpiracy more daring, treaſom more malignant, and impiety more blaſphemous. In one word, this horrid ſyſtem exhibits, in practice, the extraordinary and awful phenomenon of a ſet of men, inveſted, by the above means, with the powers of government, and exerciſing thoſe powers for the deſtruction of all other governments—attacking the very foundations of all legitimate authority—and endeavouring to overturn the ancient edifice of ſociety, in order to erect, upon its ruins, a far more extenſive and oppreſſive

deſpotiſm, than has ever yet exiſted upon the face of the earth.

But can it be true that ſyſtems, which in principle exhibit ſo great a contraſt, reſemble each other in practice? Can the waters which flow from ſuch different fountains be ſimilar in quality? This would be ſtrange, indeed! It would be contrary to the whole courſe of nature. It would, in effect, totally confound virtue and vice, and reduce the difference between them to a mere name. Such, however, is the paradox which the advocates of France would perſuade us to admit. Obliged, at length, to give up the purity and perfectibility of the new ſyſtem, and to acknowledge that, in ſpite of all their predictions in its favour, it has not only failed to produce any improvement in the ſtate of ſociety, but has equalled, in depravity, whatever has gone before it, they now, as their laſt reſource, and in the hope of ſtill prevailing on mankind to believe that its deſtruction would not be productive of any advantage, contend that it has only imitated the example of former times—that it has diſplayed nothing new in wickedneſs—and that it has been guilty of no atrocity, which is not to be matched in the records of hiſtory.

If this ſtatement were true; if the deeds of Republican France did not exceed all example of iniquity; ſtill the mode of reaſoning here reſorted to would be the moſt fallacious that was ever employed. That the hiſtory of the world abounds in crime, no perſon attempts to deny. That the peruſal of that hiſtory often fills the ſoul with horror, it is impoſſible to diſpute. That at the moment of ſuch peruſal the reader is apt, ſometimes, to exclaim, can any thing worſe have been done by Republican France! the experience of moſt readers will confirm. But theſe crimes, which ſo juſtly excite the utmoſt indignation, form only a part, though a very conſpicuous one, of the picture which hiſtory preſents to the view. That picture has its lights, as well as its ſhades—it has its bright and cheering

cheering parts, as well as thoſe which are diſguſtful and ſhocking—it exhibits not only the horrors of war, but the bleſſings of peace—it diſplays the moſt ſplendid virtues, as well as the moſt atrocious vices—while it holds forth ſome characters which excite deteſtation, it preſerves others which inſpire love, and even command admiration—it will perpetuate the memory of an Antoninus Pius, and a George the Third, as well as of a Nero and a Caligula—of a Robeſpierre, a Marat, and a Buonaparte. How different the picture of Republican France! *There* nothing meets the eye but one uniform, unmixed ſcene of wickedneſs and crime—no light—but only "darkneſs "viſible,"—no interval of peace—no pauſe from the furious rage of deſolating war—no virtue to relieve the horrid maſs of impiety and vice—not a ſingle action which can produce any ſentiment but loathing—not a ſingle character, amid the vaſt Revolutionary group, which can excite any feeling but abhorrence.

It ſhould alſo be remembered that, while hiſtory records, for the inſtruction of mankind, the crimes of thoſe who have been moſt conſpicuous on the great theatre of the world, while it informs us of tranſactions, the recital of which makes us ſhudder, it neceſſarily caſts a veil over the private condition of ſocial life, the contemplation of which would relieve and even gratify the mind. It can do little more than preſerve the memory of public characters and events, and give a general idea of the ſtate and progreſs of Society. But it is, nevertheleſs, indiſputably certain, that while the political world has been convulſed with ſtorm, and deformed with crime, it has often been the felicity of domeſtic life to enjoy uninterrupted ſerenity. While the Throne has exhibited a ſpectacle of vice and infamy, the people, though eſſentially injured by ſuch an example, have been bleſſed with quiet, order, and ſecurity, every man has ſitten under his vine, or under his fig-tree, private repoſe has been undiſturbed, and public proſperity has been progreſſively encreaſing. Even thoſe great and tremendous convulſions, which

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have ſeemed to ſhake the edifice of Society, have been partial and temporary in their operation. Their ravages, like thoſe of the raging elements, have been local; and, however dreadful for the moment, have been ſoon repaired when the ſtorm came to ſubſide.

On the contrary, the new Revolutionary Syſtem extends its ravages over the whole face of Society. Wherever its influence has prevailed, no rank, no condition, no retirement has been able to elude its fury. It has violated every right; it has invaded every comfort; it has wrung every honeſt and feeling heart with anguiſh. In France, where it firſt eſtabliſhed its dominion, it made the whole land one ſcene of carnage, devaſtation and ruin. In every other country, to which it has extended its ſway, it has not only heaped injuries, and brought deſtruction upon all, who exerciſed in any ſhape the powers of Government, but it has treated even the loweſt claſſes with ſuch inſulting and ferocious barbarity, that they have diſplayed, wherever they had an opportunity of ſo doing, a more determined ſpirit of reſiſtance, and a more eager thirſt for revenge, than the higher orders.

Such is the ſyſtem of unmixed evil, and of unlimited miſchief, which Mr. Fox compares with that ſtate of Society, of which, however chequered with crime and calamity, the main object has always been to protect the weak againſt the ſtrong; and to build the fabric of human happineſs upon the foundations of religion and virtue. But in ſpite of ſo inſidious a compariſon, theſe ſyſtems (allowing for the imperfection of human nature) diſplay no leſs ſtriking a difference in practice than in principle; and they thereby afford an incontrovertible proof that the moral Government of the world, like the phyſical, is ſubjected to fixed and eſtabliſhed rules, the authority of which it is not in the power of man to ſuperſede, for they cannot be violated with impunity.

It is generally underſtood, that Mr. Fox is employing his leiſure in writing, that important part of modern hiſtory which commences at the Reſtoration

ration of the Britiſh Monarchy in the perſon of Charles the Second. Should it be the object of this work, or of any work in which the Honourable Member may be engaged, in conformity with the purport of his reported ſpeech (above noticed), to ſet off the atrocities of former times againſt thoſe of the French Republic, his publication will be a very dangerous preſent to the world. But it is to be hoped, that the good ſenſe of the public will put them upon their guard againſt the falſe principle and the dangerous tendency of ſuch a production, however attractive, intereſting, and, in ſome ſubordinate reſpects, inſtructive, it may be rendered by the ſuper-eminent talents of the Honourable Author.

If the blackeſt portions of hiſtory were to be ſelected, they would not bear any compariſon with that which compriſes the tremendous æra of the French Revolution. A Revolution which is altogether *ſui generis*; a perfect anomaly in the hiſtory of mankind. But certainly periods might be found, which diſplay a much nearer analogy to the preſent, than the one above mentioned. The Roman Empire, like the French Republic, was a monument of univerſal ambition, and a ſource of univerſal diſturbance. It was founded, like that Republic, upon a principle of anarchy; for the Roman people, after the expulſion of their Kings, had no Government which was capable of preſerving, by its intrinſic force, domeſtic order and quiet. They were therefore driven, as France muſt be ſo long as ſhe remains deſtitute of ſettled Government, to foreign war, as their only poſſible relief from internal convulſions; and their wars, proceeding from ſuch a cauſe, like thoſe of Republican France, were, on their part, without a ſingle exception, unjuſt and aggreſſive. But here the compariſon ceaſes. For Rome, when ſhe ſubverted her Monarchy, did not extend her Revolution to the whole frame of her ſocial ſyſtem. She did not expel her nobles and her prieſts—ſhe did not pull down her orders—ſhe did not confound all diſtinctions of rank—

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ſhe did not abjure her Religion—ſhe did not renounce her ancient laws, her uſages, and her inſtitutions.—On the contrary, all theſe things ſhe carefully preſerved, and continued even to cheriſh. She was not, happily for herſelf and the reſt of the world, acquainted with the modern ſyſtem of the rights of man, but acted upon principles diametrically oppoſite to thoſe, upon which this diſorganizing ſyſtem is founded.

If the foreign conduct of Rome be compared with that of France, it would be found to diſplay a difference ſcarcely leſs ſtriking than that which diſtinguiſhes the domeſtic ſyſtems of the two Republics. She did not abroad, any more than at home, act upon a principle of ſocial ſubverſion. She exhibited, indeed, an awful and inſtructive example, proving to mankind that an independent Monarchical State, if it become a Republic, can neither itſelf maintain order and tranquillity, nor ſuffer other States to enjoy peace and ſecurity, even though it preſerve every other part of its original organization. To compoſe her inteſtine commotions, Rome made war her conſtant and habitual occupation. She diſplayed a boundleſs ambition, an inſatiable thirſt for conqueſt and dominion: but ſhe aimed at nothing further than conqueſt and dominion. She was ſatisfied with ſubjecting other nations to her authority. She did not wiſh to ſubvert their inſtitutions—ſhe ſuffered them to enjoy their Religion, their laws, their uſages—ſhe reſpected their cuſtoms and their prejudices—ſhe did not approach them with promiſes of freedom, and then ſubject them to the moſt oppreſſive of all tyrannies—that of forcing them to change their habits of life, to renounce their principles, and to accommodate themſelves to a new ſyſtem of manners. She did not violate their temples, and profane their altars. The Jews, of all people on earth, the moſt attached, and the moſt juſtly ſo, to their Religion, performed all its rites without moleſtation, during the whole of their ſubjection to the Roman power. Their laws were allowed to be pleaded at the

Bar of a Roman Governor*. Their ſacred places were reſpected by a heathen conqueror. When Pompey took Jeruſalem, though he entered the Temple, which he found to contain articles of great value and 2000 talents of ſacred money, yet, according to the teſtimony of the Jewiſh hiſtorian, Joſephus, " did he " touch nothing of all this on account of his regard " to religion.—And the next day he gave order to " thoſe who had charge of the Temple, to cleanſe it, " and to bring what offerings the law required to " God†." Cicero makes this conduct a matter of national boaſt—" *At Cn. Pompejus, captis Hyeroſoly-* " *mis, victor ex illo fano nihil attigit*‡." Nay, even when, in conſequence of the ſeditious conduct of the Jews, their city was beſieged and deſtroyed by the Romans, Titus, who conducted the ſiege, hearing, while he was repoſing himſelf after a battle, that the Temple was in flames, " ran" (ſays the hiſtorian) " to the holy houſe, in order to have a ſtop put to " the fire§." How different ſuch ſcenes from thoſe which have attended the triumphs of Republican France! How different, as conquerors, Pompey and Titus from Buonaparte, who, when in Italy, burned the town of Benaſco, maſſacred 800 of its inhabitants, and gave orders to ſet fire to every village where the tocſin ſhould be ſounded, and to put the inhabitants to death! and this merely becauſe the inhabitants of Pavia, incenſed at the inſults which the French troops had heaped upon every thing they formerly held moſt ſacred, and particularly at ſeeing the tomb of St. Auguſtin, which they were accuſtomed to view with peculiar veneration, mutilated and defaced, flew to arms, took the French guards priſoners, without, however, injuring the perſon of a ſingle ſoldier. But the portion of modern hiſtory, to which Mr. Fox is reported to have alluded in Parliament, and which

* Acts, chap. 24. v. 26.—Ib. c. 25. v. 8.
† Antiquities of the Jews, B. 14. c. 4. §. 4.
‡ Orat. pro L. Flacco. § Hiſt. of the Jewiſh War, B. 6. c. 4. §. 7.

he is ſuppoſed to have ſelected for a more elaborate illuſtration, in order to eſtabliſh a compariſon in infamy with the French Republic, diſplays a ſtill ſtronger diſſimilitude to the conduct of that Republic, than is to be found in the Roman Annals. Scarcely can that period be ſaid to have produced any great convulſion in the political relations of Europe; certainly it was not fraught with deſtruction to all ſocial inſtitutions. It neither exhibits, like the age of Imperial Rome, a ſcene of univerſal conqueſt; nor does it unfold, like the æra of Jacobin France, a ſcheme of total ſubverſion. We find in it, indeed, as in many other periods, projects of overweening ambition, of flagrant injuſtice, of extenſive conqueſt. But we ſee thoſe projects defeated by vigilanſe, by wiſdom, by timely and perſevering exertion. We ſee, indeed, a reſtleſs State, already too powerful, endeavouring to extend its dominion at the expenſe of its neighbours; and we ſee it even ſucceſsful in ſome attempts at unjuſtifiable encroachment—but we ſee it baffled in its great ſchemes of aggrandizement—we ſee the States of Europe, nay, its ſmall States, maintain their independence; the balance of power ſucceſsfully aſſerted, and rendered even more firm than before; and the general ſecurity, not only protected, but eſtabliſhed upon a firmer baſis than ever. How different ſuch a period from that in which ambitious Rome made herſelf the miſtreſs of the world! How much more different from that in which Revolutionary France has made herſelf the ſcourge of humanity!

It will not be in the power of Mr. Fox to conceal ſuch glaring contrarieties, even though he exert the whole force of his abilities, in diſplaying the principles and conduct of the Houſe of Bourbon in the moſt unfavourable light. The people of this country, in particular, will be ready to join with him in execrating the ambition, the cupidity, the injuſtice, which have long marked the foreign ſyſtem of that Houſe. But they can, at the ſame time, diſtinguiſh between a Bourbon and a French Director or Conſul. Without

out ſelecting, for the purpoſe of ſuch diſcrimination, the XVIth Louis, whoſe virtues were an ornament to the Throne, they can do juſtice to the Grand Monarque himſelf, who, with all his faults, poſſeſſed qualities which commanded the reſpect and admiration of his enemies; and they feel that this Prince, hoſtile as he was to Great Britain, was a totally different kind of being from the Jacobin rulers of France, not one of whom, down to Buonaparte inclusive, has diſplayed a ſingle quality which can excite, in a virtuous breaſt, any feeling but deteſtation, and who, one and all, are a moſt foul diſgrace to human nature. Great, indeed, was the political danger to which Europe was expoſed by the love of falſe glory, which animated the breaſt of that Monarch; but the political miſchief, already done by the French Republic, greatly exceeds in extent the utmoſt projects of ambition, which there is any reaſon to ſuſpect him ever to have had in contemplation; while the ſocial danger, to which the whole world is expoſed by the ſubverſive ſyſtem of that Republic, is ſuch as to render all political intereſt comparatively inſignificant. Though the French Monarch endeavoured to gain a preponderance, which would have totally deranged the balance of power, he could not, without endangering his own Throne, attack the pillars by which all Thrones are ſupported—he could not, without expoſing his own authority, inculcate the diſorganizing principles of the Rights of Man, even had his mind been baſe enough to favour ſuch principles—nor could he, with ſafety to his own Government, diſpatch his miſſionaries into other countries, to propagate the levelling doctrines of liberty and equality, and to inſpire the multitude with a ſpirit of inſubordination, and with a blind jealouſy of rank and property. The world had, therefore, the beſt ſecurity—that of perſonal intereſt and ſelf-preſervation, that he would not employ, even againſt his worſt enemies, ſuch dangerous weapons, nor ſeek to diſſolve the ties which conſtitute the ſtrength of regular Government,

and which are eſſential to the happineſs of orderly Society.

But, on the other hand, the French Republic is ſo conſtituted, that her fundamental principles lead her to wiſh for the deſtruction of every Throne, and of every ſocial inſtitution, whether Religious, or political. By purſuing this object with a deſperation, of which there is no example, ſhe has gained a moſt alarming preponderance in Europe. And ſhe is impelled, not merely by her original ſtructure and natural diſpoſition, but by the paramount intereſt of ſelf-preſervation, to perſevere in endeavouring, by her arms and by her artifices, by war and by peace, to overthrow all regular Government, and to ſubvert the very foundations of all ſocial order and ſecurity. Her characteriſtic is a ſpirit of deſtruction; her animating principle is a love of demolition. Her ambition, however inordinate, her luſt of dominion, however inſatiable, conſtitute the leaſt formidable, and the leaſt odious part of her character. Other States have been actuated by a thirſt for conqueſt, and all States have, at times, diſplayed a deſire of aggrandizement. But this Republic fights leſs for aggrandizement than for ſubverſion. She conquers not to govern, but to exhauſt, to diſorganize, to tear up by the roots all ancient eſtabliſhments and inſtitutions. The Monarchy of France obtained by force of arms, even within the laſt century, great acceſſions of territory. It did not, however, force its ſubjects by conqueſt, to bewail their change of Sovereigns. It not only protected their perſons and property, but it held ſacred their ancient uſages, their accuſtomed rights, their local privileges, and it allowed preſcription to prevail over the right of conqueſt, and the power of the Conqueror. How different the triumphs of Republican France! What is there that can ſtand before *her* devouring ſword? With her beſom of liberty ſhe ſweeps away every thing which a people has been accuſtomed to hold dear—ſhe inſults all their

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feelings and all their prejudices—and ſhe reduces all her conquered ſubjects to a perfect equality of degradation, miſery and ruin. Let her *mild* and *ſympathetic* fraternity with the Belgians, the Italians, and the Swiſs, be compared with the *deſpotic* ſway of the Houſe of Bourbon over the conquered inhabitants of Flanders, Lorraine, and Franche Comté; and then let Mr. Fox himſelf declare to which of the two conquerors he would chooſe to yield obedience.

Should Mr. Fox turn his attention from the Houſe of Bourbon to that of Stuart, he will find our feelings in uniſon with his, when he repreſents the Second Charles as diſgracing the Throne by his vices, and by his want of Britiſh ſpirit. The Hon. Author will do well to avail himſelf of the opportunity, which the reign of that Monarch affords him, of holding out to the abhorrence of mankind the deteſtable and pernicious character of a profligate King; and he may alſo, with great advantage, take this occaſion to ſhew, that diſſoluteneſs on the Throne is unſpeakably more dangerous, to a free ſtate, than a tyrannical diſpoſition. For both theſe qualities were united in the above Monarch; but while, by his corrupt manners, he inflicted a deep wound on the morals of the country—a wound, the effects of which are ſtill viſible—he was ſo far from being able, arbitrary as he was, to injure the Conſtitution, or to endanger the Liberties of the ſubject, that an eminent Commentator, who deſcribes his reign as "wicked, ſanguinary, and turbulent," fixes, nevertheleſs, upon this period as the æra in which "the Conſtitution of England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative was happily eſtabliſhed by law*." As a relief, however, from the painful feelings which a review of the character of Charles the Second cannot fail to excite in every

* 4 Bl. Com. p. 439.

well formed mind, Mr. Fox may, by way of contraſt, turn his attention to another Prince, who has, at once, diſplayed a moſt ardent and ſteady attachment to the Conſtitution, and exhibited a moſt exemplary pattern of Religious and moral excellence—a Prince whoſe piety, and whoſe virtues, combined with a manly firmneſs and conſiſtency of character, have been for years the grand bulwark, not only of this country, but of the whole civilized world. If at ſuch a time the Britiſh Throne had been deficient in any one of the qualities by which it has been ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed, it is more than probable that every Religious and ſocial eſtabliſhment would, ere now, have been laid in the duſt, and that an atheiſtical band of ſanguinary anarchiſts, would, at this moment, have been triumphing upon the ruins of civil Society. How thankful ſhould we be to Divine Providence for raiſing us up ſuch a Prince at ſo awful a criſis! But to what a dreadful reſponſibility will thoſe perſons be ſubject, who counteract, by their profligate lives, the ſalutary effect of ſuch an example; or who, by haraſſing his Government, labour to fruſtrate the efforts of ſuch a Monarch, to avert deſtruction from his people, and from mankind!

The reign of the ſucceſſor of Charles the Second, will afford Mr. Fox an opportunity of launching out into praiſes of the event, which he never mentions without rapture, and which is uſually, though not very accurately, termed "the Revolution." The beſt friends of lawful Government agree with Mr. Fox, in conſidering the preſervation of their Religious and civil rights, againſt the attacks of a Monarch who was certainly hoſtile to both, and the additional ſecurities which thoſe rights have ſince attained, as ineſtimable bleſſings. But, at the ſame time, they reflect, with heart-felt concern, on the very high price which was paid for theſe bleſſings; and it even leſſens, in their eſtimation, the value of the high privileges which were thus procured, to know that they were purchaſed by a violation of the

the moſt ſacred of all temporal duties—the duty of Allegiance. They alſo moſt ſtrenuouſly proteſt againſt every attempt to transform into a precedent an anomalous tranſaction, which was contrary to all law, and which nothing could even palliate, but the imperious and irreſiſtible neceſſity of ſelf-preſervation—a neceſſity which, whenever it occurs, will, like an overwhelming torrent, burſt over the ordinary barriers of defence and ſecurity. On the contrary, Mr. Fox is generally ſuppoſed (but may we not hope erroneouſly?) to rejoice as much in the irregularity of the Revolution as in its conſequences; to make it a theme of conſtant exultation, *becauſe* it amounted to a reſiſtance of legal authority, and an interruption of legal ſucceſſion; and to hold it forth as an example, to be contemplated with ſatisfaction and delight, in all times, and under all circumſtances. Whether or no this ſtatement of Mr. Fox's ſentiments and conduct be juſt, at leaſt it may be expected of him to warn his countrymen, againſt the inſidious endeavour of ſome perſons, to convert the Revolution into an authority for the Anarchial and Jacobinical doctrine, that the people have a right to chooſe and to change their Government, and to depoſe and elect their Governors:—a right, from the exerciſe of which Citizen Talleyrand, in his letter to Lord Grenville, has the audacity to aſſert, with an obvious reference to the Revolution, that "his Ma-"jeſty holds his Crown." This daring inſult to the King and to the Conſtitution, every true Briton muſt reſent with indignation and ſcorn. The Revolution, far from affording any ſanction to ſuch a doctrine, had for its avowed object the preſervation of the entire Conſtitution in Church and State, the fundamental principle of which is *hereditary* Monarchy; and the perſons who brought about that event, and who were—not the people at large—but characters of the higheſt rank and conſequence in the country, far from laying claim to ſuch a right, made the abdication and vacancy of the Throne the very baſis of their proceed-

ings* : nay, the Legiſlature itſelf, by one of its firſt acts, ſolemnly declared, that the Perſonages who, on this occaſion, became poſſeſſed of the Crown, were ſeated upon *the Throne of their Anceſtors*†.

One of thoſe Perſonages the Honourable Author may be expected to panegyrize with enthuſiaſtic rapture. The generality of his readers will, indeed, be very far from viewing with equal admiration the *perſonal* character of William III., or from thinking that the word Revolution has ſuch magic in the ſound, as to render a man deſerving of love, who was deſtitute of ſome of the beſt feelings of his nature. But, in one very important reſpect they will be ready to admit, that the character of this Prince cannot be eſtimated too highly. His Antigallican ſpirit—his inextinguiſhable jealouſy of France—the inceſſant vigilance, the unconquerable ardour, the inflexible perſeverence, with which he reſiſted the attempts of that Power to obtain an undue preponderance in Europe—his unceaſing efforts to rouze other States to a ſenſe of their common danger—his indefatigable exertions to form and keep together confederacies, for the preſervation of the balance of power—in ſhort, the zeal with which he devoted himſelf to the great cauſe of general ſecurity, the ſteadineſs with which he maintained that cauſe to the end of his life, the dauntleſs intrepidity with which he encountered every difficulty, and faced every danger, and, above all, the unſhaken firmneſs which he diſplayed in the midſt of diſaſters that ſeemed to be inſurmountable—theſe are qualities on which, in the eſtimation of the Britiſh people, Mr. Fox cannot be too laviſh of his praiſe. The ſubject, too, derives great additional importance from the circumſtances of the preſent moment, when the danger, inſeparable at all times, from the inordinate ambition of France, infinitely ex-

* Bill of Rights, 1. W. and M. Seſ. 2. c. 2. §. 1
† Ib. §. 7.

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ceeds that which it was the object of William III. to avert. It will be happy for Great Britain and for mankind, if Mr. Fox exert his great talents, in endeavouring to animate the Princes and Statesmen of this awful period with the soul of the Great Monarch, who, above a century ago, stood forward as the guardian of Europe and the defender of its liberties. He will here have full scope for all his powers, and he can never possess an opportunity of exerting them to greater advantage. He may at once display his eloquence and his wisdom, by invoking the shade of his illustrious Hero to raise that voice, which was once heard with such effect, to animate the Nations to one grand and determined effort against their ancient disturber and their common enemy; and after extolling this country for its magnanimous and persevering exertions in the present war, to conjure it never to be deterred by any reverse, or by any difficulty, from opposing, with all its force and all its influence, the attempts of France to obtain a preponderance incompatible with the political equilibrium, and with the independence of Europe.

In thus holding forth the example of William III. to the imitation of modern Princes and Statesmen, Mr. Fox will be but consistent with himself. He will only enforce the sentiments which he has frequently avowed in the course of his public life. He will act in strict conformity with the truly British principles which, in the year 1787, he manfully asserted in the House of Commons, when he honourably commended the Government of this country for interfering, to prevent the French Government from acquiring an ascendancy in the United Provinces. On that occasion he represented France as having adhered, *under all changes of administration, for more than a century, to one constant and regular idea, that of overweening pride and national aggrandizement; as having been anxious, by all the means in her power, to grasp at more than an undue influence over the other Powers of Europe—and particularly, as having been*

the inveterate and unalterable political enemy of Great Britain, which he deſcribed, with equal force and juſtice, as *a great maritime power, to which the diſtreſſed ſhould fly for aſſiſtance whenever unjuſtly attacked by France.*

It cannot be ſuppoſed that the man, who uttered this manly and dignified language, has loſt his Antigallican ſpirit, becauſe France, from a Monarchy, has been transformed to a Jacobin Republic, or a pure military Deſpotiſm, ſubmiſſive to the nod of a foreign uſurper. It cannot be ſuppoſed, that on account of any internal changes whatever, he can view with complacency and confidence a country, which, under all changes of adminiſtration, has adhered to *one regular and conſtant idea, that of overweening pride and national aggrandizement*, or that he ſhould be willing to gratify the pride and ambition of this *inveterate and unalterable political enemy of Great Britain*, becauſe ſhe has in a few years exceeded all example of national atrocity, by her judicial murders and legiſlative robberies—by the moſt extenſive and ſavage maſſacres—by her ſweeping confiſcations and proſcriptions—by her treaſons, regicide, and blaſphemies. —Still leſs, if poſſible, can it be believed that ſo enthuſiaſtic a friend to liberty, and one who has been loud in his execrations of the deſpotiſm of the Bourbons, can be partial to that unqualified tyranny, by which France has been faſt bound during the whole Revolution, and which is now centered in a ſingle individual; a tyranny compared with which, the authority of Louis XIV. was a mild conſtitutional freedom. Unleſs theſe conſiderations ſhould operate in Mr. Fox's mind, as ſo many recommendations to favour, he muſt, at leaſt as much as ever, view France as an object of jealouſy, diſtruſt, and Argus-eyed vigilance; and he muſt ſee, with the utmoſt indignation and alarm, her approaches to univerſal dominion. It is eaſy to conceive with what an ardour of zeal he would have oppoſed ſuch attempts on the part of the Houſe of Bourbon—With what a glow of Britiſh patriotiſm

patriotiſm he would have devoted to the ſcaffold any Miniſter, who ſhould have recognized by treaty, or even countenanced by negociation, the pretenſions of that Houſe—if it had ever dared to advance ſuch pretenſions—to extend its bounds to the Alps and the Rhine, and to hold in abſolute ſubjection the whole coaſt which is oppoſite to the Britiſh ſhore, from the Northern Sea to the mouth of the Channel. Can he then be willing to have it recorded as his opinion, that the French Republic is entitled to terms, which ſhould on no account be granted to the French Monarchy?—That the Robeſpierres, Syeyes and Buonapartes of the French Revolution, paſt, preſent, or to come, ſhould be complimented with the deſtruction of the balance of power, which ought to be defended, to the laſt extremity, againſt the Capets?—That Great Britain ſhould abjure her ancient politics in favour of a ſucceſſion of Revolutionary Tyrants, who have diſgraced human nature by their crimes, and have drenched the earth with blood? It has been his cuſtom, and that of his friends, to proteſt againſt any alluſion to the iniquities of Republican France, when her relation to other countries, and their conduct towards her, have been in contemplation. Well then; this proteſt, revolting as it is to the feelings of nature, and irreconcileable as it ſeems to be with the dictates of ſound policy, ſhall, for once, be admitted—a veil ſhall be caſt over deeds at which humainty ſtands aghaſt—nay, it ſhall even be admitted, for the ſake of argument, that the queſtion between France and the reſt of Europe is merely political, and that her neighbours have nothing to apprehend from her revolutionary principles, from her diſorganizing arts, from her decrees of fraternity, and from her endeavours to promote inſurrection in other countries. In ſhort, by the aid of theſe immenſe conceſſions, France ſhall be conſidered merely as France; ſuch as ſhe has ever been, and relieved of her overwhelming load of recent guilt. Then let Mr. Fox ſay on what conditions he would cultivate her friendſhip, and

and deprecate her further hoſtility. That Gentleman would be a miracle of inconſiſtency, if, inſtead of courting pacification with her on the footing of her preſent poſſeſſions and her actual claims, he did not require her recognition of the ancient balance of power, and of the treaties by which that balance has been protected, as a preliminary to all pacific intercourſe; nay, if he did not conſider it as a juſt and neceſſary cauſe of war, to compel her to return within ſuch limits as might be compatible with the general ſecurity. Whatever, beyond theſe objects, he may be willing to grant her in her preſent ſtate, muſt be conſidered as gratuitous conceſſions to revolutionary principles, to republican forms, and to the moſt inſulting as well as the moſt cruel of all deſpotiſm—to deſpotiſm in the name, and under the guiſe of freedom.

Nothing can tend more to ſimplify the great queſtion of Pacification, than thus to conſider it with a reference to principles which have been conſecrated by time and experience. Such a reference may be particularly uſeful to thoſe politicians who, ſtunned by that tremendous ſhock, which has convulſed to its centre the whole ſocial fabrick, ſeem to have no knowledge of ſurrounding objects, and to have loſt, for a time, even thoſe feelings which Engliſhmen have long conſidered as innate and inſtinctive. It will materially aſſiſt ſuch perſons, in recovering the uſe of their ſenſes, to remember, that it is ſtill FRANCE with whom we are contending—Let them recollect their hiſtory for a little more than an hundred years, and then ſit down and form their projects of pacification. Let them ſuppoſe the French Monarchy to ſtand preciſely in the place of the French Republic, (a ſuppoſition ſurely not unfavourable to the tranquillity of the Globe,) and then conſider what conceſſions they would make as the price of peace. The moment the ſubject is viewed in this light, it loſes all its complication, and becomes intelligible to the meaneſt capacity. It is not ſuſceptible of any material difference

difference of opinion. Let a Bourbon Prince be ſuppoſed to wield the Gallic ſceptre, inſtead of a Director or a Firſt Conſul, or any other denomination of Republican Tyrant which may yet iſſue from the Chaotic womb of the French Revolution, and men of all parties will agree, that the indiſpenſible condition of peace is the reſtoration of general ſecurity, and the re-eſtabliſhment of that political equilibrium, which has been defended by ſo many wars, which has been guarded by ſo many treaties, and which is the vital principle of the public Code of Europe. It will then be out of the power of faction itſelf to forget, that the aggrandizement of France is incompatible with the ſafety of every other State. This being the caſe, do the name of Buonaparte, or the hiſtory of the French Republic, authorize us to renounce the wiſdom of antiquity, and to conſider its ſage warnings as out of date? Has the French Revolution entirely drawn the ſting of French ambition? Is the new political character which France has aſſumed, to ſay nothing of her new moral character of Jacobiniſm, calculated to diſpel our fears and to inſpire us with unlimited confidence? Or rather, do not theſe conſiderations call upon us moſt loudly to adhere, with inflexible perſeverance, to the ſyſtem under which we have become great and proſperous, and for which Mr. Fox was once ſo ſtrenuous an advocate —that of watching the motions, ſuſpecting the deſigns, and oppoſing, with all our ſtrength and reſources, the ambitious projects of our Gallic neighbour? If France, as a Monarchy, was enterprizing, crafty, and perfidious, is ſhe not infinitely more ſo as a Republic? If, as a Monarchy, her yoke was grievous, is it not infinitely more ſo as a Republic? If, as a Monarchy, ſhe chaſtized Europe with whips, has ſhe not, as a Republic, chaſtized it with ſcorpions?

In favour, however, of the prepoſterous notion, that we ſhould concede to France as a Republic, and particularly as ſuch a Republic, terms of peace which not a man

a man in the kingdom would conſent to grant her as a Monarchy, it is often aſked, with an air of triumph, whether it is in our power to deprive her of thoſe acquiſitions which render her ſo formidable? whether we can reſtore the balance of power? and whether we will continue the war for an object which evidently is not attainable? Theſe queſtions are generally propounded by thoſe perſons who have invariably oppoſed every attempt to prevent her aggrandizement; and they muſt be allowed to come with a very bad grace from ſuch perſons. But the fallacy they contain exceed even their indecency: for they imply that war affords no other means of compelling an enemy to conſent to reaſonable and moderate conditions of peace, than by wreſting from him, by main force, the poſſeſſions which it is unſafe to allow him to retain—that there can be no other way of making him relinquiſh a conquered territory, than that of re-conquering it in form—and that, while a ſtate of hoſtility is grievous to us, whoſe views are juſt and equitable, it is attended with no inconvenience, no hardſhip, no danger to him, whoſe pretenſions are arrogant and injurious in the extreme. But, ſurely, war muſt be conſidered as an inconvenience to both parties; and if one can reſolve to endure that inconvenience rather than forego its ambition, the other muſt be deſpicable indeed to ſhrink from it, when it is the only preſervative of honour and independence. Indeed, the power which one country poſſeſſes of inflicting upon another this awful calamity, in redreſs or prevention of injuries, is the grand bulwark of general order and ſecurity, and the principal inſtrument provided by Providence to reſtrain violence and injuſtice. It is a duty which every State owes to itſelf, to aſſert, whenever and as long as it may be neceſſary, by means of this dreadful expedient, not only its own undoubted rights, but thoſe general intereſts which are the common bulwarks of the ſeparate intereſts of each individual State: and although it may not be able to attack the enemy in that part which furniſhes the ground of diſpute, or the cauſe

cauſe of danger, it may be wounding him in ſome other part, or by haraſſing and diſtreſſing him generally, compel him, at length, to renounce his hold of what may ſeem to be out of the reach of attack.

It is upon theſe principles, that Great Britain, though incapable herſelf of any great continental exertions, is the natural guardian of the balance of power in Europe, againſt France, the natural enemy of that balance. Her hoſtility, in conſequence of her naval power, the main ſpring of her energy, the chief ſinew of her ſtrength, is formidable and diſtreſſing to her Gallic neighbour (who, fortunately in this reſpect, is alſo a naval power) beyond that of any other nation; and in the preſent war, an unprecedented ſucceſſion of matchleſs victories has rendered it ſo in an unprecedented degree. During the continuance of the war, it is phyſically impoſſible for France to regain her commerce, her manufactures, and her navigation —while Heaven, ſmiling as it were on the juſtice of our cauſe, and the rectitude of our views, has bleſſed us, in the very midſt of war, with a great increaſe of theſe main ſources of national ſtrength and proſperity. Can we be inſenſible of the value of this maritime ſuperiority, which even the ancients conſidered as deciſive of the fortune of war, and of the claims to dominion? It was their maxim, "*Qui mare* "*teneat eum neceſſe rerum potiri.*" We do not, indeed, ſeek to convert our naval pre-eminence into an inſtrument of ambition; our only wiſh is to make it ſubſervient to the general intereſt. But, with ſuch purity, and, it may be ſaid, ſuch generoſity of views, with ſuch means of puniſhing, too, with ſome of the greateſt hardſhips of war—hardſhips which, thank Heaven! we do not ourſelves experience—the inſolence, the injuſtice, the inſatiable rapacity of our foe—are we to be told that we muſt, by a diſgraceful peace, yield to his immoderate pretenſions, and recognize his right to domineer over Europe, becauſe, forſooth, we may not be able to make a triumphant entry into Holland, to march an army into the Auſtrian Netherlands,

lands, to lay ſiege to the fortreſs of Luxembourg, or to plant our victorious ſtandard on the once free and happy mountains of Switzerland? Rather ſhall we not avail ourſelves of that dreadful rod, which ſeems to be put into our hands for the kindeſt and wiſeſt purpoſes—for the benefit of mankind—and ſay to him, that—if he would enjoy the bleſſings of peace, he muſt deſiſt from thoſe claims which are incompatible with the general welfare—he muſt recognize the right of other nations to independence, and ſuffer them to replace the ancient and neceſſary barriers of their ſecurity. And although the Republican deſpots who ſucceſſively govern that miſerable country may be indifferent to the ſufferings of their ſubjects, ſo they can purſue their own ambitious and deſtructive projects, their people will view with abhorrence their rapacious rulers, who, in order to feed an empty ambition, deprive them of the enjoyment of their natural advantages, which nothing is wanting to reſtore, but a ſacrifice of ſome uſeleſs, though ſplendid conqueſts. Even the ſubjects of Buonaparte will ſoon diſcover that ſomething more is neceſſary for their happineſs, than that boaſted ſecurity from the guillotine, which makes them, for the moment, worſhip their tyrant; and they will be ſenſible of the folly of ſacrificing, to the perſonal pride of a foreign uſurper, the ſolid advantages of national proſperity, and the invaluable comforts of ſocial life.

But although we had not ſuch powerful means of obliging the enemy to forego, at length, his exorbitant and inadmiſſible pretenſions, it would be incumbent upon us to maintain the conteſt, until peace might be obtained on ſuch terms as would render it preferable to a ſtate of hoſtility. That war is an evil of very great magnitude, that peace is a bleſſing of very high value, no one pretends to diſpute. It does not, however, follow, that pacification muſt, under any circumſtances, be a benefit. It is poſſible for peace to be attended with an increaſe of danger; to be deſtitute of the bleſſings which conſtitute its value; to be purchaſed at the ineſtimable price of honour and ſecurity.

It

It may poſſibly be, not only a greater evil than war, but an evil of ſuch a magnitude, that, in compariſon, war would be a poſitive good, and, ſo far, a deſirable bleſſing.

Whenever, therefore, pacification is in queſtion, it becomes neceſſary to compare the ſituation in which it would place us, with that in which we already ſtand. The point for conſideration is not ſo much the probability there may be of our obtaining this or that ſpecific object by a continuance of the war, as whether, at the given period, peace, on ſuch terms as it is in our power to command, would be decidedly preferable to war; otherwiſe it is neceſſary to perſevere in hoſtilities, although we cannot diſtinctly foreſee the period of their termination. To ruſh precipitately into an inglorious and inſecure peace, becauſe the proſpect of one that is ſafe and honourable is not within the compaſs of our view, would be no leſs abſurd than for a traveller to plunge into the darkſome foreſt, there to repoſe among wolves and tygers, becauſe he cannot as yet catch even a diſtant glimpſe of any habitation, where he may ſecurely reſt his weary limbs.

This view of the ſubject excludes all doubts reſpecting the preferableneſs of peace or war, at the preſent juncture. For there is now no queſtion of any peace which would not confirm to France ſuch a degree of aggrandizement as would enable her to lord it over the reſt of Europe. According to the articles which an Auſtrian officer, without any authority for that purpoſe, was lately *prevailed upon* to ſign at Paris, there is now no hope of any other pacification than one which, in its moſt favourable conſtruction, would leave our natural enemy in poſſeſſion of all Germany to the Rhine, of a great part of Italy, with the probable means of acquiring the reſt—of Savoy, Nice, Piedmont, Switzerland, and, what is ſtill more intereſting to us, of the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the whole Dutch coaſt. Is there an Engliſhman who can conſider ſuch a peace as a deſirable exchange even for a diſaſtrous war? But that it would be advantageous for this country to conclude, on *ſuch terms*, a triumphant

naval war, is a propoſition which no man in his ſenſes will venture ſeriouſly to advance.

This, however, is not all. We are not ſure of obtaining peace even on ſuch humiliating and ruinous conditions. In order to be permitted to negociate, we muſt give up every advantage which, in conſequence of ſo many victories, diſtinguiſhes our preſent ſituation; we muſt allow the enemy to equip his fleets, to furniſh his arſenals, to relieve his blockaded places, and enable him again to meet us on our element, or (which he would probably prefer) to renew, with better proſpect of ſucceſs, his attempts to invade Great Britain or Ireland—and all this, before we can know whether he will, on any terms, admit us into his inſidious and perilous amity. A Naval Armiſtice, in ſhort, is the condition which he dares to propoſe to Britons, as the indiſpenſable preliminary to negociation. Here, at leaſt, he has touched upon a ſtring which vibrates in every Britiſh heart.—It remains to be ſeen, whether the malicious ingenuity of Oppoſition can diſcover any ground of cenſure againſt Government for rejecting the audacious propoſal. It is more probable that the party will rather chuſe to renew their attack upon the rejection of the overtures for negociation at the commencement of the preſent year, becauſe the merits of that caſe depend upon a complication of circumſtances. But upon the queſtion of a Naval Armiſtice, the ſpontaneous feelings and intuitive judgment of every man who is at all ſolicitous for the welfare of Britain, pronounce ſo decidedly for a rejection, that the papers in the ſervice of Oppoſition, nay even thoſe in the pay of the enemy, have not dared to aſſert that the demand ought to have been granted. Can a ſtronger proof be required of the determination of the Firſt Conſul againſt peace, than his inſiſting on a preliminary even to negociation, for the acceptance of which not a man in this country ventures openly to declare.

In addition to the many cogent motives which call upon us to perſevere in the conteſt, rather than conſent to terms of peace with the French Republic, which every man in this kingdom would reject with diſdain,

if

if they were propoſed by the French Monarchy, the preſent ſtate of France affords the greateſt encouragement to try, ſtill further, the chances of war. The internal condition of that country is as precarious as its external power is formidable. The Coloſſus which threatens to beſtride Europe, and which terrifies the world, is, like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, ſupported by a frail compound of baſe and heterogeneous materials; and it may in an inſtant be broken in pieces, "and "become like the chaff of the ſummer threſhing-floors."—The French Republic is inceſſantly changing her tyrants and her conſtitution; ſhe is not poſſeſſed of "*any permanence either as to perſons or things.*" The Conſular Government, like its predeceſſors, is liable to be "blown down by a breath of wind, and to make "way for other men who have different views, or may "be ſlaves of an oppoſite intereſts."

The reign of Buonaparte, like that of his predeceſſors, muſt have its term, of which, to judge from experience, a large proportion is already expired; and the period of its termination will probably be more favourable to the cauſe of lawful government than any of the preceding revolutions could be *. For ſuch is the joy

* Since the above was written, the Author has ſeen a copy of an excellent tract, not yet publiſhed, on Buonaparte's propoſals for opening a negociation for peace, entitled "A Letter to **** *******, by the Rev. John Brand, M.A. of which the following paſſage will not be here inapplicable:—

"A few months continuance has not yet, in any caſe, given ſtability "to thoſe who have uſurped power in France; and if there be ſome "circumſtances which ſeem to promiſe it to the preſent uſurpation, "which were wanted to the former, they are more than over-balanced "by the Conſul being an effective alien. The ſpirit of Revolution "often ſeems dormant, *when it is ſecretly exerting itſelf with great "efficacy*; and may be really dormant, but not dead. Revolution in "France reſembles a certain inſect, which the reſearches of modern "naturaliſts have diſcovered, and which, from its inceſſant gyration, "or rotatory motion, has obtained with us the name of the *wheel "animalculum*. It follows from what Dr. Pulteney, in his view of "the writings of Linnæus, tells us, that this great legiſlator of "natural hiſtory includes this ſpecies among the *chaotic* animalcula; "which immediately follow the Furiæ. When dried, it will remain "as duſt for long periods of time, but revives, in full vigour, by "barely putting a ſingle drop of water upon it, and inſtantly reſumes "its revolutionary movements. Now, according to the average "duration

joy which has been inſpired by the conſolidation of power in the hands of a *ſingle* tyrant, that its revulſion to *many* would, even in idea, excite a degree of horror which would render ſuch an event almoſt impoſſible; and among the numerous probable competitors for the ſucceſſion to this modern Alexander, there is no one whoſe ſuperiority in wickedneſs and ſucceſs would give him a decided aſcendancy over the reſt. A civil war would, therefore, probably take place, which would naturally lead to a joyful *Reſtoration*. At all events, the demonſtration would be then complete, that nothing but the re-eſtabliſhment of lawful authority can afford the French people a reaſonable hope for the enjoyment of that repoſe in which all their deſires begin at length to centre. The Firſt Conſul ſeems, indeed, to be fully aware, that he has no other chance of eſtabliſhing his government, even for a time, than by a ſucceſsful revolutionary war, or, which would be in effect the ſame thing, a peace which would leave Europe at his mercy. But while Great Britain refuſes to be a party to ſuch a peace, the door will continue open to improve any viciſſitudes which may take place in France. There will even be a chance for a new combination of power to cruſh the efforts of Gallic malice and preſumption. So long as the Britiſh ſtandard is unfurled in the cauſe of ſociety, there will be a rallying point for other nations, when they witneſs, as no doubt they ſoon will, the attempts of the Republic at further encroachments, and her continued advances towards the accompliſhment of that plan of univerſal ſubjugation, of which, hitherto, ſhe has not for a moment loſt ſight, which ſhe knows how to pro-

" duration of a French Conſtitution, the preſent Conſular Govern-
" ment ſeems already to have ſurvived almoſt a third of its term *.
" The time may be a little more, or a little leſs; for, without a dili-
" gent enquiry, which I have not time to enter upon, an error may be
" eaſily fallen into, in reckoning the periods of power enjoyed by
" their ſeveral ſets of rulers, before they have been ſent to Cayenne,
" or the Guillotine."

* This tract contains internal evidence of having been written ſome months ago.

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mote by peace as well as by war, and which her ſucceſſes are not very likely to induce her to abandon. Unleſs Europe be in that ſtate of dementation which is an awful ſymptom of approaching ruin, it will ſurely diſcover, at length, the neceſſity of confederating upon the wiſe principle, unfolded in the famous declaration of the Emperor of all the Ruſſias; namely, *to deſtroy the monſter who threatens to cruſh all legal authorities.* But, although the expectation of another Confederacy ſhould not be realized—although the French Republic, with Buonaparte at its head, ſhould, incredible as the ſuppoſition may appear, ceaſe for a time to be offenſive to its neighbours, and the reſt of Europe ſhould, upon mature deliberation, ſuffer France to retain a power ſo preponderant, as to reduce the whole Continent to a ſtate of dependence—although, in ſhort, all ſenſe of right, intereſt, honour, duty, and danger, together with every feeling of reſentment for the paſt, and of ſolicitude for the future, ſhould be extinguiſhed in a ſtupid deſire of precarious repoſe, and ſhort-lived tranquillity, ſtill an inexhauſtible ſource of viciſſitude will remain open in the heart of Republican France, and a new exploſion of the revolutionary volcano may, provided the Britiſh thunder continue to be heard, revive the hopes and re-animate the exertions of the civilized world.

It may be ſaid, perhaps, that prudence requires us to calculate the riſks, as well as the chances of war. This, it muſt be owned, is a very unuſual ſpecies of calculation with us, when peace cannot be obtained without a ſacrifice of honour and ſecurity. But if (to view the ſubject in its moſt unfavourable light) any of us ſhould be appalled at the idea of our being, once more, left alone in the conteſt, to bear the whole brunt of French Republican wrath, and to face the implacable reſentment—the inſatiate malice of Buonaparte himſelf—If we ſhudder at the idea of a new army of England, aſſembled, like the former one, under this redoubted champion, for the invaſion of our iſland, and again filling the air with bluſtering menaces "to

" deſtroy for ever the Britiſh Government," and " to " puniſh Albion for its long catalogue of crimes againſt " humanity."—If the apprehenſion of ſuch ſcenes inſpire any of us with diſmay, let us, for Heaven's ſake, ſuppreſs our fears, and *aſſume a virtue if we have it not*, leſt the heroes of Agincourt, Creſſy, and Poictiers—of Blenheim, Ramillies, and La Hogue, iſſue from their graves, to load with reproaches their degenerate deſcendants—or leſt the no leſs illuſtrious heroes of Camperdown, St. Vincent, the Nile, and St. Jean d'Acre, with many others, whoſe achievements in the preſent war not only ſurpaſs all precedent, but almoſt exceed belief, think that they have fought and conquered for a puſillanimous race, who tremble at the threats of France while a Britiſh Navy rides triumphantly, the miſtreſs of the ſeas, and impriſons the diſpirited and broken remains of the hoſtile fleets within their very innermoſt harbours. Or if, deriving a juſt confidence from ſuch reflections, we ſtill contemplate, with chilling dread, the poſſibility that, favoured by the darkneſs of night, or the direction of winds, ſome of the Gallic hordes may be able to elude our naval guardians, and to effect a landing on Britiſh ground—ſtill let us beware leſt, by appearing to dread ſuch an event, we inſult thoſe gallant and patriotic legions, who, like the Cadmean troop, ſprang forth in an inſtant, in martial array, when Buonaparte prepared to lead on the firſt army of England, and on whoſe appearance, the mighty hero preferred the mad Egyptian expedition to an enterprize againſt Britons, whom he ſaw determined to defend their King, their Altars, and their homes. Before ſuch an enterprize can ſucceed, it is neceſſary, not only that thoſe legions ſhould be falſe to the engagements, which they have plighted with the ſolemnities of Religion, but that our regular troops ſhould want that valour, to encounter an invading enemy, which they uniformly diſplay in foreign countries—nay, that the whole body of Britiſh people ſhould be diſpoſed to ſurrender, without a ſtruggle, whatever is dear and

valuable,

valuable, to the mercy of their ancient foe. A Prelate * of the Anglican church has too good an opinion of his countrymen, to believe ſuch things poſſible; nay, he is willing to confide in their patriotic energy, even though a bridge were placed acroſs the Britiſh Channel, at its narroweſt part, to favour an invading enemy. Every nation which has been overcome by France has been inſtrumental to its own deſtruction, either by its internal diviſions, or by indulging the prepoſterous hope, favoured by Gallic artifice, that, by neglecting to avail itſelf of its means of defence, it might appeaſe the wrath, or conciliate the clemency of the foe. But, happily for us, that foe has given us ſo many and ſuch unequivocal proofs of inveterate malice and inſatiable reſentment—he has demonſtrated ſo fully, that all his outrageous and vindictive paſſions centre in a fixed deſire to accompliſh our ruin—and ſo diſtinct are the ideas which we have formed of the objects of a Gallic invaſion—that whenever an attempt of that nature is at all likely to be made, the moſt furious opponent of Government chooſes rather to fly to the ranks, than to truſt to the forbearance of an adverſary, whoſe generoſity he has been wont to extol, and whoſe cauſe he has been accuſtomed to plead, within the walls of Parliament.

Some of the Gentlemen in Oppoſition have had an opportunity, in the preſent war, of giving a formal opinion upon the ſubject of invaſion. Being conſulted by an agent of France †, who was directed to procure the beſt information reſpecting the probable ſucceſs of ſuch an attempt, they declared in the moſt poſitive terms, that it would ſerve only to unite, in the cloſeſt manner, the people of this country, and that it muſt inevitably fail. If thoſe among us, who are accuſtomed to view every thing in the moſt gloomy light, are thus confident upon a queſtion of ſuch im-

* The Biſhop of Landaff, in a pamphlet publiſhed in 1798, and entitled "An Addreſs to the People of Great Britain."

† Mr. Stone, afterwards tried for High Treaſon.

portance, ſhall we reſign ourſelves to deſpondency? Shall we, from our impregnable Iſle, look with terror on any efforts which the enemy can make againſt us, and which, unleſs we be falſe to ourſelves, muſt be as ineffectual as the angry billows, which foam againſt the craggy ſides of the ſolid rock? Shall we, with a naval ſuperiority which we never before poſſeſſed, be intimidated into a ſacrifice of all the intereſts for which we have been ſo long contending, and confirm to our adverſary a degree of power and aggrandizement, which would render him the dictator of Europe? Surely the deſcendants of ancient Britons are not arrived at ſuch a ſtate of degeneracy. Our anceſtors, with half our comparative advantages, would have contemptuouſly hurled defiance at France, until they made that haughty rival ſue for peace, on terms compatible with *their* honour and ſafety. Animated by the juſtice of their cauſe, and fired with indignation at the inſolent pretenſions of the foe, they would have replied to all his menaces,

"This England never did, and never ſhall
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror;
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we ſhall ſhock them."

But it is poſſible that ſome perſons, who in the field would be bold as lions, may, when they turn their eyes towards the Bank of England, find their ſpirit and patriotiſm abſorbed in calculations of the different effects of peace and war upon their funded property; or, extending their views ſtill further, they indulge themſelves, perhaps, in avaricious dreams of the commercial advantages, which they expect to derive from a general pacification. But if, on ſuch grounds, we decide upon the great queſtion of peace or war, we ſhall, indeed, deſerve the invidious appellation, beſtowed upon us by our inſulting enemies, and prove ourſelves to be a mere "nation of ſhop-"keepers." The reſult, however, will convince us, that

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ſuch a low and ſordid policy is injurious even to thoſe intereſts, which it is moſt ſtudious to promote. Although the faſcinating ſound of the word peace is ſure always to produce an advance in the *nominal* value of funded property, the *real* value of that property would be dreadfully diminiſhed, and even its current price would be ſpeedily and greatly depreſſed, by a diſgraceful and unſubſtantial peace.

During the preſent moſt expenſive and deſperate conteſt, our commerce and our credit, in ſpite of numberleſs predictions of bankruptcy and ruin, have been in a progreſſive ſtate of proſperity. To what is this wonderful phenomenon to be attributed? Certainly it is in a great meaſure owing to the ſalutary influence of a wiſe ſyſtem of finance. But its grand operating cauſe has been that manly, noble, and reſolute ſpirit, with which we have defended not merly our own honour and our own rights, but the general welfare and ſecurity. It is this which has procured us the confidence of other nations, and has taught us to confide in ourſelves. It is this which has conſtituted us the guardians of ſociety. It is this, in ſhort, which has made the riches of every clime to flow into our ports, invigorated thoſe reſources which have been employed for the general benefit, and furniſhed the means, which, upon principles of the moſt politic wiſdom, we devoted to the defence of Religion, order, law, and juſtice, againſt the attacks of atheiſm, anarchy, and rapine. Shall we depart from a line of conduct, which, beſides being ſo judicious and ſo honourable, has led to ſuch happy conſequences? Shall we renounce that ſyſtem of liberal and enlightened policy, which promotes our own ſafety and happineſs, by conſulting the ſafety and happineſs of all with whom we have a common intereſt, and, retiring within ourſelves, loſe all concern for the reſt of mankind, in the gratification of the moſt ſordid and mercenary feelings? If we do this, we ſhall ſoon find that our boaſted wealth, by debaſing our ſpirit, is in reality our greateſt misfortune. We ſhall ſoon feel

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according to circumſtances, the full extent of his deſigns is not, at all times, equally apparent; and the uncertainty which thus ariſes reſpecting his views is, in the genuine ſtile of Jacobinical ſophiſtry, applied to us, who are under the neceſſity of oppoſing his object, whatever it may be, and though it were altogether unknown to us. But, without having any reaſon to flatter ourſelves, that he has abandoned the original deſign of involving us in the horrors of Revolution, his avowed deſigns are more than ſufficient to provoke our moſt determined and perſevering reſiſtance, and to give to our object a moſt diſtinct ſpecification. For with whatever hypocriſy he may, at times, conceal or diſguiſe his ultimate views, it is notorious that he ſeeks to ſecure for himſelf an acceſſion of territory and power, which would be incompatible with the ſafety of all Europe, and in an eſpecial degree with that of Great Britain, whoſe deſtruction is evidently the predominant wiſh of his heart. The queſtion, therefore, is brought to a very ſimple iſſue. It is reduced to the ſingle point whether, with every thing to apprehend from the malice of our adverſary, we ſhall ſuffer him to attain the means of gratifying that malice to its utmoſt extent? Whether we ſhall permit him to ſecure an avowed object, which would encourage him to purſue, and enable him to accompliſh his concealed objects, be they never ſo deſtructive. In refuſing to be thus acceſſary to our own ruin, we act ſtill on the defenſive, and fight for objects of no leſs importance than our own honour and ſecurity, and the liberties and independence of Europe. And, although theſe terms be not found in the vocabulary of a Frenchified oppoſition, they are indelibly engraven on the heart of every True Briton.

But if it were not in our power to anſwer, in ſo ſatisfactory a manner, the inſidious queſtion, what is the object of the war? there would yet be another queſtion of far greater importance, particularly in ſuch a war as the preſent; What would be the effects of peace?

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With our arms in our hands, and while we retain a poſture of defence, we know, tolerably well, to what we have to truſt. But if we lay down thoſe arms, and reſign ourſelves to ſleep, who can tell in that ſleep of peace "what dreams may come?" Who can foreſee what may befal us, if we venture to indulge our longing for repoſe, without thoſe ſafeguards and ſentinels, by which our repoſe has always, hitherto, been protected? Who would chooſe to undergo the toils of war, to bear its burdens, and to endure its anxieties,

"But that the dread of ſomething after peace,
That undiſcovered country, from whoſe bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear the ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of?"

The advocates for an accommodation with the French Republic, endeavour to perſuade us that no material difference can exiſt between the ordinary effects of peace, and thoſe which, at this time, it would produce; and in order to favour the analogy, they expatiate much upon the uſual inſtability of pacific engagements. A more dangerous error can hardly exiſt than to conceive the two caſes ſimilar. It is true that humanity, juſtice, and good faith, have always had too little influence in producing and enforcing the amicable conventions of different States; and that the efficacy of ſuch ſtipulations was ſeldom proof againſt a concurrence of intereſt and power to infringe them. It ſhould not, however, be forgotten, either that treaties which, like that of Weſtphalia, were conſidered as the bulwarks of the public law of Europe, have been looked upon as ſacred from age to age; or that it was uſual, in ſubſequent treaties, to enumerate and confirm preceding ones, for a very conſiderable time backwards. But a peace with the French Republic would open a ſcene entirely new

new to the political world. Such a peace would imply, in the very meaning of the term, a diſſolution of all previous treaties, and more particularly of thoſe, which are moſt eſſential to the general ſecurity and independence. Beſides that, in point of ſtability it would not vie with the moſt precarious of all former pacifications, it would be deſtitute of the uſual and moſt common effects of peace—and it would be fraught with conſequences unknown to paſt experience. Formerly the termination of hoſtilities enabled us to diſband our war eſtabliſhments, to reduce our expences to the ratio of a peace expenditure, to reſtore (with the ſingle exception of that prudent vigilance, which ought ever to ſubſiſt where there is a diverſity of intereſt) a reſpectful, and an amicable communication with the Government with which we had been at enmity, and to enjoy, without fear or danger, an unlimited intercourſe with the ſubjects of that Government. Will any man ſay that theſe effects could attend a peace with Republican France? Is there a Stateſman, even in the ranks of Oppoſition, who upon ſuch a peace would dare to pronounce the word *diſarm*? Is there one who would venture to lay up our navy in ordinary, to reduce our land forces to a peace eſtabliſhment, to diſband our militia, or to diſſolve the volunteer corps, which were formed upon the impulſe of unprecedented danger, to defeat projects which had for their avowed object our utter extinction as a nation? If peace could not authorize ſuch reductions, it would not be attended with any great diminution of expence. It would be accompanied with the burthens of war; but it would be deſtitute of the important advantages which, during the war, compenſate thoſe burthens, and diſpoſe us to bear them with chearfulneſs. Our commerce would loſe the great advantages it now derives from the reſtrictions, impoſed by a naval war on that of the enemy. Our ports would no longer be crowded with captures, which afford ſome recompenſe to the proweſs of our gallant tars, whoſe prodigies of valour excite the aſtoniſhment of the world, and

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fill every Britiſh heart with exultation. The inextinguiſhable ardour of theſe intrepid champions, deprived of its natural vent, and reſtrained from diſplaying itſelf againſt the enemy, might burſt forth in eruptions infinitely more dreadful than the ſhock of war, or the thunder of contending fleets. And thus a navy, which is at once our Pride and our Palladium, would become a juſt object of jealouſy and terror*.

This abſence of the bleſſings of peace and of the advantages of war would not, however, conſtitute the principal objection to an accommodation with the French Republic. The communication which ſuch an event would reſtore between the two countries, would prove to this a ſource of new and inexpreſſible danger. The national intercourſe, which ſerved formerly for the reciprocation of commercial benefits, of improvements in manufactures, of diſcoveries in ſcience, of advancements in literature, would be converted into a vehicle of the moſt fatal contagion. What numbers of our countrymen, and particularly of our youth, would be attracted to the capital of triumphant guilt, there to ſee the grandeur of the victorious Republic, and, in that ſink of vice and impiety, utterly to extinguiſh their Religious and moral principles! How many, too, would reſort thither to be inſtructed in the revolutionary art, and to conſpire, with its foreign enemies, againſt their native country! And although they would not be able to attend the public ſittings of a Jacobin Club, nor be welcomed by the fraternal embrace of the Preſident of a National Convention, (ſuch forms being incompatible with the conſular authority), they would experience no want of private tutors in the ſcience of "organizing Revolutions;" a ſcience in which every man in office, power, or public ſtation, is a diſtinguiſhed profeſſor! The miſchief, however reſult-

* It ſhould not be forgotten that a danger of this kind would be inſeparable from a Naval Armiſtice.

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ing from ſuch excurſions of baneful curioſity or perverſe deſign, though great, may be conceived. But who can eſtimate the danger ariſing to our internal tranquillity, and to our conſtitution itſelf, from the "Apoſtles of Rebellion"—the Miſſionaries of the *Propagande*, who would, in ſhoals, viſit this country to infuſe diſcontent and to excite revolt? Who can even calculate the effect of the appearance among us of a Republican Ambaſſador and his Jacobin ſuite? How would our demagogues exult at the exhibition of the tri-coloured cockade at St. James's! With what rapture would they chaunt their Iö Pæans, when they beheld the ſacred preſence of Britiſh Majeſty polluted by a train of Gallic regicides*! With what confidence would they conſider ſuch a ſpectacle as the triumph of the French revolution, and as the prelude to a revolution in this country! What energy would ſuch ſcenes give to deſperate faction! How rapidly would they light up the ill-covered embers of ſedition! How would they animate our agitators and anarchiſts! How would they quicken the "imperiſhable ſeed" which the propagators of the Rights of Man have moſt copiouſly ſown†! Can it be ſuppoſed that a Con-

* This idea is ſo tranſporting to them, that they ſometimes chaunt their Io Pæans by anticipation: thus Mr. Wakefield——"For myſelf, "who have exulted in the ſucceſs of the French, and the diſgrace of "their inſolent and odious foes, with a keenneſs of tranſport not to "be deſcribed, I have been long prepared to hail the triumphant "entry of a Republican Repreſentative; and ſhall exclaim, with "equal fincerity and rapture,

"Dicite Iö Pæan et Iö bis dicite Pæan.
"Oh! may I live to hail that glorious day,
"And ſing loud Pæans through the crouded way."

The ſame writer thus bears teſtimony to the deleterious influence which the neighbourhood of the French Republic would have on the Britiſh character and manners—

"The neighbouring influence of the French Republic; not her arms, "but the ſilent and tranquil operation of her principles, on our cha-"racter, our manners, and our policy; an imperceptible, efficacious "energy! which nothing can preclude, nothing can counteract, and "nothing eventually reſiſt."——See a reply to the letter of Edmund Burke, Eſq. by Gilbert Wakefield, B. A.

† "Imperiſhable ſeed." The modern philoſophers do not deſpair becauſe the ſucceſs of their labours is poſtponed, or becauſe the moſt zeal-

Conſular Ambaſſador would neglect ſo fair an opportunity of promoting the exerciſe of the holy right of inſurrection? Is it likely that a Jacobin Plenipo ſhould be deficient in powers to treat with the Sovereign People, to recognize their majeſtic prerogatives, and to negociate with them a fraternal alliance? Would he not, like Chauvelin, be authorized to make "a ſolemn appeal to the nation?" Would his employers neglect, in conformity with the commentary on the famous decree of the 15th of December 1792, which was framed by the Executive Council, for the uſe of their Revolutionary Commiſſaries, to "aſſociate with "him a ſufficient number of agents more particularly "deſtined for *inſtructive communication* with the inhabitants of the country," or to furniſh him (according to the promiſe then made) with "liſts of thoſe citizens "who are known for their patriotic ſentiments?" Le Brun, who was Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, and Member of the Executive Council when theſe revolutionary arrangements were formed, is now a *puiſne* Conſul; and Talleyrand, who is now Foreign Secretary of State, was then an aſſociate with Chauvelin. Theſe men have ſcarcely deſtroyed the liſts of "patriotic citizens," made out at that time; and the Correſponding Society would, doubtleſs, be very ready to co-operate in the friendly taſk of "inſtructive communica-"tion."

Should it be thought that theſe dangers might be obviated by extraordinary precautions, let it be conſidered what kind of peace that would be which

zealous patrons of their cauſe frequently become its martyrs. Of this we are aſſured, by Mr. Southey, in the following lines:

"The damning guilt
"Of Briſſot murdered, and the blameleſs wife
"Of Roland! martyred patriots! ſpirits pure,
"Wept by the good ye fell! yet ſtill ſurvives,
"Sown by your toil, and by your blood manured,
"Th' imperiſhable ſeed; and now its roots
"Spread and ſtrike deep, and ſoon ſhall it become
"That tree beneath whoſe ſhade the ſons of men
"Shall pitch their tents in peace."

JOAN OF ARC.

ſhould require *extraordinary precautions*, to protect our internal tranquillity againſt the very envoys of the Power, with which we ſhould profeſs to be at amity, and to prevent thoſe envoys, and their ſubordinate agents, from plotting, in conjunction with domeſtic traitors, the overthrow of our Government. Beſides, might not any ſuch precautions, however neceſſary, furniſh ground for offence, and tend to diſturb the good underſtanding which, as friends of peace, we ſhould be ſolicitous to preſerve? The French Revolutioniſts are known to be the moſt iraſcible politicians who have ever appeared on the public ſtage of Europe. Though they allow themſelves an unbounded licenſe to inſult others, who do not entirely fall in with their views, they cannot brook even the ſmalleſt contradiction. Of this we had the fulleſt proof before the war, when, although they made no ſcruple to avow the vaſt deſign of overturning every ancient and eſtabliſhed Government, and of entirely changing the face of ſociety, they would not allow us the privilege even of being alarmed, much leſs of adopting any meaſures for the prevention of ſo awful a change. Although they received, with open arms, traitors from this country, who announced the diſſolution of the Britiſh Government, and the eſtabliſhment, in its ſtead, of a National Convention, every expedient which we adopted, to avert ſuch events, was conſidered by them, and their advocates here, as indications of a hoſtile diſpoſition. Although they had very conſiderably augmented their navy, when, at the cloſe of the year 1792, they openly avowed projects for our deſtruction, and when they publicly intimated a deſign of making a deſcent in this country with 50,000 caps of liberty, yet when we, in conſequence of ſuch indications of approaching hoſtility, made a comparatively ſmall addition to our maritime force, they took umbrage, and threatened that if we did not diſcontinue our naval preparations, they would prepare for war. If they diſplayed ſuch a character in the modeſty of youth, what may not be expected from them

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in the confidence of maturity, and in the exultation of ſucceſs? How could peace be preſerved with ſuch rulers, unleſs we ſhould determine to ſubmit, in all things, to their pleaſure, and to have no other law than their will?

It appears, then, that the relations of peace and amity, which ſome of us are ſo eager to form with the French Republic, would be incapable of duration—that, inſtead of reſtoring that friendly, confidential, and mutually beneficial intercourſe, which ſuch relations were wont to produce, they would conſiſt in a cold, conſtrained, and diſtruſtful civility, an hypocritical uſe of forms, thinly covering, but by no means concealing, a mutual and irreconcileable hoſtility; and, which is worſt of all, that they would furniſh to the enemy means of miſchief far more dreadful than any which can be ſupplied by war. We ſhould tremble much more at his ſymbols of friendſhip than we had even done at his tokens of hoſtility. We ſhould find it more difficult to guard againſt an Ambaſſador and his train, than a General at the head of his army. We ſhould be convinced that there may be more harm in deplomatic arrangements than in military operations. In the moſt favourable view of the ſubject, we ſhould enjoy nothing more than an armed truce—"a warlike peace." We ſhould only reſt upon our arms; and fatal would be the night in which we diſcontinued our watch. Our ſword, inſtead of repoſing quietly in the ſcabbard, muſt continue, at leaſt, half drawn, that it might be ready, at a moment's notice, to prevent ſurpriſe, or defeat treachery. But the danger would be that no vigilance and no energy would be able to counteract the Jacobinical arts which, under the maſk of friendſhip, the enemy would employ for our deſtruction.

Some perſons, indeed, have diſmiſſed from their minds all apprehenſion of danger from Jacobinical arts, ſince the moment when the laſt revolution in France veſted the ſupreme authority in Buonaparte. They conſider the Firſt Conſul as a determined foe

to the Jacobins, over whom he triumphed when he concentrated all power in himſelf, and whom he is obliged inceſſantly to watch, leſt they diſturb his reign. But though he may dread their machinations againſt himſelf, does it follow that he would ſcruple to practice their arts, in which he has ſhewn himſelf ſo great an adept, againſt others? Becauſe he does not ſuffer them to cabal againſt his own Government, is it a neceſſary conſequence that he ties their hands from moleſting other Governments, which he is ſolicitous to ſubvert? Can it be doubted that he would be glad of their aſſiſtance in his revolutionary plans? or that he would, in compenſation for the reſtrictions he impoſes on them in France and its affiliated territories, grant them full liberty to plot againſt the tranquillity and order of the reſt of the world? Or is it likely that he would reject the ſervices of thoſe ſwarms of Jacobins which the French Revolution has hatched in every country, and which, upon the ſunſhine of Peace, would iſſue from the lurking-places where they have been obliged to take ſhelter from the ſtorm of war?

To the domeſtic dangers, inſeparable from a pacification with the French Republic, muſt be added the univerſal danger that muſt attend a Peace, by which Buonaparte, as ruler of that Republic, would acquire, not merely a preponderating influence, but a decided aſcendancy over the reſt of Europe. Is it poſſible to conceive a more certain and ſpeedy inſtrument of general ruin, than ſuch an aſcendancy would prove in ſuch hands? Can a doubt exiſt that he would avail himſelf of it to purſue that ſyſtem of general ſubverſion, to which all his paſt labours have been directed? With what facility it would enable him to accompliſh, by ſap or by ſtorm, the deſtruction of the remains of lawful authority, it is not difficult to judge, if we conſider, for a moment, the ſtate of the public mind throughout the continent of Europe, and the very weak reſiſtance which has hitherto been oppoſed

to

to the progreſs of French arms and French principles. Nay, although new revolutions ſhould ſwallow up his authority, and again convulſe the boſom of France, yet ſuch events, which, if this country were ſtill at war, might be improved to the greateſt advantage, would avail nothing if the Britiſh lion were laid inglorioufly aſleep: on the contrary, they would ſerve only to inſpire the continental nations with additional terror, and to render them more willing victims to their inſatiable foe. It might, perhaps, be the privilege of Great Britain, if a privilege it can be called, to be the laſt victim. It would even be judicious in the enemy to lull her, if poſſible, into a ſtate of falſe confidence and ideal ſecurity, as the work of death ſhould be advancing upon the continent; while ſhe, having ſet the ſeal to her own infamy, would find, like Sampſon when his locks were ſhorn, that her ſpirit and her ſtrength had deſerted her. No conſideration of foreign intereſt, or of diſtant danger, would rouze her to freſh exertions. She would ſee ſtate after ſtate ſwallowed up in the revolutionary vortex, without one effort to avert her own approaching ruin—without poſſeſſing a miniſter ſo bold, or a patriot ſo honeſt, as to pronounce ſo unpopular a word as—WAR. At length, when ſhe beheld the whole continent of Europe converted into a battery againſt herſelf, and its entire force, under the direction of a ſingle hand, employed for her deſtruction, ſhe would, in diſmay and deſpair, ſhrink from the unequal conteſt—and, like Switzerland, by baſe compromiſe and temporiſing policy, (ſuch as Oppoſition recommended to her before the war) ſurrender herſelf, by degrees, into the hands of her ancient enemy; or, by a late, deſperate, and unavailing ſtruggle, conclude the illuſtrious hiſtory of Britain, and thereby extinguiſh the laſt hope of the civilized world.

Such would be the natural operation of a general peace, which ſhould ſacrifice, in favour of Buonaparte, the balance of power; unleſs, indeed, according to the

romantically generous ſpeculations of ſome perſons, this ſcourge of mankind has undergone a miraculous change—unleſs he has not only renounced Jacobiniſm, but learned moderation, juſtice, and ſelf-denial from ſucceſſes, which would have turned the brain of any other man. For, incredible as it may ſeem, there are politicians, whoſe faith in ſuch extravagant reveries would induce them to leave this ambitious tyrant, this conſummate hypocrite, in poſſeſſion of almoſt one half of Europe, rather than continue a war which, from its commencement, has been attended with a progreſſive increaſe of national ſecurity:—and though he has hitherto diſappointed the hopes they entertained of ſeeing him, like Monk, the champion of royalty, ſtill they are unwilling to doubt of his converſion; or thinking, perhaps, that when he played the Jacobin, he played the hypocrite, they now expect him to blaze out in the character of a great and beneficent Potentate, and, inſtead of abuſing his immenſe power, to cultivate the arts of peace, to maintain the general tranquillity, and to ſeek only to make his ſubjects happy, and his empire flouriſhing. Thus an honourable Senator, in the exceſs of tranſport with which the victory of Marengo inſpired him, is reported to have "put it to the feelings of every "member of the houſe," (which he addreſſed) "whether every one action of Buonaparte, ſince the overtures which he made in the preſent year, had not "tended to raiſe him in the eſtimation of every candid "man." And the ſame Senator is further reported to have expreſſed a hope that "this magnanimous perſon, "though a kind of ſelf-appointed Dictator, would "exerciſe his power in bringing about the liberty of "France."

Whether the Jacobiniſm of Buonaparte be real or pretended, it is pure, genuine Jacobiniſm, which is here attributed to a Britiſh Senator. For what elſe is it to promote the cauſe of anarchy and oppreſſion, by a proſtitution of the name of liberty? But who, that had not lived in theſe de-

degenerate days, could believe it poſſible for ſuch baſe adulation to be offered, in the preſence of a Britiſh Parliament, to the moſt deteſtable miſcreant, by whom the vengeance of Heaven has ever puniſhed the ſins of mankind? Who could believe it poſſible for a Britiſh Oppoſition to be ſo loſt to every feeling of virtue, patriotiſm and decency, as to kiſs the feet of ſuch a wretch, in veneration for his triumphs over the Allies of their country? But although it is now demonſtrated by experience, that faction is capable of degrading even Britons to ſuch aſtoniſhing depths of infamy, ſtill every one who is not factious will rather expect the Ethiopian to change his ſkin, and the Leopard his ſpots, than Buonaparte ever to be any thing elſe than a ſcourge to humanity. Although a Member of Oppoſition may conſider the battle of Marengo, becauſe it ſeems to fix an Uſurper in his ſeat, and to preſerve his Republic from the dangers which before impended over it, as a full atonement for his crimes, both in Italy and Egypt, for his numberleſs murders, for his wanton maſſacres, and for his matchleſs impieties, ſtill every heart, in which the moral ſenſe is not quite extinct, will but abhor the more ſuch a prodigy of guilt, ſuch a monſter of cruelty, perfidy and blaſphemy, on account of every ſucceſs he may obtain in that cauſe, in which all his paſt atrocities have been perpetrated. The very perſons who now idolize this military buccaneer on account of the ſplendour and importance of his victories, have been accuſtomed to exclaim againſt thoſe conquerors who are renowned in hiſtory for having, to gratify their ambition, invaded the peace of countries which had done them no injury, ſeized upon territories to which they had no right, and deluged the earth with blood. The cenſure of ſuch exploits is certainly juſt; and it is fraught with an uſeful admonition. Mankind have always been too apt to be dazzled by ſucceſs, and, in admiration of the triumphs, to forget the crimes, of the Alexanders and the Cæſars, who have diſturbed the peace of the world. But how comes it to paſs that

the moral philoſophers who judge ſo rightly of former times, and who ſee in the heroes of antiquity but ſo many robbers and murderers, are loſt in admiration of Buonaparte, becauſe they think (with Mr. Sheridan) that " he has diſtanced every military exploit " in modern times, and achieved what never has " been attempted from the days of Hannibal to the " preſent period."

This inconſiſtency is the more ſtriking, becauſe, admitting, for the ſake of argument, that there is no exaggeration in the above ſtatement, although in the judgment of military men the perſon therein deſcribed is but a raſh and deſperate adventurer;—admitting that a General, ſhamefully driven, with his beſt troops, from a place " not defenſible according to the rules of art*," by a naval officer, at the head of a few ſeamen, and of a garriſon of undiſciplined Turks—that ſuch a General may vie with a Marlborough or a Suwarrow;—admitting that Buonaparte was raiſed to the higheſt pitch of military fame by the battle of Marengo, in which battle, however, *he* was certainly defeated, and the entire honour of the victory remained with Deſſaix;—ſtill, in every other reſpect, connected with the character of a hero, he is a juſt object of extreme deteſtation. The illuſtrious Chieftains, the brilliancy of whoſe exploits has rendered them famous in hiſtory, poſſeſſed qualities, independently of bravery and conduct, which juſtly ennobled them in the eſtimation of mankind. They had a greatneſs and generoſity of ſoul, a loftineſs and dignity of mind, which not only rendered them incapable of any thing mean and baſe, but which ſometimes impelled them to actions ſo grand and ſublime, as to command the applauſe even of thoſe perſons who are moſt indignant at their inſatiable ambition. They had alſo a ſenſe of humanity, a compaſſionate tenderneſs of heart, which

* See Sir Sidney Smith's Letter to Evan Nepean, Eſq. dated the Tigre, off Jaffa, June 19, 1799.

made

made them ever ready to fly to the relief of a vanquiſhed foe, and to alleviate, by kindneſs and ſympathy, his misfortune and his ſufferings. Until this day, ſuch qualities have always been conſidered as eſſential to true heroiſm; and no perſon who was deſtitute of them, however brave, enterpriſing and ſucceſsful, has been dignified with the title of great. Borgia was, perhaps, as bold and undaunted in the field as Julius Cæſar; but if he had gained as many triumphs as that renowned commander, he would ſtill have been deteſted as a monſter, inſtead of being admired as a hero. Who, then, will dare to proſtitute the name of Greatneſs, by uniting it with that of Buonaparte—*Monſtrum nullâ virtute redemptum*—of whom no one trait of generoſity is recorded—who has, in no one inſtance, uſed ſucceſs with moderation—the baſeneſs of whoſe actions infinitely exceeds the ſplendour of his victories—who is ſtill more diſtinguiſhed by craft, perfidy, cruelty, and oppreſſion, than by military atchievements—who, beſides having ſhewn himſelf, on various occaſions, as prodigal of human blood as Robeſpierre, is, in other reſpects, an object of ſtill greater deteſtation to every virtuous and conſiderate mind, than even that unfeeling monſter—who crowded into a ſingle expedition, treacherouſly undertaken againſt a country, enjoying, without ſuſpicion of danger, a profound peace, and whoſe Government was in perfect amity with France, more baſeneſs and atrocity than can be found in the life of any other man—who commenced that expedition with openly blaſpheming his God, abjuring the Saviour of the world, renouncing the faith which he had till then profeſſed, and, to facilitate the ſucceſs of his enterprize, hypocritically aſſumi[illegible] the Religion of the people whom he came to enſlave—who then unneceſſarily aſſaulted a defenceleſs place, which he might have obtained by ſummons, and, that he might ſtrike a *ſalutary* terror, wantonly and indiſcriminately maſſacred men, women, and children at the breaſt—who, after cauſing, by the orders which he iſſued, the French Admiral

to loſe his life with his fleet, calumniated his memory by attributing his diſaſter to his own fault*—who at Jaffa murdered his Turkiſh priſoners in cold blood, three days after their capture—who, at Acre, ſuddenly and treacherouſly aſſaulted the place, when, by propoſing a ceſſation of arms, for the purpoſe of burying the dead, he hoped he had put the garriſon off its guard—who, having in vain attempted to aſſaſſinate, traduced Sir Sidney Smith, by falſely and maliciouſly charging him with intentionally expoſing his priſoners to the infection of the plague—and, finally, who baſely deſerted his own army, and ſecretly ſtole away to France when he found his expedition deſperate†. Shall ſuch a man be named

* Theſe facts, with numberleſs ſubordinate inſtances of rapine and barbarity, are ſubſtantiated by the beſt of all poſſible evidence, the confeſſion of the guilty parties, publiſhed to the world in letters from the Commander and officers engaged in the expedition, to their connections in France, which were intercepted in their paſſage by Britiſh cruizers. Attempts have been obliquely made to diſcredit theſe letters; but no one has yet dared openly to challenge their authenticity; and they are already incorporated with the imperiſhable records of hiſtory.

† The euloguſts of Buonaparte will probably condemn the freedom with which his character is diſcuſſed in theſe pages. Unable to deny the juſtneſs of the deſcription which is here given of him, their nice diſcernment, their accurate taſte will diſcover both impolicy and indecency in holding forth, without reſerve, the vices of a man who governs a mighty Empire, and with whom the Britiſh Government may think it proper to negociate, and perhaps to conclude a treaty of peace. It is, however, but very lately that the Gentlemen in queſtion have been ſo faſtidious upon theſe ſubjects. It cannot be forgotten with what freedom, during the whole war, they have ſuffered themſelves to ſpeak of foreign Powers—it cannot be forgotten what harſh—what very harſh terms they have uſed reſpecting Sovereigns, with whom the Government of their country was in perfect friendſhip, and even in cloſe alliance. This was, indeed, impolitic and indecent in a very high degree. It was even inſulting to their own Sovereign, whom it obliquely reproached for connections, by which he ſought to maintain the independence of Europe, as well as that ſafety of his own State. But it ſeems that theſe conſcientious Gentlemen conſider a Revolutionary—a Jacobinical Uſurper—though endeavouring to bring deſtruction upon their native land, as a more ſacred character than a lawful Monarch, who is connected with their own King by ties of the cloſeſt amity. The Author does not ſcruple to ſay that his opinion is the very reverſe of this. He is deſirous, however, that it may be remembered that no one is in the leaſt reſponſible for any of his opinions but himſelf. On this ſubject he refers the reader to the note contained in page 25. ante.

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named with a Cyrus, or even with an Alexander; with a Vth Henry of England, or a IVth Henry of France; unleſs

It is, moreover, of ſuch paramount importance to the cauſe of virtue that mankind ſhould keep alive the indignation which ſuch a character as Buonaparte is calculated to excite—that they ſhould, in his elevation, as well as in that of his predeceſſors, ſee the invariable tendency of Revolutionary principles to ſubject them to the galling yoke of the moſt unprincipled and profligate characters; and there is ſo remarkable a diſpoſition to forgetfulneſs upon theſe ſubjects, that it becomes a kind of moral duty to preſerve, by repetition, diſguſting as the taſk may appear, the remembrance of deeds, the atrocity of which is, for the moment, concealed behind the luſtre of ſubſequent ſucceſs. The intereſting narrative given by Sir Sidney Smith, of the ſiege of Acre, ſhould, for the above reaſons, be deeply imprinted on every mind. As no deſcription can produce ſuch an effect as the original language of that narrative, a few extracts, which are more particularly characteriſtic of Buonaparte, ſhall be here ſubjoined.

"The providence of Almighty God has been wonderfully manifeſt in the defeat and precipitate retreat of the French army, the means we had of oppoſing its gigantic efforts againſt us being totally inadequate, of themſelves, to the production of ſuch a reſult. The meaſure of their iniquities ſeems to have been filled by the maſſacree of the Turkiſh priſoners at Jaffa, in cool blood, three days after their capture."

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The meaſure of their iniquities ſeems to have been filled by the maſſacre of the Turkiſh priſoners at Jaffa, in cool blood, three days after their capture; and the plain of Nazareth has been the boundary of Buonaparte's extraordinary career.

He raiſed the ſiege of Acre on the 20th of May, leaving all his heavy artillery behind him, either buried or thrown into the ſea, where, however, it is viſible and can be eaſily weighed.

"The French grenadiers abſolutely refuſed to mount the breach any more over the putrid bodies of their unburied companions, ſacrificed in former attacks by Buonaparte's impatience and precipitation, which led him to commit ſuch palpable errors *as even ſeamen could take advantage of.* He ſeemed to have no principle of action but that of preſſing forward, and appeared to ſtick at nothing to obtain the object of his ambition."—"Two attempts to aſſaſſinate me in the town having failed, recourſe was had to a moſt flagrant breach of every law of honour and of war. A flag of truce was ſent into the town, by the hand of an Arab Derviſe, with a letter to the Pacha, propoſing a ceſſation of arms, for the purpoſe of burying the dead bodies, the ſtench from which became intolerable. It was natural that we ſhould gladly liſten to this propoſition, and that we ſhould conſequently be off our guard during the conference. While the anſwer was under conſideration, a volley of ſhot and ſhells on a ſudden announced an aſſault, which, however, the garriſon was ready to receive, and the aſſailants only contributed to encreaſe the number of the dead bodies in queſtion, to the eternal diſgrace of the General who thus diſloyally ſacrificed them. Subordination was now at an end, and all hopes of ſucceſs having vaniſhed, the enemy had no alternative left but a precipitate retreat. The howitzers and me-

unleſs it be to heighten, by a dark and diſguſting contraſt, the luſtre of their characters? If Mr. Sheridan were deſirous of exhibiting human nature in the moſt odious light in which it has ever appeared, could he do this more effectually than by preſenting on the ſtage, without any exaggeration of the fact, his admired hero, at once cajoling and inſulting the unfortunate Egyptians, by that miſerable farce of *Liberty and Free Government*, which his own General Boyer thus deſcribes:—"I went yeſterday to ſee the inſtallation "of the Divan, which Buonaparte has formed. It "conſiſts of nine perſons; and ſuch a ſight! I was "introduced to nine bearded automatons, dreſſed in "long robes and turbans; but whoſe mien and ap-"pearance altogether put me ſtrongly in mind of "the figures of the twelve apoſtles in my grandfather's "little cabinet."—Should Mr. Sheridan then be deſirous of placing human nature in a more favourable light, he might change the ſcene to the tent of Darius, and there exhibit the *true* hero, who, after the battle of Iſſus, diſplayed a greatneſs of ſoul, a moderation in ſucceſs, and an humanity towards the vanquiſhed, which eclipſed the luſtre of his victory, and which furniſhed one of thoſe models, by which our youth are ſtill taught to cultivate a taſte for the ſublime and beautiful in human actions. But how, alas! will the taſte of our youth be corrupted, if, deducing their models from Oppoſition elo-

medium twelve-pounders were embarked in the country veſſels at Jaffa, together with the worſt among the two thouſand wounded. The veſſels being hurried to ſea without ſeamen to navigate them, and the wounded being in want of every neceſſary, even water and proviſions, they ſteered ſtraight to his Majeſty's ſhips, in full confidence of receiving the ſuccours of humanity, in which they were not diſappointed. Their expreſſions of gratitude to us were mingled with execrations on the name of their General, who had, *as they ſaid*, thus expoſed them to peril, rather than fairly and honourably renew the intercourſe with the Engliſh, which he had broken off by a falſe and malicious aſſertion that I had intentionally expoſed the former priſoners to the infection of the plague. To the honour of the French army, be it ſaid, this aſſertion was not believed by them, and it thus recoiled on its author. He cannot plead miſinformation as his excuſe, his aid-du-camp, M. Lallemand, having had free intercourſe with theſe priſoners on board the Tigre, when he came to treat about them."

quence,

quence, they ceaſe to diſcriminate between moral qualities, confound the very extremes of virtue and vice, and, making ſucceſs their only ſtandard of perfection, loſe their reliſh for true glory, and their abhorrence of whatever is ſordid and deteſtable!

Still, however, the difficulty remains to be ſolved; how it happens that the ſenatorial patriots of this day, moſt of whom have enjoyed all the advantages which education can beſtow, and who have been taught to condemn the unjuſt conqueror, though adorned by the moſt brilliant virtues, can offer their incenſe of adulation to Buonaparte, whoſe unjuſt conqueſts, far from being relieved by the diſplay of any virtue, exhibit only ſcenes of fraud, rapine, and remorſeleſs barbarity, which would diſgrace a den of banditti. The truth is, that this man has the tranſcendant merit of warring againſt the Government to which theſe gentlemen are in oppoſition—that he partakes with them of a moſt rancorous hatred to the Adminiſtration, whoſe zeal and exertions have been alike unfavourable to the views of both; and that he ſympathizes with their impatience to ſee that Adminiſtration removed, and the King, whoſe free choice it is, obliged to truſt his affairs in the hands of men in whom he has no confidence. The Firſt Conſul alſo has been, and continues to be, the grand ſupport of that cauſe of infidelity, licentiouſneſs, and anarchy, to which theſe his advocates and admirers, have ſacrificed whatever remained to them of reputation and conſequence in the country; not, indeed, like him, from real attachment to that cauſe, but becauſe their rivals, whom they wiſhed to ſupplant, were bound, by the moſt ſacred ties of duty, to oppoſe its ſucceſs. Theſe are the qualifications which entitle Buonaparte to their admiration and their praiſe, and without which he would appear to them, as he does to every man who is not the ſlave of faction, a foul diſgrace to the ſword, as well as a bitter curſe to the age which has the misfortune to witneſs his triumphant crimes.

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It is true theſe Gentlemen, paſſing over his former hiſtory with general, though high-wrought encomiums upon the glory of his arms, and ſtudiouſly preſerving a profound ſilence reſpecting his Egyptian expedition, endeavour to convince the world that, by his conduct ſince his uſurpation of the ſupreme, or rather of the whole power in France, his conduct has been ſuch as to entitle him to univerſal confidence. They dwell with rapture on his humanity in abſtaining from human ſacrifices, while, by the aid of the memory of Robeſpierre, he can, at leaſt for the preſent, reign more ſecurely without ſteeping his ſceptre in blood. They frequently remind us of his moderation in admitting to favour men of all parties, in receiving the emigrants, and in careſſing the clergy, and of the numerous other marks of juſtice, forbearance, and conciliation, by which he has at once converted Jacobin France into the paradiſe of fools. Leaving his Gallic dupes, if any ſuch there really be, to be convinced of their error by fatal experience, is it poſſible that ſuch profound obſervers, ſuch experienced judges of human nature, as the members of the Britiſh Oppoſition, can believe in the juſtice and moderation of Buonaparte? Have they not, with all their penetration, been able to diſcover that he reſembles rather the crafty tyger, who lies in ambuſh, till he can ſpring upon his unſuſpecting prey, than the generous lion, whoſe diſtant roarings warn the affrighted traveller to provide for his ſafety? Do they not know that he is the moſt conſummate hypocrite that has appeared on the theatre of the French Revolution—a perfect Proteus, who can aſſume any ſhape, Religious or political, which may beſt promote his deſigns of fraud and deception? That, while ſeveral of his coadjutors have far ſurpaſſed him in military ſkill, he has, by his unrivalled excellence in impoſture of every kind, rendered the Republic more ſervice than any other individual, and reduced both his equals and his maſters to the moſt abject dependence on his will. Or, are they ſtill ignorant that, by his

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very laſt act in a ſubordinate ſtation, when he probably had in contemplation that change by which he has been ſince advanced to the dictatorial rank of Firſt Conſul, he diſplayed his perfidious character in a new and moſt ſtriking light, and gave a remarkable ſpecimen of his talents for diſſimulation in the character of a *peace-maker?* Should they ſtill be uninformed upon this ſubject, let them learn that when, after his flight from Acre, he diſgracefully abandoned his army in Egypt, though he did not dare to apprize his ſucceſſor of his intended departure, he bequeathed to him a leſſon in the art of treacherous negociation—that he left behind him a letter, which he took care ſhould not be delivered till he was out of reach, and in which he ordered Kleber to conſent, in caſe of neceſſity, (a caſe which he clearly foreſaw would happen) to the evacuation of Egypt; but at the ſame time to poſtpone the execution of that article—*till the period of a General Peace*, and, indeed, to delay the performance of any treaty which he might *conclude*—till *it ſhould be ratified at home.* That he directed the General to enter upon the expected negociation with a groſs lie in his mouth reſpecting the paſt, as well as with the moſt perfidious intentions in regard to the future. "*Enter then*" (ſays he) "*upon negociation—adhere* "*ſtrenuouſly and conſtantly to the aſſertion which I* "*have advanced, that France never had the leaſt idea* "*of taking Egypt from the Grand Signior.*" That, in the ſame letter, he openly diſplayed his perfidious ſoul, in all its deformity, and unbluſhingly acknowledged the falſehood of the above aſſertion, by inſiſting, with great emphaſis, on the importance of Egypt to France, "while the Turkiſh empire, menaced with ruin on every "ſide, was crumbling to pieces;"—by giving directions to ſend five or ſix hundred Mamelukes to France, in the hope that "when they ſhould have contemplated, "for a year or two, the grandeur of that nation, they "might return to Egypt, and prove ſo many parti-

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"zans;" and by concluding with a pathetic declaration, that he "*abandoned Egypt with the deepeſt regret,*" and with expreſſions of the moſt anxious ſolicitude for "*the conſolidation of the magnificent eſtabliſhment,* "*the foundation of which had been ſo recently laid.*" That, laſtly, in the ſame ſtile of groſs duplicity and abſolute falſehood, he himſelf aſſured the Grand Vizier, in a letter to that miniſter, that France had "never en- "tertained an idea of taking Egypt out of the hands "of the Sublime Porte."

But all this was previous to his regeneration. He had not yet received the reward of all his crimes—the Crown of Republican France, which, though little calculated to inſpire repentance, has, it ſeems, wrought in him a thorough reformation; which has even brought back to the boſom of the Roman Church this bitter enemy of all Religion, who has ſought alike the deſtruction of the Tiara and the Turban, of the Croſs and the Creſcent. Still, however, until his amendment can be evidenced by time, until it can be eſtabliſhed by better proofs than have hitherto appeared, it may be prudent not to truſt him too far, but rather to ſuppoſe it poſſible that he may return again to his former courſes, and even that, in his new character of juſtice, moderation, and humanity, he may be acting with his accuſtomed ſimulation. This caution may be the more proper, becauſe in the moſt eſſential points—in the extent of his ambition, in his conduct towards other ſtates, and in the terms on which, with all his impatience for peace, he is willing to put an end to the calamities of war, nothing like juſtice or moderation is to be found. He ſhews no inclination to reſtore the ſpoils which the Republic, partly by his aid, has taken from other countries, to redreſs any of the numerous wrongs which ſhe has committed, to reinſtate the Governments which ſhe has ſubverted in their lawful rights, or to remember that her conqueſts exhibit only ſo many violations of the principle, to which ſhe has pledged herſelf in the moſt ſolemn manner—a renunciation of all conqueſt.

queſt. In theſe reſpects, his juſtice is altogether a "blank chapter." Nor is his moderation more conſpicuous. The crown and territories of ancient France, immenſe as ſuch an acquiſition would be for ſuch an upſtart, are not nearly ſufficient to gratify his ambition. It is not enough for him to rank, on equal terms, with the lawful ſovereigns of Europe, and to vie with monarchs, who derive their title from the moſt ancient and venerable ſtocks of royal lineage. It would not ſatisfy this muſhroom tyrant to wield the ſceptre of Henry IVth; to ſee the repreſentatives of all the crowned heads in Chriſtendom, bowing before his Jacobin Majeſty, upon the ſacred aſhes of the murdered Louis; and to ſend his Regicide Ambaſſadors to Foreign Courts, their hands ſtill reeking with the royal blood of France. All this is vaſtly inadequate to the views of his aſpiring ſoul. His throne muſt be erected on the ruins, not merely of the Houſe of Bourbon, but of half the lawful Governments of Europe. His dominions muſt exceed in extent thoſe of every Sovereign ſince the reign of Charlemagne. He muſt be complimented, at his inauguration, with the ſacrifice of the balance of power. Other monarchs, if not, like the King of Spain, reduced to a proconſular ſtation, muſt reign only by his ſufferance. He muſt, in ſhort, be Lord of the Deſtinies of Europe. Such are the leaſt pretenſions of a man, who, if his crimes had not been rewarded with unheard of ſucceſs, would have been the ſcorn even of thoſe perſons, who are ready to proſtrate themſelves before his infamous greatneſs.

It may ſometimes ſeem difficult to form a juſt judgment of the profeſſions, by which Belligerent Powers endeavour to obtain credit for a pacific diſpoſition. The following rule, however, may be conſidered as affording an infallible criterion of the ſincerity of ſuch profeſſions, viz. that no Power can be ſincerely

deſirous of Peace who inſiſts on terms to which his adverſary cannot accede without danger or diſgrace. If this rule be applied to Buonaparte, what becomes of his pacific profeſſions? Were ever terms ſo inſolent, humiliating and injurious, as thoſe which he makes his *ſine quâ non* of peace with the Emperor of Germany? How degraded muſt that monarch appear, how perilous would be his ſituation, and that of the German Empire, if he accepted of ſuch terms? And yet the man whoſe demands are ſo exorbitant, whoſe pretenſions are ſo unjuſt, who obſtinately refuſes to make Peace, except on terms which would involve the certain ruin of the German Empire, and of the Italian States, affects an inexpreſſible impatience for Peace, and preſents himſelf to the world as the High Prieſt of the Temple of Concord. The truth is, that he is well acquainted with human nature. He knows that when a much deſired good is placed in view, the characteriſtic of man is credulity. This is, indeed, the grand ſecret of all ſucceſsful impoſture. The French Revolutioniſts firſt lulled mankind into confidence and ideal ſecurity, they even obtained advocates and partiſans, by proclaiming a love of peace, and a renunciation of conqueſt. Nay, when by their conduct they gave the lie to their profeſſions —while they were covering the earth with carnage, they ſtill found their account in making a conſtant boaſt of their pacific diſpoſition. This, too, is the grand artifice of the Firſt Conſul, who, by the Syren ſound of the word Peace, finds it poſſible to make numbers forget how often that word, in his mouth, has been fatal to the very exiſtence of nations! Still, however, he finds the charm unbroken. And although he does not, either by his words or his actions, ſhew that he is diſpoſed to ſuffer Europe to return to ſuch a balanced State, as would favour a hope of ſecure or laſting peace, he never utters the faſcinating word but it is re-echoed by thouſands of mouths, and caught again by ten thouſands of ears, with as much

much avidity as if it had never been uſed for the purpoſe of deception. Thus multitudes, notwithſtanding the manifeſt abſurdity, and the frequent detection of his artifices, are diſpoſed to form their opinion of his real character and views, from the ſuperficial profeſſions with which he endeavours to gloſs over his unbounded ambition, or from his artful conduct in thoſe ſubordinate reſpects, which involve no ſacrifice of power, no renunciation of principle. It may be well for ſuch perſons to conſider that, ſuppoſing him ſtill to purſue the ſame deſtructive projects, as he undoubtedly had in view before his advancement to the ſeat of empire, the moſt ordinary policy would preſcribe thoſe very meaſures, which are moſt relied on in proof of his pacific and orderly diſpoſition: for it is thus alone that he can hope to ſtifle the alarm which he has ſo long inſpired, and to prevail on Europe, for the ſake of a nominal peace, to releaſe to him, in full ſovereignty, the conqueſts of the Republic. Therefore it is that he finds it expedient to aſſume the title of Grand Pacificator, and to affect an extraordinary ſolicitude for peace, though he is not willing to make a ſingle ſacrifice to obtain this object of his moſt *ardent* wiſhes. Therefore it is that he prudently endeavours, by an occaſional diſplay of humanity, to blunt the horror which his previous conduct has inſpired. Therefore it is that he ſeeks to obliterate the remembrance of his ſhocking impieties, by ſometimes invoking "the Eternal," whom he has ſo groſsly blaſphemed; and by even affecting ſuch a zeal for that Religion, which he endeavoured to overthrow in Italy, and which he openly renounced in Egypt, as to iſſue his anathemas againſt the "heretical Engliſh." The effect of ſuch artifices upon many perſons who a little time ſince beheld him with terror, is an unequivocal proof of the depth of his policy, and exhibits, it may juſtly be feared, an awful ſymptom of approaching ruin.

But notwithſtanding all his ſkill in the art of diſſimulation, his conduct ſtill affords direct evidence of

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the unchanged and unchangeable malignity of his views—that evidence by which Providence has put it into the power of vigilance and diſcernment to detect fraud and hypocriſy, by decreeing that uniform conſiſtency ſhould be the excluſive attribute of ſincerity and truth. For, much as it is his intereſt to lull ſuſpicion, and to calm apprehenſion, it is out of his power entirely to conceal the cloven foot. The force of occurrences, co-operating with that of inveterate habit and implacable malice, compels him occaſionally to drop the maſk, and to diſplay his well-known Jacobinical features. Through the veil which he has aſſumed, his native character is ſometimes manifeſt. Since the period from which his advocates date his wonderful transformation, from the moſt zealous patron of anarchy to a ſincere friend of ſocial order, he has exhibited ſtrong ſymptoms of perſevering enmity to regular government, and of undiminiſhed attachment to the revolutionary ſyſtem. Conſidering, indeed, the ſituation in which he is placed, and the neceſſity he is under of diſguiſing his real ſentiments and views, the moſt trifling ſymptoms of the above kind would be "confirmation ſtrong" that his heart is as full of miſchief and malignity as ever. What then muſt be the effect, on every mind that is not abſolutely ſhut againſt conviction, of that Proclamation which he addreſſed to the citizens of St. Domingo, immediately upon his aſſumption of the reins of Government, and in which, after declaring that *the ſacred principles of the liberty and equality of the blacks ſhould never experience any attack or modification*, he thus exclaims on the benefits which they had derived from the French Revolution:—"Brave negroes, remember that the "French people have alone acknowledged your "liberty, and the equality of your right." Who does not perceive, in ſuch an addreſs, the genuine ſtrains of Jacobin eloquence? Who does not ſee that the man who could uſe ſuch language, is ready, whenever it may ſuit his purpoſe, to be ſtill more explicit, and to cry, Brave Negroes, murder the Whites—Poor,

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murder the rich—People, murder your Tyrant!—Who, in ſhort, does not ſee, from this ſingle ſpecimen, that Buonaparte has undergone no other change than that of a Jacobin General transformed into a Jacobin Conſul? If further proof could be wanting of the preſervation of Jacobin identity, through all the forms of revolutionary tranſmigration, the Britiſh people may find one which comes nearer to themſelves; when, in alluding to the ſcarcity which, at the commencement of the preſent year, exiſted in this country, the Firſt Conſul, in his official journal, thus pointed out to them how they might obtain relief:—"Let the Engliſh "people" (ſays this reſpecter of lawful authority) "riſe "againſt their oppreſſive Government, and they will "find in the French deliverers and friends."

But as proſperity is the trueſt teſt of the real characters of men, the actual diſpoſition of Buonaparte may be beſt known from his conduct as a ſucceſsful warrior. For, unfortunately for mankind, he has had an opportunity, ſince his elevation, of diſplaying himſelf in that character. He has again ſubdued the North of Italy, and recovered extenſive territoties which had been wreſted from the Republican graſp. His armies have penetrated in the heart of Germany, and again threatened the hereditary dominions of the Houſe of Auſtria. But no ſooner does ſucceſs attend his arms, than he reſumes his former character of Revolutionary Hero. He tranſports us back in an inſtant to the times of Robeſpierre and the Directory, or, which is in effect the ſame thing, to the period of his own career as a Revolutionary Chieftain. His armies maintain their priſtine character of free-booters, their courſe is marked by depredation and ravage; and they ſuck the hearts blood of every country in which they can once gain a footing. His conqueſts, inſtead of being treated according to the laws of war, are revolutionized, diſorganized and re-affiliated—his ſword is ſtill a revolutionary wand, and at its touch the Ciſalpine Republic riſes once more to view, as it

were by enchantment, and all Lombardy is, in a moment, again faſt bound by thoſe ſpells, from which it had been liberated by the invincible arm of Suwarrow. The Tree of Liberty is ſtill his ſtandard, and no ſooner was he again triumphant in the North of Italy, than it was again planted at Milan. Even his proclamations are formed upon the Jacobin model. He comes, as formerly, to ſubject and enſlave, with liberty and independence in his mouth. He announces his approach, not as an enemy and a conqueror, but as a friend, as a deliverer from oppreſſion, as a reſtorer to freedom. He re echoes thoſe hacknied promiſes to reſpect both Religious and civil rights, which were heretofore the precurſors of his moſt outrageous acts of pillage and cruelty; and he violates them in the ſame manner as formerly! Who that reads the following proclamations, which were iſſued during his ſhort but ſucceſsful expedition into Italy, can diſtinguiſh between a Firſt Conſul and the Generaliſſimo of a Jacobin Republic?

Proclamation of General Moncey to the inhabitants of the Cantons of Lugano and Bellinzona.

" Head-quarters, Althorff, May 24, 1800

" The victorious troops of the French Republic are now entering into your territory, not for the purpoſe of diffuſing the horrors and deſolation of war, but to reſtore you to your Government, to yourſelves, and to expel the troops of the Houſe of Auſtria, which by its conſtant refuſal to make peace, prolongs both your misfortunes and your want of independence.

" Property, perſons, morality, cuſtoms, and religion ſhall be reſpected.

" I repeat it, inhabitants of the Helvetic Italian Cantons, we enter your country only as friends, as your allies and defenders."

Signed MONCEY.

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Proclamation of General Buonaparte.

" Soldiers, *Milan, June* 6.

" One of our departments was in the power of the enemy, and the whole of the South was in a ſtate of conſternation. The greateſt part of the Ligurian people, one of the ſteadieſt allies of the Republic, was invaded.

" The Ciſalpine Republic, annihilated in the laſt campaign, was become the ſport of *the ridiculous Feudal Syſtem.*" (What a fund for reflection is contained in this ſingle expreſſion! How ſignificant is it of a decided and unalterable preference of the Revolutionary over the ancient ſyſtem of Government and Society!) " You will reſtore to the people of Genoa their liberty and independence; and they ſhall be for ever releaſed from their eternal enemies.

" Millions of men, *as you are daily witneſſes*, offer you their thanks."

The remaining paſſage in this proclamation will be of peculiar utility to Mr. Sheridan. That Gentleman is reported to have boaſted in Parliament of the generoſity of his Hero, in admitting, after the battle of Marengo, the Auſtrian army to a convention, and, indeed, in ſuffering it to eſcape. A peruſal of the following extract from the General's Proclamation, only eight days before the battle, will perhaps convince Mr. S. that the Auſtrian army was not indebted for its ſafety to the generoſity of Buonaparte, but that, if its deſtruction had depended upon him, it would never have gained the line of the Mincio. The public too will have an opportunity of judging how far the opinions of the Gentlemen of Oppoſition, reſpecting men and things, are founded upon the evidence of facts.

" But ſhall it be ſaid that the territory of France has been violated with impunity? Will you allow

the army, which has carried conſternation into your families—to *return to its home?* You fly to arms; well then, advance upon the foe, *oppoſe his retreat*, tear from his brow thoſe laurels with which he has adorned it, and thus prove to mankind that *the curſe of deſtiny* hangs over the dotards, who have dared to pollute the territory of the Great Nation. The reſult of our efforts ſhall be glory without ſtain, and a laſting peace."

Signed BUONAPARTE, Firſt Conſul.

Who can peruſe theſe proclamations without exclaiming

" *Naturam expelles furcâ, tamen uſque recurret* ?*"

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* If it were poſſible for any one ſtill to doubt that Buonaparte, the Firſt Conſul, is the ſame man as Buonaparte the Revolutionary General, or that Republican France is as deſtitute of honour, juſtice, and good faith, under his Government, as ſhe was under that of the Directory, ſuch doubts will ſurely be removed by the late moſt flagrant, perfidious, and flagitious infraction of the armiſtice in Italy, by the invaſion of Tuſcany, the neutrality of which they had expreſsly guaranteed, and the plunder of Florence and Leghorn. To expatiate upon theſe acts would be uſeleſs, becauſe, unleſs a ſenſe of right and wrong be totally extinguiſhed in the human breaſt, the bare recital of the facts muſt excite ſentiments of horror and indignation, which no words can expreſs. But, in order to form a juſt eſtimate of the recent claims of the Firſt Conſul to univerſal confidence, it is worth while to compare this moſt atrocious outrage on the Law of Nations, and on the rights of neutrality, this glaring violation of a ſolemn and expreſs convention, with the pretended conſcientiouſneſs of the preſent ruler of France, when a little while ſince, in his official paper, the Moniteur, he made a boaſt that a body of French troops, marching to Lucca, had made a circuit of 60 miles, becauſe they ſhould not violate the armiſtice, by ſetting their feet on Tuſcan ground! About the time that this atrocious outrage was perpetrating in Italy, Germany was the witneſs of one not leſs abominable in the demolition of its three great bulwarks, Ulm, Philipſburg and Ingolſtadt, which had been delivered into the hands of the Firſt Conſul on the expreſs condition that they ſhould be reſtored at a peace, and which, pending the armiſtice, and in direct violation of his engagement, he ordered to be ſo completely diſmantled that they may not hereafter be re-conſtructed as fortreſſes!!! Will any man now venture to ſtand up as the advocate of Buonaparte, or preſume to ſay that any confidence whatever can be placed in his engagement? If, when he is endeavouring to gain credit for a pacific diſ-

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It will eaſily be conceived that the Revolutionary agents, the tools of Jacobiniſm, which abound in all countries, are not more backward than heretofore, in ſeconding the benevolent efforts of the French Military Chiefs to reſtore freedom and independence to the countries which are ſo unfortunate as to be the ſport of the *ridiculous Feudal Syſtem.* Even before the victory of Marengo had inſpired full confidence in the reſult of the campaign, ſome of theſe baſe and ſervile miſcreants, under the well known title of a Proviſional Government, anticipated, at Milan, the Jacobin jargon of their new Maſter, which they denominated "the generous ſentiments of the Firſt Conſul "of the Firſt Nation"—"the invincible Nation"—and proclaimed "The Ciſalpine Republic" to be "recognized as a free independent Nation"—adding the uſual cant of "the free exerciſe of Religion and "reſpect to perſons and property"—and referring to their "preliminary diſpoſitions," in proof that "the "French Armies and the Hero who led them had no "other object than to bring back freedom and inde-"pendence to their country." Forgetting, however, that the only way to bring back freedom and independence to that country would be to reſtore it to that lawful Sovereign, from whom it had been violently and unjuſtly torn, and to whom its inhabitants are attached by indiſſoluble ties of affection and duty.

Can further proof be wanting, that (whatever meaſures the Firſt Conſul may think proper to adopt, in order to ſtrengthen his popularity at home, and to

poſition, he violates ſo groſsly the terms of a truce, what regard can he be expected to pay to the conditions of a treaty of peace; particularly if that treaty, by ratifying his exorbitant pretenſions, ſhould leave the independence of Europe no other ſecurity than his honour and fidelity?

The great ſcene of perfidy which he has recently diſplayed in Tuſcany, contains an underplot, which is perfectly congenial, both with the ſtile and character of the piece, and with the general ſyſtem of French Revolutionary invaſion. On entering, by his armies, this unfortunate country, he promiſed, as uſual, ſecurity of property. This promiſe he has performed by impoſing heavy contributions on Florence and Leghorn. His plunder of Britiſh property, in the latter city, was ſo perfectly of courſe, as ſcarcely to require notice.

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promote a belief, both at home and abroad, that he has renounced Jacobiniſm,) his foreign ſyſtem is altogether Revolutionary and Jacobinical? Can further evidence be wanted to convince even the moſt incredulous, that he will adhere to this ſyſtem in the teeth of any engagements which he may contract, in the name of peace? Nay, that the immenſe power which he would conſolidate in his own perſon by a peace, which ſhould ſacrifice to him the equilibrium of Europe, would but afford him freſh inducements to purſue, as well as ample means to realize his projects of general ſubverſion? If a doubt can ſtill remain on theſe queſtions, let it be remembered that neceſſity would impel him to act in ſuch a manner. It requires but little ſagacity to diſcover that nothing can be ſo dangerous to him as a ſtate of inactive tranquillity. As France is ſtill deſtitute of thoſe ties which can alone hold ſociety together in a ſtate of tranquillity, he will find, like his Revolutionary predeceſſors, that external hoſtilities can afford the only poſſible relief from inteſtine commotions. Beſides, whenever his ſubjects have no foreign war, or, which is equally intereſting to them, no ſchemes of Revolutionary acquiſition to fix their reſtleſs minds, they will be diſpoſed impertinently to pry into his title, which would

" Hang looſe about him, like a giant's robe
" Upon a dwarfiſh thief."

They will be apt to ponder upon ſo ſtrange a phenomenon as that of a native of Corſica, pretending to exerciſe over them a far more deſpotic authority, than was ever claimed by their natural and lawful Sovereigns.—The very force, which is neceſſary to *convince* them of his right to rule over them, would be dangerous to himſelf, if not provided with ſome foreign occupation—nay, his armies would, in caſe of a general peace, prove his moſt formidable enemy, becauſe they would be then entitled to the long promiſed reward of a milliard

milliard of livres*; a reward which his coffers are far from enabling him to beſtow, and which he would not dare to refuſe. If, therefore, it were as true as it has been demonſtrated to be falſe, that he has undergone a miraculous change in his diſpoſition, and that he really pants for repoſe, he would be impelled by indiſpenſable neceſſity, and by the imperious motive of ſelf-preſervation, to maintain the character in which alone he has hitherto appeared—that of a reſtleſs and unwearied diſturber of the peace, order, and happineſs of the world. Indeed, at the very moment that he is dictating a Continental peace, he is preparing for its violation, and paving the way for his future incurſions into the heart of Italy and of Germany, by demoliſhing the fortreſſes which form their chief bulwarks againſt an invading enemy.

But if all other motives were inſufficient to induce the Firſt Conſul ſtill to purſue his favourite object, the ſubverſion of all lawful authority, he would be left without a choice by the commanding influence of the French Revolution, of which, though the tyrant of France, he is but the ſervile inſtrument, and which will continue to be, as it has hitherto been, more powerful than its agents. To check the force of this tremendous machine, exceeds the ſtrength of his arm, and the extent of his courage. By following its impulſe he has attained his preſent greatneſs. As its intrepid director he may ſtill be irreſiſtible. But the moment he attempts to ſtop, or even to controul its movements, he will be hurled into that abyſs, in which ſo many of his predeceſſors lie buried. Of the magnitude of the danger to which this dread engine of deſtruction, under ſuch guidance, muſt expoſe the whole civilized world, ſome idea may be formed, if we conſider how large a portion of the ſocial fabrick it has already laid in ruins, and how inſtantaneouſly it convulſed the whole edifice to its deepeſt foundations.

* Upwards of forty millions ſterling.

Thoſe

Thoſe Powers who hope to reſtrain its fury, and to ſhackle its force, by the ſilken bands of peace, will rue their error like the affrighted Philiſtines, when Sampſon brake the cords with which he had been bound, "as a thread of tow is broken when it touch-"eth the fire."

Without inſiſting, however, on the great and extraordinary perils which are to be apprehended from the overwhelming influence of the Revolution, or from the perſonal character of Buonaparte, the danger inſeparable from the preſent aggrandizement of France, under any ſyſtem of Government, muſt be ſufficiently obvious to fill with alarm every breaſt, which feels the ſmalleſt ſolicitude for the liberties and independence of Europe. Can it be neceſſary to enquire into the internal condition of that moſt ambitious country, when ſhe not only has extended her dominions to the Alps and the Rhine, which ſhe aſſerts to be her natural boundaries, but alſo holds in abſolute ſubjection, under the hypocritical title of independent Republics, immenſe territories, which are not compriſed even within thoſe limits? It is obvious that the Balance of Power would be deſtroyed if any one State, and more particularly ſo potent and ambitious a one, ſhould become ſo formidable, that no other Continental State would be able to encounter her ſingly. But if France, whether Monarchical or Republican, were to acquire, by a general Peace, a legal title to her preſent acquiſitions, or even to one half of them, what Continental Power would dare to look her in the face? What Power would venture, by giving her offence, to incur the riſk, (which ſeems to be already the great object of general dread,) of becoming her firſt victim? Who, particularly after the experience of the laſt few years, would have any confidence in alliances or confederacies, to preſerve the remaining liberties of mankind? If the Stateſmen of former times, if the Heroes who, during ſo many centuries, have fought and bled in defence of the Balance of Power, were able to take a view of what is now paſſing on the great Thea-

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tre on which they acted ſuch brilliant parts, with what aſtoniſhment and indignation would they ſee the Powers of Europe, inſtead of uniting, with a fixed determination to reſtore the ancient and tried baſis of general ſecurity, haggling and truckling to obtain ſome abatement of the exorbitant pretenſions of their common foe! How eagerly would the venerable ſhades return from ſuch a ſcene to their enviable ſtate of inſenſibility and oblivion! Read, O infatuated Powers! the hiſtory of the Wars which have been waged to prevent *any* extenſion of the limits of France—to reſtrain her from acquiring even a preponderance in the ſcale of Europe. See the deliberate wiſdom of ages eſtabliſhing it as an immutable principle of European policy, that the Gallic Power, in its moſt circumſcribed ſtate, is highly dangerous to the general ſafety, and that unceaſing vigilance is indiſpenſably neceſſary to guard againſt the encroaching ſpirit of Gallic ambition. Say then, will you ſuffer France, by the very terms of a general Peace, to become the Dictator of Europe? Will you formally ſurrender into her hands the ſceptre of univerſal Dominion? Is your love of Peace ſo ardent, and your impatience for it ſo eager, as to induce you to purchaſe it at the price of your independence? Or if your ſpirit be ſo debaſed, as to ſubmit to any conditions for the ſake of repoſe, are you ſo beſotted, has fear ſo totally bereaved you of underſtanding, that you can expect repoſe to be the fruit of daſtardly conceſſion; at leaſt, ſo long as you have any left to concede? If you hope, by the magnitude of your ſacrifices, to ſatiate the ambition of your aſpiring neighbour, "who enlargeth her deſire as hell, and as "death cannot be ſatisfied, but gathereth unto her all "nations, and heapeth unto her all people"—if you expect by ſubmiſſion to inſpire her with a deſire for the tranquil enjoyment of her vaſt poſſeſſions—if you think by a compliance with her utmoſt demands to take from her even the ſhadow of a pretext for further moleſtation—ſuffer yourſelves to be inſtructed by De Witt, whoſe maxim it was, that "no independent

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" Government ſhould yield to another *any* evident " point of reaſon or equity, and that all ſuch con- " ceſſions, *far from preventing War, ſerve to no other* " *purpoſe than to provoke freſh claims and inſults.*" If there be any truth in this maxim, the ſacrifices which you may be diſpoſed to make, in order to obtain peace, will be only the cauſes of a new War; unleſs by their enormous extent they ſhould put it out of your power to engage in another conteſt, and ſhould induce you to ſubmit, without a ſtruggle, to be formally enſlaved, and, like the Spaniſh Monarchy, to kiſs the chains which your puſillanimity had forged.

But whatever other Powers may do, ſhall Great Britain crouch at laſt to the overweening pride and inſatiable ambition of France? Shall ſhe renounce the ſage and venerable councils to which ſhe is indebted for her greatneſs, and conſent to the deſtruction of that Balance of Power which ſhe has ſo long, ſo honourably, and ſo ſucceſsfully defended? Shall ſhe do this while in the zenith of her glory? When not a foe dares to meet her triumphant Flag? When ſhe has completely humbled the Naval power of her haughty rival? When ſhe has enchained the Jacobinical Monſter which reared his audacious creſt againſt her matchleſs Conſtitution? When ſhe has made the moſt diſtant nations witneſſes of her triumphs? When ſhe has cruſhed the perfidious tyrant of the Eaſt, who lent himſelf as the baſe inſtrument of Gallic vengeance againſt her Indian territories? And when, finally, by a cloſe and well connected Union with her Siſter Kingdom, ſhe has, at length, conſolidated her before divided ſtrength into one harmonious and mighty Empire? Shall ſhe deſcend from ſo high and commanding a ſtation, to lay the independence of Europe, as well as her own honour and ſafety, at the feet of her ancient and implacable enemy, and to ſeek for inglorious repoſe in the lap of inſecure and treacherous peace? Before ſhe can be brought thus to blaſt her laurels and enſure her ruin, the Jacobins, whom ſhe harbours

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in her boſom, muſt triumph over the laws by which they are faſt bound, and obtain a complete aſcendancy. They muſt (like the Jacobins in France, who prepared and accompliſhed the ruin of the Gallic Monarchy) overawe her Senate and compoſe her Councils. They muſt ſurround her Throne and adminiſter its affairs. Except among theſe agents of anarchy and deſtruction, where could a Miniſter be found to ſign a treaty which ſhould revoke all ancient treaties, annul the law of Nations, renounce the political equilibrium, and recognize the right of France to univerſal dominion? Can it be thought that a ſon of the Great Chatham would be a party to this deed of infamy? Or would Mr. Fox himſelf ſuffer his name to appear in ſo foul a tranſaction? In the deſperation of hopeleſs party, the latter may, indeed, endeavour to drive Miniſters to the adoption of meaſures which would enſure the ſpeedy downfall of any Miniſter, and in the diſgrace of a rival he may find conſolation for the ruin of his country. But he would cut off his right-hand rather than ſuffer it to be ſubſcribed to ſuch a Peace as that which, in the name of his indignant country, he preſumes to demand from his Majeſty's preſent Miniſters*. Nay, is there a man in whoſe veins one drop

* Although it muſt be admitted that Mr. Fox would not, in any caſe, as Miniſter, conclude a Peace on ſuch terms as he ſeems deſirous of impoſing on the preſent Adminiſtration, yet a little reflection will ſhew that he, of all men, would be the leaſt likely to obtain better conditions. While the Gentlemen of Oppoſition are endeavouring to perſuade the public that their nomination to office is a neceſſary ſtep to put an end to the calamities of War, it ſeems to eſcape their recollection, (but it will not eſcape that of any other perſons,) that they would labour under peculiar diſadvantages in negociating with the French Republic. What kind of pacification could be hoped for from men, who conſider the country for which they would have to treat, as the aggreſſor in the War? Who have conſtantly repreſented that country, (falſely, indeed, but that circumſtance would not avail them), as acting in the moſt injurious manner towards France, as having, during the whole conteſt, been heaping upon her provocations and inſults ſo outrageous as to produce all her animoſity and injuſtice againſt other States? What terms of Peace could ſuch perſons expect to procure, or even have the conſcience to demand? It would not boot them to ſay that it was their opponents who had offended, or to urge their own ſervices in favour of the enemy. He would reply that, according to their own admiſſions, the Britiſh Government had provoked the War, and thereby occaſioned the

drop of Britiſh blood, uncontaminated by the *virus* of Jacobiniſm, continues ſtill to flow, who would give his conſent to ſuch a Peace? Is there one who would ſuffer the venerable Genius of Britain to be yoked to the triumphal Car of Gallic Atheiſm and Anarchy? No, in ſpite of all the threats of an enraged enemy—in ſpite of all the clamour of factious demagogues—the people of this country will never ſubmit to the ſacrifice of that honour, which they have ſo long and ſo gallantly maintained; they will never conſent to feed the pride and ambition of their "*inveterate and unalterable political enemy*;" they will never agree to give up that general ſecurity, without which they know that no ſecurity can any where exiſt. Confiding in the juſtice of their cauſe, in the firmneſs and magnanimity of their Sovereign, and, above all, in the favour of Providence, which has hitherto been their *ſure rock of defence*, they will ſtill ſtand in the breach, and contend manfully for the preſervation of that Great European Commonwealth, of which they form a part, and the diſſolution of which it is impoſſible they ſhould long ſurvive. Such are their pretenſions—ſuch their objects in the War—ſuch the terms on which alone they will treat for Peace.

In the mean time it ſhould be remembered, that a conteſt like the preſent requires prudence and circum-

the immenſe loſſes he had ſuſtained in men, in ſhips, and in money—that the Britiſh Government had loaded him with injuries for which he muſt have ample reparation—and he would be entitled to quote againſt themſelves their own frequent and numerous declarations, to prove, not only the juſtice of his claim, but that they were fully and irrevocably pledged to admit it, to whatever extent it might be carried. To this charge againſt the Britiſh Government, which it would be out of *their* power to repel, or even to meet, he would add that the Britiſh people had alſo incurred his juſt indignation by ſtrenuouſly ſupporting their Government; a charge which would alſo be ſupported out of the mouth of the Gentlemen in Oppoſition. And as to the ſervices rendered him by thoſe Gentlemen, he would urge, not only that they had not been effectual, but that they were to be conſidered as the mere operations of a party, actuated by no principle, labouring in their vocation, and employing the means which ſeemed to them beſt calculated to produce the removal of an adminiſtration, whoſe place they were deſirous to fill.

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ſpection, as well as courage and firmneſs. The ſubtle foe is always endeavouring to circumvent by fraud thoſe whom he cannot hope to ſubject by force. If he find it impoſſible to compel his adverſaries to ſacrifice, in his favour, all political equilibrium, he will tempt them, at leaſt, to abandon that juſt, natural and well-tried Balance of Power, by which the independence of Europe has been ſo long preſerved, and to join with him in the eſtabliſhment of ſome other ſyſtem, founded upon the principle of a new arrangement of territory. To recommend this dangerous experiment, he will offer to gratify their cupidity at the expence, not of his own ambition, but of thoſe States which are too weak to remonſtrate againſt injuſtice. He will flatter the leading Powers, that they may thus equiponderate with him; and if they happen to caſt a longing eye on ſome nook or corner which may be wanting to complete the ring-fence of their dominions — ſome Naboth's vineyard, which has hitherto been protected by the wiſe and ancient ſyſtem of public law, and of mutual jealouſy—doubtleſs he will indulge them in ſo reaſonable a wiſh, provided it do not interfere with his great and magnificent deſigns. To judge from appearances, there is conſiderable danger of their being drawn into this ſnare of experimental equipoiſe. An idea is gone forth and too generally prevails, that a total, or at leaſt a very great change muſt neceſſarily take place in the ſyſtem of Europe. And the Stateſmen of the day, if Stateſmen they can be called, inſtead of endeavouring to prevent a misfortune, the extent and effects of which are infinitely beyond their powers of calculation, think it wiſdom to yield to what their indolence terms, neceſſity, and they buſily employ themſelves, not in defence of the old, but in ſpeculations upon the new order of things. Perhaps, too, they are captivated by the idea of novelty, (ever faſcinating to the human mind,) and ſeduced by the vanity of being concerned in the erection of, what they may think, a grand edifice of Political Power. If they yield to theſe

impulſes, they will diſcover their folly when it ſhall be paſt remedy. They will be convinced that there could be no ſafety in departing from the principles, on which experience had formed that nice and delicate, yet ſtrong and durable ſyſtem, called the Balance of Power—that no new fangled ſcheme of barriers and counterpoiſes can have that ſolidity, which the ancient one poſſeſſed, and chiefly, perhaps, becauſe it was ancient—that while, on the one hand, their antagoniſt knows how to retain with a firm and tenacious graſp, a graſp which cruſhes all power of reſiſtance, whatever he can once ſeize, they will be united by a very feeble and precarious tie to their new poſſeſſions—that while the weight of Republican deſpotiſm is ſcarcely to be thrown off by any effort, authority can only, by ſlow degrees, ſtrike its roots into a ſtrange ſoil.—In ſhort, they will find that all plans of freſh partition and diſtribution are favourable ſolely to the Revolutionary ſyſtem, and that the bright meteor, which they miſtook for a well-poiſed balance in the political heavens, was only an ignis fatuus, by which the great enemy of ſocial order endeavoured to lead all civilized States, into the bottomleſs gulph of anarchy and perdition.

Another artifice employed by the Rulers of France, to divert the attention of Foreign Powers from their own ambition and aggrandizement, is to hold out Great Britain as an object of jealouſy and dread, on account of her Commercial greatneſs, her Colonial acquiſitions during the preſent War, and her Naval ſuperiority. A moment's conſideration will ſurely ſuffice to place, in its proper light, this inſidious attempt to divide thoſe whom a perfect identity of intereſts ought to unite by the cloſeſt ties.

Other States muſt have very imperfect notions of the nature of commerce, if they view with jealouſy the Commercial proſperity of Great Britain. Such proſperity, inſtead of being prejudicial, is beneficial to them, as it tends to excite their emulation, as it ſets them an example of ſucceſsful induſtry, and as it ſtimulates them to improve their natural advantages,

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that they may have commodities to give in exchange for thoſe, which the activity, ingenuity and enterprize of their neighbour enable her to export. Moreover, as the great and extenſive commerce of Great Britain is the fair and honeſt reward of her induſtry and good faith, it operates as a general benefit, by holding forth the ſtrongeſt inducement to the cultivation of qualities, ſo eſſential to the individual welfare and the common ſecurity of Nations. As to her Colonial acquiſitions, it might eaſily be ſhewn that they would afford no juſt cauſe for alarm to other Powers, even if ſhe were to inſiſt, as in juſtice ſhe might, on retaining them all, in ſatisfaction for the unjuſt attack which has been made on her, and for the immenſe debt which ſhe has incurred, in the defence of all Europe. For they would not, like the continental acquiſitions of France, deſtroy, nor even endanger the Balance of Power—they would not enable her to invade the territories of other States—they would only put it in her power to furniſh thoſe States with a larger proportion of the articles, of which they ſtand in need, and to pay for which they muſt, as has been already obſerved, exert their induſtry, and improve their natural advantages. But ſhe has ſhewn herſelf diſpoſed to conſider theſe valuable acquiſitions, with an exception only of ſuch of them as are neceſſary for the ſecurity of her own trade and poſſeſſions, as a ſacrifice in the general cauſe, and as a compenſation for the re-eſtabliſhment of the Balance of Power on the Continent. What better proof can ſhe give of her diſintereſted and inviolable attachment to the welfare and ſecurity of Europe?

In regard to the Naval ſuperiority of Great Britain, inſtead of affording cauſe to other nations for jealouſy, or for dread, it is, at this time particularly, a juſt ſubject for exultation to the whole civilized world. It ſhould be remembered, indeed, that Naval Power is not, like territorial dominion, ſuſceptible of an equilibrium. At all times ſome one State has poſſeſſed a decided ſuperiority at Sea. But this is not, *in itſelf*,

injurious to other Powers. It does not enable the State poſſeſſing it to deſtroy the independence of other States. It does not furniſh armies to march from one end of the Continent to the other. Neither is it prejudicial to the general freedom of commerce. For the reſources and proſperity of a great Naval Power depend upon the ſecurity of the rights of commerce, as defined by the laws of Nations, and upon a general confidence in its inviolable reſpect to thoſe rights. It is, therefore, its intereſt to afford them protection; and if it were to abuſe its power by endeavouring to ſacrifice them to an apparent or momentary intereſt, the ſpell of its proſperity would be broken, and the whole edifice of its grandeur would crumble into duſt*.

But though the Naval ſuperiority of an inſular State, like Great Britain, be fraught with no danger to the Balance of Power, or to the general independence of Nations, nothing can be more dangerous than ſuch a ſuperiority, when united to a Continental preponderance. If France were at any time to become miſtreſs of the ſeas, the liberties of Europe would inſtantly vaniſh. Where, indeed, would now have been thoſe liberties, if, in the preſent War, the Navy of Great Britain had not acquired a degree of pre-eminence, which it never before poſſeſſed? Where would even have been the commerce of thoſe very nations, which are called upon to view with jealouſy the Britiſh Fleets, if it had not been protected by thoſe Fleets againſt the Gallic Freebooter, who has violated the rights of every Neutral Nation, who has endeavoured to tram-

* At this moment Great Britain is affording an eſſential protection to the rights of commercial States by aſſerting the general principle that a Belligerent Power is entitled to ſearch the veſſels of Neutral Powers, that they may not furniſh the enemy with the means of prolonging the War—a principle, without which neither the rights of neutrality, nor the laws of War would be of much value; and the dereliction of which would annihilate the public law of Europe, and prove fatal, not only to the exiſtence of this country as a Maritime Power, but to the eſſential and permanent intereſts of thoſe very States, which are ſo ſhort-ſighted as to be diſpoſed to ſacrifice it for the ſake of a momentary advantage.

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ple upon all law, who has totally diſregarded the obligation of treaties, and who has ſought to ſubvert the foundations of commercial, as well as of political ſecurity? Nay, what greater general calamity can be conceived, than for the navy of Revolutionary France to be freed from the reſtraints, which are impoſed on it by that of Great Britain? What hope would remain for Europe, if French Republican inſolence, by being releaſed from the chaſtiſement of the Britiſh flag, were to domineer by ſea as it does by land?

Of ſuch importance, to the whole civilized world, is the Naval ſuperiority of Great Britain. To that ſuperiority it is owing that there is yet an independent country in Europe—that there is yet any ſecurity for perſons and property: and upon that ſuperiority it ſtill depends, whether, what is yet left of lawful Government and ſocial order, ſhall be preſerved from the inſatiable rapacity and deſtructive ambition of France*.

It is true, the ſituation of Great Britain is ſtill inexpreſſibly arduous; the difficulties with which ſhe has ſtill to cope are many and great; but ſhe is able to face, and, with the bleſſing of Providence, to ſurmount them all, provided ſhe be true to herſelf—provided ſhe continue to exhibit the glorious ſpectacle of a loyal and dutiful people, adhering ſtedfaſtly to their Sovereign in a moment of trial and danger, and, by ſtrengthening the hands of his Government, aſſiſting him to maintain the conteſt, with undiminiſhed energy, until he may be able to bring it to a ſafe and honourable concluſion. But if, on the contrary, they were to liſten to the advice of thoſe perſons, who, fearing neither God nor man, labour inceſſantly to produce diviſions

* It is but juſtice to Mr. Sheridan to obſerve, that upon all queſtions in which the Britiſh Navy is concerned, he generally gives vent to Britiſh feelings. On other ſubjects, as appears in a former part of this work, his feelings ſeem at times to be French. This inconſiſtency cannot be otherwiſe accounted for than by ſuppoſing that in the former caſe the feelings he expreſſes are his own, but that in the latter they are borrowed from his aſſociates.

among them, when their union is ſo neceſſary—who ſeek, by popular clamour and commotion, to drive their Sovereign to part with Miniſters in whom, after long experience, both he and his Parliament and his people repoſe their confidence—then, indeed, would they ſoon find their laſt hope to vaniſh—then would the ſun of Britain ſoon ſink into the ſhades of univerſal night. How could the moſt ſkilful pilot be expected to preſerve the veſſel through the ſevereſt ſtorm, ever produced by conflicting elements, if the crew, inſtead of aiding him to the utmoſt of their power—inſtead of co-operating, in their reſpective ſtations, and in due ſubordination, were to give way to their impatience at the duration of the tempeſt—if they were to riſe againſt their officers, becauſe the hurricane does not abate, becauſe the horizon does not brighten—if, laying aſide their accuſtomed diſcipline, they were to divide into parties and cabals reſpecting the management of the veſſel? Inſtead of ever reaching the deſired port, the ſhip would be inevitably loſt, and the infatuated mariners would find, in a watery grave, the recompenſe of their folly and their crime.

The Britiſh people are daily exhorted to act a part no leſs fooliſh and criminal. They are adviſed to ſlacken their vigour, and to relax in their duty, becauſe the ſtorm ſtill rages with undiminiſhed fury—becauſe they cannot yet get ſight of port. They are adviſed to deſert their Sovereign, becauſe he cannot yet procure for them the conſtant object of all his endeavours, a ſafe and honourable Peace. They are adviſed to abandon and betray their Government, which has hitherto conducted them, with ſafety and honour, through the moſt arduous conteſt in which they have ever been engaged;—a conteſt, in which they have had to ſtruggle with every ſpecies of difficulty, foreign and domeſtic—with the fickleneſs, puſillanimity, and, in ſome inſtances, the treachery of Allies—with occaſion

caſional ſcarcity, ariſing from inclement ſeaſons*—with an enemy who has ſet at nought every principle of honour and good faith, and every rule which was either preſcribed by morality, or eſtabliſhed by the univerſal conſent of civilized nations—and with a new and moſt dangerous ſpirit of inſurrection denominated Jacobiniſm, which the French Revolution has excited in every country, and which, in this country, incredible as it may ſeem, has been encouraged and foſtered by *a ſtrange, uncouth, and unnatural alliance* with political party—a conteſt, in ſhort, in which dangers of an unprecedented kind have aſſailed every exiſting Government, and expoſed all civilized ſociety to deſtruction—in the very beginning of which "the ſpirit of democracy was" every where "at its height"—in which "an agitation "on the ſubject of Government" was "every where" produced by "a great and mighty event" —by the overthrow of "a mighty fabric," which "could "not fall to the ground without a concuſſion which the "whole world would feel†"—and in which "anarchy "from the boſom of France threatened" (and, indeed, diſturbed) "the tranquillity of the univerſe‡."

Such is the conteſt which Great Britain has ſuſtained for nearly eight years, with a degree of glory that eclipſes the brighteſt portions of her annals. In ſuch

* One of the main artifices of Jacobinical faction, is to render the war unpopular and odious, and thereby to deprive it of patriotic ſupport, by repreſenting it as the cauſe of the preſent ſcarcity, and of the conſequent high price of proviſions. This ſtatement has been ſo completely refuted * as to render any further expoſure of its fallacy unneceſſary. But if it were ſtrictly true, what effect ought it to produce on the public mind? Should it not rouze our indignation to a higher pitch againſt the adverſary, who, for the worſt of purpoſes, and with a view to our deſtruction, compelled us, by an actual attack, to engage in the war? Every hardſhip which we ſuffer in ſuch a war is only an additional conſequence of the unjuſt aggreſſion of France; and inſtead of being made a pretext for clamour or cavil againſt our Government, ſhould only add fuel to our rage, and energy to our exertions, againſt our injurious and malignant foe, who is the primary cauſe of every hardſhip and every calamity which the war has been, or can be the means of producing.

* See Mr. Brand's publication on this ſubject.

† Mr. Erſkine—ſee ante, page 25.—‡ Guerden—ſee ante, p. 26

a conteſt has ſhe ſtood foremoſt among the nations, ſeeking every where the hotteſt of the battle, and inſpiriting others to keep the field. And ſtill, amid unnumbered difficulties, ſhe diſplays the ſame glorious example. Should her efforts ſucceed, poſterity will look upon her exploits with aſtoniſhment, admiration, and gratitude; and the name of Briton will be held in veneration to the end of time. Should ſhe fail, ſhe would ſtill enjoy the conſciouſneſs of having done her duty—I had almoſt ſaid, if that were poſſible in ſuch a cauſe, more than her duty:—and while ſhe found, from lamentable experience, that mortals cannot "command ſucceſs," ſhe would poſſeſs the invaluable conſolation of knowing—that SHE HAD DESERVED IT.

THE inexpreſſibly awful ſcenes which are now paſſing on the great theatre of political ſociety, derive much additional ſolemnity from the conſideration, that they diſtinguiſh the approach of one of thoſe grand diviſions of time, by which the Chriſtian world computes its progreſs from the commencement to the completion of its beſt hopes. It is for irrational animals to paſs from day to day, and from year to year, without reflection; but man, unleſs by an unpardonable abuſe of his high privileges, he reduce himſelf below the brute creation, will find times and ſeaſons, at which to make a ſolemn pauſe—to review attentively his paſt courſe—to examine, ſeriouſly and fully, his preſent ſituation—and to prepare, with all the advantages which ſuch a ſurvey can produce, for his future progreſs through the arduous and intricate path of life. To enſure the recurrence of theſe ſalutary inveſtigations, he will conſider certain periods as impoſing upon him the duty of employing them in ſuch a manner. The anniverſary of his birth will re-

remind him of the irretrievable loſs of much ineſtimable time, and of many valuable opportunities; and it will ſuggeſt to him the neceſſity of improving, to a better purpoſe, the fleeting and uncertain remainder of his temporal exiſtence. The commencement of a new year, according to general computation, in addition to thoſe reflections which peculiarly regard each individual, will bring within his view the comprehenſive concerns of ſociety, the common, but moſt important intereſts of all, who are united by that dear and ſacred connection, which is expreſſed by the emphatical and venerable term—one's country; a connection which combines, in one great tie, all the bands that unite man to man, and which, by the guardian and unceaſing ſuperintendence of Government, protects, and can alone ſecure, the invaluable bleſſings of ſocial intercourſe, in its moſt endearing as well as in its moſt diſtant forms. But a change of century is calculated to fill every conſiderate and feeling mind with emotions, which it is impoſſible to deſcribe. Such a change ſcarcely an individual in exiſtence has before witneſſed, and ſcarcely an individual now alive will again behold. Such a change brings together, in one point of view, objects ſo vaſt, that the concerns which ordinarily engage our moſt anxious ſolicitude, dwindle, upon compariſon, into almoſt total inſignificance. Contemplating the lapſe of centuries, the imagination views, at a ſingle glance, the riſe and fall of empires—the whirl, the violence, and ravages of Revolutions—the great and aſtoniſhing viciſſitudes which mankind experience in their Religious, moral, and political ſtate; it beholds, at one view, the ſucceſſion of ages; it ſurveys the ſtill higher, though leſs regular arrangement of æras; and it meaſures the duration of the world with as much familiarity as the ſpan of human life. But it cannot ſtop here; it enters the obſcure and boundleſs regions of ſpace and eternity, and is compelled to confeſs, that objects which, juſt before, had reduced to comparative nothingneſs the moſt

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intereſting ſcenes of human exiſtence, are themſelves but as duſt in the balance, in compariſon with what is ſtill beyond. Then ruſhes into the mind the idea of HIM, who is the Author, the Governor, the Sovereign Diſpoſer of all. But totally loſt in the immenſity of ſuch a conception, to the formation of which, the meridian genius of a Newton is ſcarcely more adequate than the dawning reaſon of a child, the ſoul is inſpired with that humility, which is the foſtering nurſe of every virtue—with that reverence and devotion, which become a ſtate of abſolute dependence on the Great Creator—and with the livelieſt gratitude for the hopes, which it has been authorized to form, of a future extenſion of its intelligence, which ſhall enable it to contemplate, with underſtanding and delight, thoſe ſublime ſcenes that now infinitely exceed its powers of comprehenſion.

As the near approach of a new century has ſo powerful a tendency to excite the mind to reflection, it ought to be a ſeaſon of great Religious and moral improvement. It might, indeed, be juſtly conſidered as a general calamity, if ſuch a period were to paſs unnoticed, except as a mere chronological occurrence. But never did a ſecular revolution call ſo loudly upon mankind to pauſe and reflect, as that which is now at hand. Never did a period of that denomination, or of any denomination, find the human race in ſuch need of being rouzed and warned, as at this awful juncture. Never was the world in ſo calamitous or ſo perilous a ſtate as at this moment. It is true, former ages have witneſſed the fall of ancient and mighty empires. They have ſeen vaſt regions laid waſte by the ſword of ferocious conquerors, and nations, far remote from, and totally unknown to each other, reduced to one common yoke of debaſing ſervitude. They have alſo beheld the ravaging fury of ruthleſs barbarians, who trampled upon the productions of art, extinguiſhed the light of ſcience, and replunged the world in the cheerleſs gloom of profound ignorance. But what was all this in compariſon with the

gers which now threaten—with the ruin which now impends? We have to deplore a convulſion, which has already laid low ancient and mighty empires, and which expoſes all empires to ſubverſion; but, what is infinitely worſe, that convulſion has given birth to the fell monſter Anarchy, who has already eſtabliſhed his chaotic empire over one half of Europe, and who labours with, alas! a dreadful proſpect of ſucceſs, to involve the human race in univerſal contention and endleſs diſorders. We ſee the moſt ſanguinary conquerors, ſpreading deſolation far and wide, and reducing the moſt populous and extenſive regions under their deſpotic yoke. But what a yoke! Not one which merely excludes the moſt diſtant hope of liberty, but which, while it enſlaves, protects.—No: *their* dominion is that of the vulture, who preys upon the vitals of every victim in which he can once fix his mercileſs talons. They do not even exhauſt their rage upon the phyſical exiſtence of man; they endeavour to extirpate from his breaſt every Religious and moral principle, and to deprive him of the conſolations of virtue, and of the hope of Heaven. It muſt be acknowledged, indeed, that theſe fiends in human ſhape do not declare war againſt the arts and ſciences; on the contrary, they ſtrain every faculty of the human mind to its greateſt degree of practical exertion; they explore, with indefatigable reſearch, all the ſecrets of nature, and carry every invention of ingenuity, and every refinement of civilization, to the utmoſt pitch of improvement. But theſe attainments ſerve only to render them a more grievous ſcourge to humanity. The cultivation of their talents, the extent of their knowledge, their advancements in ſcience, only enable them the better to purſue their projects of deſtruction, more effectually to attack Religion, Government, and Social Order, and to eſtabliſh more firmly their horrid ſway of impiety and vice. If the rude tribes, whom we have been accuſtomed to denominate barbarians, had not, in their ſtate of uncorrupted ſimplicity, poſſeſſed ſome virtues, the want of which is

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juſtly lamented in the moſt poliſhed ſociety; if they had been diſtinguiſhed only by that fierce and ferocious reſentment of injuries, which rendered them ſo dreadful to their enemies; ſtill their undiſguiſed and unappeaſable vengeance would have been as much leſs terrible, than the refined malice of the philoſophical and revolutionary barbarians of France, as it is leſs horrid to be delivered over at once to a violent death, than to be ſubjected to every torture which ingenuity can invent, and to be cruelly kept alive, by the ſkill of ſurgery, and the art of medicine, in order to be reſerved for an endleſs repetition of torments.

But language is unable to afford an adequate deſcription of the monſters, who have already proved the greateſt curſe which mankind has ever experienced, and ſtill leſs of the tremendous conſequences, which would inevitably attend the complete ſucceſs of their diabolical plans. On theſe ſubjects exaggeration is, for the firſt time, impoſſible; and the moſt literal deſcription is ſure to be the moſt ſtrong and impreſſive. The ſpontaneous feelings of every individual muſt ſuggeſt to him, that the preſent ſituation of Europe is preciſely that of a large community, divided into a great number of families, in one of the moſt numerous and powerful of which, ſome deſperately wicked ſervants have riſen againſt their lord, a moſt kind and affectionate maſter—murdered him and his wife, with his neareſt relatives and beſt friends—taken poſſeſſion of his inheritance—and openly invited, with a promiſe of their fraternity and aſſiſtance, the ſervants of all other families to follow their example. Not content, however, with this, they have ſallied out with force and arms, ſeized upon many neighbouring eſtates, and driven the lawful proprietors into exile. And when, by this accumulation of guilt, they have rendered themſelves ſo formidable as to defy all law, and to defeat all oppoſition, they call upon every proprietor who has hitherto ſucceeded in preſerving his poſſeſſions, to ſanction their robberies, to guarantee their unjuſt acquiſitions, to accord them indemnity for their

crimes, and to leave them in full poſſeſſion of a degree of force, which would enable them, at leiſure, to proceed in their career of depredation, until whatever remains of right, order and authority, ſhall be buried in one common heap of anarchy and ruin.

The ſubject, however, forces itſelf upon the reflecting mind in another and a more awful light. The diſtreſsful ſituation, and the truly alarming proſpects of the ſocial world, muſt not be conſidered as the mere reſult of political cauſes. Such cauſes would have been totally inadequate to the production of ſuch effects, if they had not found ſociety in a ſtate of dreadful depravation, with regard to Religion and Morals. This is the principal ſource of the great and tremendous evils, with which we are now viſited. And it is the more neceſſary to remount to that ſource, becauſe it is there alone, that any effectual remedy can be applied. The preſent age has been diſtinguiſhed by the moſt deep, daring, and extenſive conſpiracy againſt the Majeſty of Heaven, which has ever been conceived by the human heart. A ſect of Infidels, who, to the honour of all paſt times, are known by the denomination of *modern*, have openly proclaimed War "againſt the Throne and Monarchy of God." The founders and partiſans of this ſect have, for upwards of half a century, been ſtraining their faculties, to eradicate all ſenſe of Religion from the mind of man—and to accompliſh their infernal purpoſe they have purſued a mode, at once the moſt impious, and the moſt artful, that could be imagined. The exiſtence of a Deity is ſo obvious a deduction of reaſon from the works of creation, that a direct attempt to propagate Atheiſm, as a ſyſtem, muſt defeat itſelf by its own abſurdity. But the end which is unattainable by direct, may be accompliſhed by circuitous means. Therefore theſe impious men directed their attacks againſt revealed Religion, the truth of which, inſtead of being abſolutely demonſtrable by reaſon, depends upon a more remote, though when complete, as it is in the preſent inſtance, an equally convincing

vincing ſpecies of proof—hiſtorical teſtimony. They knew that if they could baniſh from Chriſtendom the particular form, in which Religion had been there inculcated, and in which, alone, it had obtained belief and excited veneration, they would, in effect, deſtroy its ſubſtance, and leave the mind a total void of dark and hopeleſs Atheiſm. They alſo felt and indulged a peculiar and inſatiable animoſity againſt the Chriſtian Religion*, on account of its immaculate purity; which, though admirably calculated to promote the happineſs of man in this life, was at direct variance with the vices, in the indulgence of which they had determined that their happineſs ſhould conſiſt; and they were fully aware that the ſame corrupt propenſities by which they were enſlaved, would facilitate their ſucceſs in endeavouring to weaken a reſtraint, ſo unwelcome to a very large portion of mankind. With theſe views and advantages they ſet themſelves to work; and having a perfect knowledge of the nature of man (except, indeed, as an immortal being), and of the machine of Society—having alſo a perfect acquaintance with the channels, by which literature afforded an acceſs to the human mind—they laboured with indefatigable induſtry, but, for a great number of years, with concealed efforts†, not only to make proſelytes to their ſyſtem, and to eſtabliſh ſecret ſocieties of infidels, but to deſtroy, by ſubtle and ſceptical diſquiſitions, and particularly by the moſt powerful of all weapons, raillery and ridicule, all ſenſe of Religion in mankind.

In the mean time, the Diſciples of this ſect, in furtherance of their original plan, framed and propa-

* The founders of this infernal ſect, or rather the framer of this Infidel Conſpiracy, Voltaire, diſplayed, in a moſt horrid manner, his rage againſt Chriſtianity, by the frequent uſe of the moſt blaſphemous expreſſion—écraſez l'infame—which, ſhocking to relate, he dared to apply to the Author of our Holy Region.

† It was the deep maxim of Voltaire, "Strike, but conceal the "hand."

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gated an entire new ſyſtem of morals, to which has been given the name of Modern Philoſophy. A Philoſophy which attacks the foundations, while the infidel ſcheme aims its blows at the main pillar of Civil Society—a Philoſophy which tends to extinguiſh all the feelings of nature, by teaching its votaries to ſacrifice their firſt, their ſtrongeſt affections, at the ſhrine of general humanity—A Philoſophy which holds up gratitude to contempt, and which deſpiſes the ſacred impulſes of paternal love and filial piety—a Philoſophy which expoſes to ſcorn every ancient uſage, every eſtabliſhed inſtitution, every local attachment, and which would ſacrifice, in one raſh moment, the collective wiſdom of paſt ages—a Philoſophy which undermines the very foundations of virtue by making vice appear amiable, by adorning guilt with attractive qualities, and rendering it an object of pity and of love, and by adorning even thoſe crimes which ſtrike at the very exiſtence of ſociety, ſo as to make them not only to loſe all their deformity, but to call forth the tendereſt ſympathy of mankind—a Philoſophy which inculcates to every individual that his own caſual and capricious notions of right and wrong are to ſuperſede thoſe ancient rules, which are taught by divine wiſdom, or eſtabliſhed on the baſis of human experience, and which have hitherto been regarded with reverence, and conſidered as the teſts and the bulwarks of morality—a Philoſophy which maintains the moſt criminal and deſtructive actions to be juſtifiable, provided their perpetrator have ſo depraved a judgment, and ſo vitiated a heart, as *ſincerely* to think them meritorious*.

* The fallacy and the baneful tendency of this ſcheme of Philoſophy, have been moſt ably expoſed in a courſe of Lectures on the Law of Nature and Nations, lately delivered in Lincoln's Inn Hall, by a Gentleman, who, having changed his original views of the French Revolution, has not only had the manlineſs openly to avow that change, but has alſo laboured with great induſtry, and, there is reaſon to hope, with much ſucceſs, to counteract the pernicious principles on which that Revolution is founded. The publication of the above Lectures is much to be deſired by every friend to Social Order, as well as by every admirer of ſound learning, profound reſearch, and of eloquent illuſtration.

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Can Hell's vaſt magazine of miſchief contain a more potent engine of deſtruction than this horrid ſyſtem, which tends to effect a complete ſubverſion of every exiſting eſtabliſhment—a total Revolution in the political and moral world?

Theſe two ſyſtems of Modern Infidelity and Modern Philoſophy, have for many years been corrupting the heart of Europe, and thence diffuſing their poiſon to every part of the civilized world. Unfortunately they found Society in a ſtate extremely favourable to their operation. The European eſtabliſhments in the Eaſtern and Weſtern Worlds, by opening new and moſt copious ſources of wealth and proſperity, had contributed, in conjunction with the diſcovery of the art of printing, to produce a great and a ſudden Revolution in the minds and the manners of civilized Nations. The treaſures, which, by means of thoſe eſtabliſhments were poured into Europe, by giving a new ſtimulus to induſtry, obtained a ſpeedy and general circulation, and all claſſes were thereby enabled to enlarge their ſphere of gratification. Deſire encreaſed with enjoyment, and mankind no longer confined their wiſhes as formerly to a mode of life ſuitable to their condition. The upper ranks began to deſcend from their dignified and, comparatively, cheap magnificence, that they might with leſs reſtraint participate in voluptuous indulgencies. They quitted their rural ſports, and even their feſtive board for the more expenſive and enervating pleaſures of a capital. The old and venerable family Manſion was, at length, deſerted even at the ſeaſon, when it was wont to be the ſeat of hoſpitality, and to diffuſe, to all around, a cheering warmth amid the rigours of winter: and the once dignified owner, who had ſhone as a ſtar of the firſt magnitude in his natural ſphere, was loſt in the confuſed galaxy of a diſſipated metropolis. The middle claſſes turned their minds from the attainment of competence to the acquiſition of wealth. They began to conſider the poſſeſſion of great abundance, not only as the ſupreme good, but as eſſential to happineſs. Their co-

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vetuouſneſs was excited by a view of the numerous avenues to opulence, which opened on every ſide, and inflamed by the inſtances of great and unprecedented accumulation which occurred among their equals. They did not, however, in general ſeek to acquire that they might accumulate, but that they might enjoy. They employed their riches as means of gratification. Their thirſt of gain*, and their love of pleaſure, acted and re-acted upon each other. In every indulgence, and even in oſtentation, they began to vie with their ſuperiors. And the principle of reſpect, that neceſſary bulwark of Social Order, became weakened in a moſt alarming degree. Even the lower orders experienced the effect of the general change. Their labour procured them a more comfortable ſubſiſtence, and they both experienced wants and enjoyed luxuries, to which, till then, they had been utter ſtrangers. They alſo began to entertain notions of independence, alike injurious to themſelves and to ſociety at large. Theſe cauſes have continued to operate, without interruption, for a long ſpace of time, but within the compaſs of a few years in a greatly accelerated ratio. Every perſon, who has attained only a middle age, can teſtify how much habits of luxury, diſſipation, and, their natural conſequence, a ſpirit of inſubordination, have encreaſed within the period of his recollection—until, at length, they are become the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics of the age, and their dominion ſeems to be fully eſtabliſhed in the human breaſt. The deſtructive tendency of luxury, (which, while it is generally produced by riches, encreaſes in its turn a deſire for gain), has been the frequent theme of Moraliſts; and hiſtory brings ample confirmation that their deſcription of its baneful conſe-

* To provide the means of luxury, traders, of every deſcription, ſought for exorbitant profits, and thoſe whoſe deſires were moderate and reaſonable were carried away by the ſtream, and obliged to comply with a practice which they could not, with any effect, reſiſt. The conſequence has been an exceſſively high price of the neceſſaries of life, and unfortunately, in times of ſcarcity the evil falls with great ſeverity on the labouring poor, particularly in the agricultural line, whoſe wages have not, like thoſe of other labourers, kept pace with the dearneſs of ſubſiſtence.

quences are not, and, indeed, cannot be over-charged. It would, though indiſputably juſt, be conſidered as common place declamation, to repreſent it as having, in a courſe of time, ſpread its ravages over the whole face of the Globe—ſwallowed up the moſt powerful Monarchies, and the moſt extenſive Empires, and carried deſolation where the ſword had not been able to penetrate, or where its fury had been appeaſed.

Sævior armis,
Luxuria incubuit, victumq; ulciſcitur orbem.

But though ſuch deſcriptions are unneceſſary, it can never be uſeleſs to conſider that luxury is an inexhauſtible ſource of private miſery and public diſorder—that it is the moſt dangerous foe to human happineſs, becauſe it is the moſt injurious enemy to virtue, without which, by the ordinance of Heaven, happineſs is not to be enjoyed. Other paſſions, indeed, when carried to an extreme, wage open War with virtue, and often ſubject it to their yoke; from which, however, it frequently delivers itſelf by its native energy. But this, like a ſubtle and lurking poiſon, gradually weakens, and, at length, deſtroys it altogether. Its effect is to excite inſatiable deſires, which being incapable of gratification, produce diſappointment, and end in total diſſatisfaction and diſguſt. Every thing is then ſeen through a falſe medium, nothing is eſtimated according to its real value; and the mind is inceſſantly diſturbed by a reſtleſs deſire of change. The ſoul, inſtead of enjoying that undiſturbed ſerenity, that calm ſunſhine, in which true happineſs conſiſts, is conſtantly vexed by "troublous ſtorms." The ſocial affections are overwhelmed by inordinate and boundleſs craving; and, at length, the worſt poſſible ſtate is produced—the ſtate of ſelfiſhneſs; which is, in effect, the utter extinction of man as a ſocial being—which burſts all the ties by which he is united in various

relations, to the reſt of the world, and which brings on the diſſolution of expiring virtue*.

If luxury alone be ſo pernicious and deſtructive, what muſt be its effects; when favoured by an extraordinary relaxation of Religious and Moral principles? Nothing but the vigorous and ſalutary influence of thoſe principles can, in any degree, arreſt its progreſs. What ravages then muſt it not produce, when, inſtead of meeting with ſuch checks, it finds them removed out of its way, or, at leaſt, dreadfully enfeebled by the operation of other cauſes, beſides its own encreaſing aſcendancy? When it is aided by regularly digeſted and widely diffuſed ſyſtems, which tend to eradicate Religion and morality from the heart of man? When it is aſſiſted by ſuch auxiliaries as that modern Philoſophy, which tends entirely to deſtroy the ſocial affections, the only germ of virtuous principles and habits—and that modern infidelity which has ſucceeded ſo far, as to produce in one of the populous ſtates of Europe a formal and national profeſſion of atheiſm†, and to efface from

* No two things can poſſeſs a greater antipathy than ſelfiſhneſs and virtue. According to the Conſtitution of our nature, virtuous ſentiments can only be formed by means of the ſocial affections. For a ſenſe that virtue is neceſſary to the happineſs of mankind, and that vice muſt be productive of their miſery, is the main ſource of a love of virtue and of a hatred of vice. But an indifference to the happineſs of others muſt render us indifferent to the means of their happineſs. Therefore, without the ſocial affections, virtuous ſentiments could not poſſibly be formed; and by the extinction of thoſe affections, which is the natural effect, and, indeed, the very definition of ſelfiſhneſs, virtue muſt be eradicated from the mind. Their total extinction, as a general caſe, is beyond the limits of experience, and we may hope of poſſibility. But in proportion as they are enfeebled, the dominion of virtue muſt be diminiſhed, and that of vice confirmed.

† The following ſketch of the progreſs of Revolutionary France towards atheiſm, which the author has met with, may not be found undeſerving of notice:

They began with decreeing the liberty of all religious worſhip—they then ſtripped the clergy of all their poſſeſſions, "to bring them nearer to the ſtate of the apoſtles."—They prohibited the eccleſiaſtical dreſs (April 2, 1790)—They exacted from the prieſts an oath to maintain all the Decrees of the Aſſembly (Nov. 20, 1790)—perſe-

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from the minds of multitudes, in all classes, throughout Christendom, the belief of a Deity, and of a state of future retribution—a belief which, in all ages, has been considered as the main pillar of society, and which is the only effectual restraint upon vice!

Thus, three great and powerful causes of corruption, either of which would, singly, be more than sufficient to make the moral and social world one scene of ruin, have been long operating, with combined force,

cuted those who refused that oath, and practised the grossest indecencies on women who attended the ministration of such conscientious priests.—In 1791 they greatly diminished the number of churches.—In 1792 they decreed the transportation of Priests whose conscience would not suffer them to take the oaths.—In 1793 they abolished one Sunday in a month.—They forbade that the shops should be shut on a Sunday.—They afterwards changed the calendar, established decades, and got rid of Sunday altogether.—They decreed that every church-yard should exhibit the inscription, "Death is an "eternal sleep." They encouraged, invited, and entered publicly in a register the apostacy of Priests, and *rewarded it with a pension*.—They applauded the Declaration of the *Commune* de Séve, that "men "should be no longer the victims of an imaginary God."—One of the sections of Paris declared, in the Assembly, that "they would no "longer have Altars, or Priests, or other God than Nature;"—and the Assembly thereupon decreed, that the people of Paris had merited well of their country.—At length one of the Convention, at a fitting of that body, not only made a public profession of infidelity, but openly declared that he gloried in being an athiest.

Although modern infidelity has made France its principal abode, it has extended itself to every country in Europe. Nay, the following extract from a valuable pamphlet, which was lately published on the other side of the Atlantic, proves that America, though comparatively a young country, with a scanty population, has experienced this dreadful curse in a most alarming degree. "Add to this consideration, "that infidelity has awfully increased. The time was, and that within "your own recollection, when the term infidelity was almost a stranger "to our ears, and an open infidel an object of abhorrence. But now "the term has become familiar, and infidels hardly disgust. Our youth, "our hope, and our pride are poisoned with the accursed leaven. "The vain title of "Philosophy" has turned their giddy heads, and, "what is worse, has corrupted their untutored hearts. It is now a "mark of sense, the proof of an enlarged and liberal mind, to scoff at "all the truths of inspiration, and to cover with ridicule the hope of "a christian; those truths and that hope which are the richest boon "of divine benignity, which calm the perturbed conscience, and heal "the wounded spirit; which sweeten every comfort, and soothe every "sorrow; which gives strong consolation in the arrest of death, and "shed the light of immortality over the gloom of the grave. All are "become the sneer of the buffoon, and the song of the drunkard."—"The Voice of Warning to Christians, &c." Printed at New York.

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and with reciprocal re-action. Their effect has been various in different countries. Germany has been the principal ſchool of the new Philoſophy, and its *literati* have laboured indefatigably to deluge Europe with works of all deſcriptions, and chiefly with plays and novels, which moſt artfully inculcate their pernicious ſyſtem*.—In France, luxury and infidelity have eſtabliſhed a joint dominion, and have not only reduced the people of that country to a ſtate of degradation, depravity, and miſery, of which no example is to be found in hiſtory, but have rendered them the ſcourge of the whole earth. The Britiſh nation, favoured by their "quiet good ſenſe," by their admirable ſobriety of character, by their detached ſituation, and by their Religious and moral habits, have been leſs injured by the impious and diſorganizing ſchemes of modern infidels, than their continental neighbours; but their unrivalled proſperity has expoſed them, in a moſt dreadful degree, to the moral ravages of luxury; while the new Philoſophy has not only made a conſiderable progreſs among them, but even infected the ſources, from which the principles of the riſing generation are derived. They have ſeen among them aſſociations, formed for the promotion of ſcepticiſm and atheiſm—public harangues, under the pretence of diſcuſſion, have been delivered, for the ſame purpoſe, in the heart of their metropolis—and the preſs has been employed to circulate the poiſon throughout the humbleſt walks of life, and to corrupt the mind of the peaſant and the artiſan.

Still, however, this favoured country, happily for itſelf, and the world, poſſeſſes more Religion and virtue than can be found throughout the reſt of Chriſtendom. It is in this reſpect the very reverſe of France, the moſt corrupt of all modern nations; and the Supreme Being ſeems to have preſerved, with the moſt

* The author has been aſſured, by very reſpectable authority, that nearly 10,000 writers are ſuppoſed to be thus employed in Germany.

ſtriking juſtice, a difference between the fate of the two countries, which remarkably correſponds with their reſpective merits. The one ſeems, according to the uſual courſe of Providence, to be ſelected as the ſcourge of thoſe which are leſs wicked than itſelf—while the other is made the bulwark of the ſocial world, to preſerve it from total deſtruction.

But though, while the great cauſes of human depravity have had a very different operation in different countries, their effect is every where viſible, in a moſt dreadful corruption of principle and degeneracy of practice—in an extreme licentiouſneſs of manners—in a prodigious and ſtill progreſſive encreaſe of the moſt pernicious vices, and particularly of the moſt pernicious and deſtructive of all vices, that of adultery—a vice hoſtile to an inſtitution which is the parent of every other inſtitution, the ſource of every ſocial affection, and which is raiſed to the higheſt degree of ſanctity, and guarded with the moſt diſtinguiſhed care, from even the remoteſt danger of violation, by that Holy Religion, which conſults both the preſent and future happineſs of mankind. It cannot excite ſurpriſe that the decay of that Religion ſhould be accompanied with a great encreaſe of a vice, the very approaches to which it is ſtudious to prevent, and which, at the ſame time, takes its origin from the ſtrongeſt impulſe of our nature. But when it is alſo conſidered, that the modern enemies of that Religion, that the infidels and philoſophers (as they call themſelves) of the day, have, with an infernal depth of policy, employed their main effort to render the marriage tie contemptible in the eyes of mankind*;—and when it is further conſidered, that the diſſipated habits of life which have obtained, in a moſt extraordinary degree, are peculiarly fraught with temptations to a criminal indulgence of the paſſions, (which is in

* One of theſe Philoſophers in this Country, felt it due to his principles to apologize for having entered into the marriage ſtate, which he had before termed an "odious monopoly!"

fact

fact their great recommendation to the votaries of unlawful pleaſure);—when theſe conſiderations are taken into the account, it would only appear ſurpriſing if the vice of adultery had not encreaſed to a very great extent.

The moſt unerring teſt of the morals of ſociety, at any given period, is the degree of reſpect and attention which is paid to the nuptial engagement. In proportion as that engagement is viewed with reverence, and obſerved with fidelity, an age may, with certainty, be denominated virtuous. But it is impoſſible to find a more apt deſcription of a corrupt, profligate, and vicious age, than to ſay, it is diſtinguiſhed by a diſregard to the marriage vows. Such a deſcription is unfortunately applicable to the preſent times; and a ſtronger proof cannot exiſt of extreme and general depravity.

In a Religious point of view the times are diſtinguiſhed by a moſt dangerous and extenſive apoſtacy from a Religion, which is the only preſervative of the civilized world from abſolute Atheiſm, and which is inſeparably interwoven with all the civil inſtitutions of Chriſtendom; and by a ſtill more alarming lukewarmneſs in thoſe, who ſtill profeſs that Holy Religion. That apoſtacy, however favoured by the ſyſtem of modern infidelity, could not have prevailed to ſuch an extent, without this lukewarmneſs. It is impoſſible, either in a community or an individual, for a Religion, ſo calculated, as Chriſtianity, to warm as well as to purify the heart, to be exchanged for infidelity, without firſt degenerating into a cold, formal, and nominal profeſſion*.

* So long ago as the year 1776, the Rev. Mr. Jones of Nayland, a moſt intelligent and accurate obſerver of the ſigns of the times, publiſhed the following reflections on the growth of Heatheniſm among modern Chriſtians:—"The Reader may be ſhocked when he is told "that there is a diſpoſition to Heatheniſm in our age of ſo much "improvement, and pronounce the accuſation improbable and viſionary; but he is requeſted to weigh, impartially, the facts here "offered, and then to form his judgment." The tokens of this "Pagan infection are very obſervable. Where at laſt (ſays he) will "this taſte for Heathen learning, which hath been prevailing and

 "increaſing

But there is one circumſtance ſtill to be noticed, which diſtinguiſhes the preſent ſtate of Society, and which is perhaps the moſt alarming ſymptom of this awful criſis. The cauſes which have been long operating ſo banefully on manners and morals, have eſſentially injured the conſtitution of the human mind. The diſeaſe has not only contaminated the ſyſtem, but it has weakened, and almoſt over-powered thoſe energies, which could alone ſtruggle with it—which could alone afford a hope that it might ultimately be vanquiſhed.

The moral ſenſe has been enfeebled to a degree, which threatens its total extinction. Conſcience has not only loſt its power to reſtrain men from the commiſſion of the moſt heinous crimes, but it ceaſes to excite indignation againſt the crimes of others. That moral anger, the fear of which, though incapable of preventing human wickedneſs, has always hitherto kept it within ſome bounds, has ceaſed to exiſt, and crimes, which, in any former period, would not have been tolerated, if they could have been conceived, now are beheld without horror by the generality of mankind, and even meet with advocates in perſons, who

" increaſing for ſo many years, from the days of Lord Herbert to the " preſent time? Whither can it lead us but to indifference and Athe- " iſm? A Chriſtian corrupted with Heathen affections degenerates " into ſomething worſe than the original Heathens of antiquity :" And as if he had before his eyes (in 1776) that " beginning of ſor- " rows" to Europe, the French Revolution and Apoſtacy, the introduction of the old abominable Pagan idolatry, and revival of Pagan rites in the dedication of Altars to Liberty and Reaſon, he obſerves, " Should any perſon aſk me how Chriſtianity is to be baniſh- " ed out of Chriſtendom, as the predictions of the Goſpel gives us " reaſon to expect it will, I ſhould make no ſcruple to anſwer, that " it will certainly be brought to paſs by this growing affection to " Heatheniſm: therefore it is devoutly to be wiſhed, that ſome " Cenſor would ariſe with the zeal and ſpirit of Martin Luther to " remonſtrate effectually againſt this indulgence of Paganiſm, which " is more fatal to the intereſts of Chriſtianity, than all the abuſes " purged away at the Reformation. This is now the grand abuſe, " againſt which the zeal of a *Luther*, and the wit of *Eraſmus* ought " to be directed: it is the abomination of deſolation, ſtanding where " it ought not, even in the Sanctuary of Chriſtianity, and is a " worſe offence than all the profanations that ever happened to the " Jewiſh nation."

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lay claim to Religious and virtuous characters. That ſhocking Conſpiracy againſt Religion, order, and government, the French Revolution, diſtinguiſhed as it has been by atrocities which ſurpaſs all example of human turpitude, has been openly defended, even in this country, not merely by men whoſe lives exhibit one uniform ſeries of vice and profligacy, (that were not ſo ſtrange,) but by men who appear to live in the regular and habitual performance of their private duties to God and man. To what is this wonderful inconſiſtency to be attributed? Certainly not to a deſire of promoting the ſucceſs of the deteſtable cauſe they thus defend, but to a want of moral feeling, which, if it exiſted in any conſiderable degree, would render them incapable of ſuppreſſing their horror at ſuch crimes and at ſuch criminals. Their moral diſapprobation is ſo weak as to be overpowered by motives of ambition and views of party; and hence it is that they have for years been endeavouring to juſtify, and that they are ſtill endeavouring to palliate tranſactions, the blackneſs of which has never been equalled, and the faithful deſcription of which will appear to poſterity, a moſt groſs and injurious libel on human nature. This aſtoniſhing inſenſibility to crime, by producing in the vicious a conſciouſneſs of ſecurity againſt the indignation of mankind, relieves vice of its laſt reſtraint, a ſenſe of ſhame. The moſt abandoned characters, if they were ſure to excite abhorrence, would ſhun the face of day; but *now*, confident of being received, at leaſt with ſtupid indifference, they ſtalk abroad and glory in their flagitiouſneſs. Odious as hypocriſy undoubtedly is, it is a recognition of the ſupremacy of conſcience—it has been juſtly and beautifully deſcribed as a homage paid by Vice to Virtue; but when guilt lays aſide this maſk, the proof of human degeneracy can be carried no further*.

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* The author of the letter ſigned Cato, in the valuable collection of papers, publiſhed under the title of the Anti-jacobin, obſerves, that the looſe and indecent attire in which our females preſent themſelves

In the room, however, of that moral ſenſe, that ſalutary indignation againſt vice, which conſtitutes the grand bulwark of virtue, the preſent age has ſubſtituted other qualities, which, by caſting a mantle over guilt, ſeem intended to afford ſome apology for the indulgence with which it is treated. There qualities have aſſumed the ſpecious names of Candour, Liberality and Moderation. But what a vile counterfeit do they diſplay of thoſe amiable principles of feeling and judging, to which ſuch appellations really belong. Inſtead of conſiſting in a diſpoſition to make due allowances for the imperfections of human nature—to incline to a favourable judgment of actions, whenever they can bear a favourable conſtruction—to allow every man credit for good motives, when there are not ſufficient grounds to ſuppoſe him actuated by bad ones—and, even in caſe of delinquency, to exerciſe lenity whenever, without injury to the public intereſt, it may reaſonably be expected to promote reformation—inſtead of operating in ſuch a manner, modern Candour, Liberality and Moderation, conſiſt in a ſacrifice of all principle; in a diſpoſition, not merely to regard undoubted guilt with complacency, but even to conſider it as meritorious, and in a readineſs to palliate the greateſt crimes, and to invent excuſes for the greateſt

ſelves to the public eye, warrants an apprehenſion that ſhame is taking its leave even of that part of the ſex who would ſcorn any imputation on their character. It muſt be acknowledged, that there is too much ground for this apprehenſion. But ſtill it may be hoped, that in this country, the indecent attire of our females, like the levelling garb of our youth, has been merely the conſequence of inconſiderate imitation. Accuſtomed to adopt the fopperies of our Gallic neighbours in better times, we have deigned to conſider them too much as objects of imitation, ſince they have become objects of juſt deteſtation to all mankind. Our youth have received from France the Revolutionary faſhions, which were invented, and actually *ordained*, for the purpoſe of confounding all diſtinction of rank. And our females have not ſcrupled to diſplay the ſhameleſs modes of Pariſian proſtitutes, who aided the cauſe of anarchy by endeavouring to baniſh modeſty from the female breaſt. A little reflection will, it is hoped, ſet all this right again. The Britiſh youth will abhor faſhions which they adopted, without conſidering that they were of Jacobin extraction. And the native and invincible modeſty of the Britiſh fair will triumph over all the arts of Gallic corruption.

criminals.

criminals. Theſe qualities, in ſhort, ſeem to be the conditions of a convention between virtue and vice, by which it is agreed that all hoſtilities ſhall ceaſe between theſe, hitherto, irreconcileable enemies, and that moral feeling ſhall no longer take offence at moral turpitude. A convention which, like the pacific treaties of the French Republic, tends to deprive Religion, Virtue, and Social Order, of whatever ſecurity they ſtill poſſeſs*.

Beſides this apparent extinction of the moral ſenſe, the preſent age has alſo to lament the decay of theſe ſubordinate, but moſt beneficial feelings, which conſtitute, as it were, the out-works of virtue.

Where now are to be found any veſtiges of that Humility, which like the principle of gravitation in the phyſical world, tends, in the moral, to keep every thing in its due place; which is indiſpenſable to the exiſtence of a ſenſe of duty, and of a diſpoſition to render juſtice to others; and which, in the youthful mind, is the foſtering nurſe of every excellence, and the neceſſary preparation for future uſefulneſs. To this benign and decorous grace has ſucceeded a ſelf eſtimation, which makes every one over-rate his claims on others, and to under value his obligations to them—which weakens the attachment of individuals to one another, and to the community of which they form a part—and which, by degenerating into pride and arrogance, diſpoſes men to conſider themſelves as the natural enemies of each other, and gives a boundleſs ſcope to the furious paſſions, which diſturb the happineſs and the order of the world. To the extinction of humility in the human mind, may, in a great degree, be attributed the ſuppreſſion of gratitude in the human heart. The acts of kindneſs, which ought to call up the livelieſt emotions of thankfulneſs, and which were apt to

* On this ſubject the reader is again referred to the letter ſigned Cato, (already noticed), which letter is founded upon ſome compliments paid by Mr. Sheridan, to the *encreaſed amiability and conciliating feelings of the age*;—and alſo to the admirable poem in the ſame collection, entitled "New Morality."

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do ſo in former times, are now conſidered only as a right, and often as very inadequate to the extent of juſt and unalienable claims. The effect is to dry up the very ſources of tenderneſs and benevolence—for to confer benefits, without a hope that they will be gratefully received, is beyond the ordinary degree of perfection which the human character can be expected to attain. And if it were not for oſtentation, or, at beſt, a fear of attracting cenſure, by the omiſſion of the moſt preſſing duties of humanity, it is to be feared that, not only many of the acts of beneficence, which are recorded to the honour of the age, would be omitted, but that the world would exhibit a ſhocking ſpectacle of inhumanity. Theſe ſubſtitutes for proper feeling have certainly their uſe, but, in the mean time, the heart is almoſt debarred from thoſe pleaſures which conſtitute its choiceſt gratification, and which fertilize it for the growth of every virtue—the pleaſure of doing good from the pure impulſe of ſympathy, and that of receiving it as the generous donation of benevolence.

Purſuing the ſubject ſtill further, we ſhall find reaſon to lament a general and aſtoniſhing apathy of mind, in regard even to intereſts of the greateſt importance. All the cauſes, which have led to the preſent ſtate of depravity, have combined to produce this effect: but luxury has been its principal cauſe, by rendering mankind indifferent to every thing, excepting perſonal gratification. The direful reſult has been that the preſent moſt calamitous and perilous ſtate of the world has failed to make that impreſſion, without which it would denote the moſt egregious folly to indulge a hope, that the ſtill greater dangers which impend, may be averted. While a great part of Europe has exhibited the moſt heart-rending tragedy which, for years, has threatened, and which ſtill threatens, to involve, in its cataſtrophe, the whole human race, men have ſcarcely diſplayed a more than ordinary concern for the preſent, and, literally, they have manifeſted no ſolicitude for the future.—Councils and ſenates have treated, as a common war, a conteſt which menaced

with

with ruin every exiſting government, and which, from its commencement, was fraught with inſtant danger to every inſtitution, Religious and civil. The moſt horrible ſcences of carnage, commotion, and anarchy, have been unable to diſturb, except in the very ſpot where they occurred, and for the moment while they laſted, the courſe of luxury and diſſipation—and mankind are now ſtanding on the brink of an abyſs of ruin, which ſeems to yawn for them, with as much careleſſneſs and indifference, as if they were roaming in a garden of ſweets, far remote from every danger, and ſecure of the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of every delight*.

It remains to be obſerved, that the ordinary habits of modern life partake of, and ſerve to increaſe, the general depravity. The age exhibits a manifeſt relaxation in regard to induſtry, regularity, and punctuality. A general love of eaſe and pleaſure, the natural fruit of long indulgence, makes it an object of conſtant and univerſal endeavour to tranſact every buſineſs with as ſmall a degree of exertion as poſſible—and the extraordinary facilities which have been diſcovered, to relieve labour, both of mind and body, favour, in a remarkable manner, the ſucceſs of ſuch an endeavour. The conſequence is, that, in ſpite of thoſe facilities, no buſineſs is ſo well done as formerly, when diligence was agreeable, becauſe it was habitual—when it was the practical maxim of the uſeful part of ſociety, *labor ipſe voluptas*. In the moſt reſpectable lines of utility the character of a real man of buſineſs is in danger of expiring with thoſe perſons, who formed their habits during the Old Stile: and the

* A moſt awful example of this inſenſibility was exhibited in Dublin, in the winter immediately ſucceeding the horrors which attended the Iriſh Rebellion, at its moſt dreadful period, and even when that Rebellion was likely again to burſt forth; at a moment ſo awful, when ſcarcely a family but had to deplore the loſs of ſome relative, who had fallen a victim to the moſt ſavage outrage, and when all families had juſt cauſe to dread their total deſtruction, the career of luxury and diſſipation was purſued with an eagerneſs and with a thoughtleſs levity, which had not been exceeded, and, indeed, ſcarcely equalled, in the moſt quiet and peaceable times.

evident

evident inferiority in the moſt common products of induſtry, when compared with their former excellence, is a ſtanding proof of a diminution of care and diligence, even in what are called the labouring claſſes. Indeed the diminution of productive labour among mechanics and artiſans is become a very ſerious evil, both in a political and moral point of view. While the moſt uſeful, becauſe the moſt neceſſary labourer, the cultivator of the ſoil, is under the *happy* neceſſity of employing unremitting induſtry, a very large proportion of thoſe perſons, who are employed in the various branches of manufacture, are enabled, by a high rate of wages, to paſs one, two, and often more days in the week in idleneſs and diſſipation—and it may, among ſuch perſons, be conſidered as a general rule, that their labour and their pay are in an inverſe ratio to each other*. The conſequences are, that the ſtate loſes a large portion of its effective ſtrength—the induſtry of its inhabitants—the morals of the unfortunate individuals are corrupted, and a ſpirit of inſubordination endangers the ſecurity of property, and the exiſtence of ſocial order.

Among the higher claſſes, the modern arrangement of time is unfavourable both to induſtry and morals; an arrangement, which is commonly deſcribed by the epithet—late hours, and which allots to enervating repoſe, or to debilitating diſſipation, portions of time, the devotion of which, according to the dictates of nature, to activity, or to reſt, would conduce to invigoration and health. Such an arrangement of time has a pernicious effect in all the concerns and duties of life, particularly in thoſe which have any other

* Surely the happineſs as well as the utility of the various and valuable claſſes of artiſans and mechanics, and indeed the ſafety and good order of the State, call loudly upon the Legiſlature to counteract, more effectually, their combinations for an encreaſe of wages. They have already ſucceeded in this object to a degree which almoſt enſures their own miſery—which has given a dreadful blow to ſubordination, and greatly leſſened the ſecurity of property.

object than perſonal intereſt. Equally juſt and ſtriking is the proverbial obſervation, that if a man loſe an hour in the morning he is running after it the whole day. But what a ſcene of hurry muſt that day be, the very commencement of which is poſtponed to a late hour. Buſineſs in ſuch a caſe will be imperfectly, becauſe haſtily performed—dependents, releaſed, in a great degree, from ſuperviſion and controul, will ſlacken in their care and attention—and punctuality, eſſential as it is to convenience and comfort, will be baniſhed, not merely from engagements of the firſt importance, but from thoſe of friendſhip and conviviality, and the feſtive board will partake of the general want of regularity and preciſion*. The phyſical effects of ſuch an arrangement of time are too obvious to require enumeration. But it ſhould not eſcape obſervation, that the pernicious influence of late hours on bodily health, muſt produce a proportionable diminution of mental vigour—a conſequence certainly injurious to morals. For habits of virtue, particularly in a corrupted age, (abounding with ſnares,) cannot be formed without many ſtruggles; and to ſuſtain, with ſufficient reſolution, thoſe ſtruggles, much vigour of mind is neceſſary. It is, moreover, evident, that late nocturnal hours, by being favourable to diſſipation, tend exceedingly to encreaſe temptations to vice. In ſhort, it may be conſidered as an indiſputable truth, that no habit which is not in its own nature vicious, can be more injurious to virtue than that which now generally prevails, in regard to the arrangement of time—and perſons of rank and weight in ſociety, will render it an eſſential ſervice, if they employ the powerful influence of their example, in reſtoring modes of life more congenial with utility, with health, and with good morals.

* It is not undeſerving of notice, at this period of ſcarcity, that the lateneſs of the faſhionable dinner hour conduces much to encreaſe the conſumption of proviſions, by rendering a previous dinner, under another name, neceſſary in regard to health.

Should

Should it be thought that ſome of the topics, which have been here noticed, have received more attention than they deſerve, it ſhould be remembered that nothing can be of trifling importance, which relates to morals; and that an imperceptible ſtream may, by undermining the foundations, gradually endanger the ſafety of a building, which might ſecurely defy the violence of a torrent. Many things which appear trivial to a ſuperficial obſerver, are intimately connected with the welfare, and, indeed, the exiſtence of Society; and, at a time like the preſent, the importance of ſuch things is inconceivably encreaſed—Of this the foe to Society is well aware; for there is nothing, however unimportant it may appear, by which he does not endeavour to promote the ſucceſs of his attack. In no inſtance has he ſhewn a more profound knowledge of human nature, or diſplayed a more artful adaptation of means to object, than in his endeavour to ſerve the cauſe of general ſubverſion by ſuperſeding thoſe external appendages, which are uſed to diſtinguiſh the various claſſes of Society. It is with the deepeſt artifice, as well as with a perfect conſiſtency of character and views, that the Modern Philoſophers, in purſuance of their levelling ſyſtem, have declared War againſt Titles and Armorial Bearings; and that they have even attacked thoſe forms of dreſs, which have been uſed to diſtinguiſh the higher orders, and endeavoured to introduce a garb which really tends to confound all diſtinction of rank. The ſignal for this attack was given in France, and it has been repeated, in every country, by all who wiſhed to promote the cauſe of anarchy. Unfortunately many, who in their hearts abhor that cauſe, have been prevailed upon to ſhew a contempt for outward appearances*. It

* It is a fact, that a gentleman, known to the author, ſaw lately in a high aſſembly two perſons, whoſe appearance was ſo *undignified*, as to make him wonder at their being admitted into ſuch a ſituation. His wonder, however, was greatly encreaſed when he was informed that

It behoves ſuch perſons to conſider, that the ſentiment denominated reſpect is a neceſſary bond of the Social Union—that this ſentiment, by its mild operation, gives vigour to authority, and efficacy to laws—that it harmonizes the whole ſyſtem of Society, and, without any effort, keeps every part of it, from the loweſt to the higheſt, in its proper place. But this highly valuable ſentiment never can, with the maſs of mankind, be the reſult of reflection. It would be impoſſible, by any chain of reaſoning, to convince the multitude that it is eſſential to their happineſs. Neither can it be, according to the ſyſtem of modern philoſophers, a pure homage to merit and virtue.—To ſecure its exiſtence, it muſt depend upon cauſes more certain and univerſal in their operation, than the claims of virtue or merit. It muſt even operate where no ſuch claims are known to exiſt. It muſt be, in ſhort, as it has ever been, a ſpontaneous impulſe, which no reflection is neceſſary to produce; and it muſt be excited by the mere preſence or idea of its object. It is to ſome external diſtinction that the child is taught to bow with reverence, until an aſſociation is formed, in his mind, between that diſtinction and a feeling of reſpect; ſo that the latter is ſure to be called forth by the appearance of the former. It is thus that, according to the philoſophy of nature, all our beneficial impulſes, (even that of filial affection itſelf,) are produced. For according to that philoſophy, man is a creature of ſenſation and habit, as well as of reaſon. Not only are all his impreſſions originally derived from the ſenſes, but, even in relation to the moſt important concerns, they frequently terminate there, without exciting a ſingle reflection in his mind. The moſt improved and cul-

that thoſe perſons were no leſs than the Duke of ——— and the Earl of ———, whoſe cropped heads and Gallic Pantaloons, as well as the reſt of their garb, would have qualified them, in appearance at leaſt, to aſſume the character of Members of a Robeſpierrian Committee.

tivated underſtandings are not capable of freeing themſelves from this dominion of ſenſe. It is thus that nature effects the moſt important ends by the moſt ſimple means; and provides for the attainment of whatever is indiſpenſable to the well being of Society, by the operation of cauſes, which, inſtead of being partial or precarious, are univerſal, certain and invariable. It is thus that emblems, which are uſed to denote the moſt elevated dignities, although abſtractedly conſidered, of very trifling value, excite in the minds ſentiments of the moſt beneficial awe and reverence—ſentiments favourable to liberty as well as good order, ſince they aſſiſt government in performing its functions with the leaſt poſſible degree of force, by rendering the ſubmiſſion of ſubjects voluntary, cheerful and habitual, rather than the effect of compulſion. Nay, even the influence of Religion upon the human mind is moſt uſefully promoted by the obſervance of ſolemnities which operate by the ſenſes. Nothing, it is plain, can ſerve more effectually to promote the miſchievous deſign, which has lately been formed of diſturbing, and, indeed, of diſſolving all the relations of Society, than to bring into contempt ſuch emblems and ſolemnities. What could tend more to withdraw the allegiance of ſubjects from their Sovereign, than, like the infamous Paine, to teach them to conſider the Crown as an artificial bauble, of no more value than the gold and jewels which it contains?—What could more effectually ſerve to bring Religion into contempt, than to prevail on mankind to deſpiſe the ſolemnities which they have been accuſtomed to obſerve in its public celebration? But the emblems of Royalty, and the ſolemnities of Religion, excite only that high degree of reſpect, which is denominated Reverence, and they are therefore calculated only for occaſional diſplay. It is in the common intercourſe of life that the ſentiments of reſpect, which, by preſerving the gradations, conſtitute the chief bond of Society, muſt be formed and maintained. But it would be impoſſible either to pro-

duce or to keep alive thoſe ſentiments, without the aid of ſome external diſtinction, which, operating directly upon the ſenſes, may, by the inſtinctive force of habit, invariably excite the accuſtomed impreſſion. The two ſpecies of external diſtinction, which are beſt fitted to produce ſuch effects, are manners and dreſs; which, while they are neceſſary to ſupport a claim to reſpect, are not calculated to raiſe in the mind any of thoſe invidious ideas of painful compariſon, which other diſtinctions are apt to call forth. A difference which is expreſſive of ſome excluſive perſonal gratification, as a ſplendid houſe, a ſumptuous table, is, of itſelf, more likely to excite envy than reſpect; but the latter ſentiment alone is produced by manners and dreſs, when they correſpond with the rank of the individual. Indeed, theſe perſonal diſtinctions tend materially to counteract the invidious reflections which the diſparities of fortune are apt to ſuggeſt. Hence the luxuries of a poliſhed and elegant nobleman, and thoſe of a wealthy quaker, are ſeen with a very different eye. Of theſe two kinds of external diſtinction, manners and dreſs, indiſpenſable as they both are, the latter is the moſt operative upon the bulk of mankind. Cultivated manners are calculated chiefly to make an impreſſion on cultivated minds; but dreſs is more excluſively an object of ſenſe, and it is, therefore, moſt fitted to operate on the maſs of Society. It wants no aid from reaſon, education or reflection. It is ſimple and obvious—it inſtantaneouſly ſtrikes the ſenſes, and it is uniform, conſtant, and invariable, in its operation. It is a ſymbol which no one can miſunderſtand, which every one, entitled to it, may without difficulty poſſeſs, and it denotes a claim, which being founded in cuſtom, (the moſt ſolid foundation of all claims) every one is ready to allow. The neceſſity of exterior appendages, in order to keep alive ſentiments of reſpect, and to afford additional aid to authority, is recognized by the moſt barbarous nations; and the Indian Chief, when he diſplays his gaudy feathers and

tinſel ornaments—when his ſcarified body exhibits a painful pre-eminence beyond the extent of plebeian privilege—he proves himſelf a much better judge of human nature and of Society, than the ableſt advocate for the ſublime ſyſtem of modern philoſophy.

The reſult of theſe reflections ſhould be to induce, at this time, a more than ordinary attention to the ceremonial uſages of well ordered ſociety. The daring attempt which has been made, to overthrow all ſocial eſtabliſhments, gives to every barrier and outwork of ſuch eſtabliſhments a great additional importance; and it ſhould impel every one, who wiſhes for their preſervation, not only to obſerve the ſolemnities of Religion, and to treat the emblems of authority, with an unuſual degree of reverence, but alſo to preſerve, with ſcrupulous attention, every form which has been accuſtomed to command reſpect. The manners of cultivated life, which, while they characterize ſtation, ſerve alſo to promote the general obſervance of decency and decorum—the laws of heraldry, which have for ages been the hereditary guardians of birth and dignity—nay, even the diſtinctions of dreſs, which are neceſſary at once to mark and to defend the gradations of rank in ſociety—all theſe conſiderations acquire new claims to attention, becauſe a contempt for ſuch manners, laws, and diſtinctions, is made ſubſervient to the cauſe of Anarchy, and becauſe every neglect of them, is a ſacrifice in favour of that cauſe.

Such, alas! upon the whole, is the preſent moral ſtate of ſociety—ſuch are the direful effects of luxury, co-operating with the modern ſyſtems of infidelity and philoſophy—effects which appear, indeed, in various degrees in different countries, but which are dreadfully conſpicuous in all. It is obvious that ſuch a ſtate muſt, in the nature of things, lead, at length, to general diſturbance, contention, and anarchy—to the ſubverſion of all eſtabliſhed Government—and to the ſubjection of the human race to the mercileſs and inceſſantly fluctuating dominion of the moſt ferocious and ſanguinary monſters. For what leſs than theſe dreadful conſequences can be expected to reſult, when human de-

pravity, which, unleſs it be moſt powerfully checked by means the operation of which is now greatly enfeebled, muſt be rapidly progreſſive, ſhall have arrived at ſuch a pitch, as to have extinguiſhed every ſpark of Religion and virtue in the human breaſt—to have rendered the paſſions of men abſolutely ungovernable—to have produced an univerſal reſtleſſneſs and diſſatisfaction, an utter contempt for every ſpecies of authority, human and divine, and a hatred of every reſtraint, Religious, political and domeſtic—when, in ſhort, it ſhall have effected a diſſolution, not only of thoſe broader ties of reſpect and ſubordination, in which conſiſts the vigour of authority; but alſo of thoſe finer ligaments—the ſocial affections, the Religious principles, and the virtuous habits, which conſtitute the *ſtamina* of ſociety?

Happily for mankind, they are not yet arrived at this ſtate of extreme depravity; happily, the ſituation, in which the civilized world is now placed, is not the conſequence merely of its irreligion, its corrupted principles, and its vicious habits. Other circumſtances have co-operated with the degeneracy of the age, in producing the exploſion, which has ſhaken the ſocial edifice to its foundations. If that exploſion had been delayed, until the human race had approached the laſt ſtage of moral corruption—until the volcanic elements of infidelity, luxury and vice, had acquired ſufficient force to produce it, without the concurrence of extraordinary political cauſes, it would have been fatal in the firſt inſtance, and the barriers of ſociety would have fallen at the firſt blaſt of the trumpet of Anarchy. But the deleterious influence of human depravity was a neceſſary, though it has not been the ſole cauſe of the evils, which we have now to deplore, and of the ſtill greater dangers which we have to apprehend. Without that influence the French Revolution could not have proved ſo general and ſo grievous a ſcourge to mankind. This dreadful Revolution has derived, if not its exiſtence, at leaſt its main force, from the vitiated ſtate of ſociety. To this it is indebted for the moſt atro-

cious and deſtructive character which it has aſſumed for the production of ſuch monſters as Robeſpierre, Marat, Le Bon, and Buonaparte, and for the dreadful ravages by which it has deſolated a great part of the earth. The great progreſs which it has made, in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time, is evidently owing to the decay of Religious and moral principles. If thoſe principles had been in a flouriſhing ſtate, the attack, if it could have taken place, could not have been ſo violent, and the defence would have been unſpeakably more vigorous. But unhappily the influence of thoſe principles was greatly enfeebled, and the oppoſite ones had attained a very high degree of force, when mankind were ſurpriſed by this terrible conflict: hence it is, that the Revolution has made ſuch aſtoniſhing advances towards the overthrow of all ſocial eſtabliſhments; and, to judge from preſent appearances, it will accompliſh that overthrow, unleſs it be reſiſted by means very different from thoſe which have been hitherto employed.

What means ſhould be reſorted to, in order to prevent ſo dreadful a cataſtrophe, it cannot be difficult to diſcover. In a great Moral conteſt—in a ſtruggle involving the exiſtence of all the Religious and political Eſtabliſhments of the World, where can any adequate defence be found, but in the maſs of Religion and Virtue ſtill remaining in Society? Happily, notwithſtanding our great depravity, that maſs is ſtill conſiderable. Happily, the Eſtabliſhments which are attacked, are ſtill cheriſhed and venerated by a large portion of mankind. But our ſtock of Religion and Virtue will not avail us, unleſs it be called forth, in an extraordinary manner, into action. It muſt be excited and exerted in a degree, proportionate to the immenſe intereſts it has to defend. In a conteſt like this, every individual ſhould conſider himſelf as put upon his trial, and as called upon to rouze all the faculties of his ſoul, and all the energies of his heart, for the preſervation of whatever is dear and valuable in ſocial life. He ſhould do his utmoſt to inſpire others with a ſenſe of the common danger, and to ſtimulate them to come forward in the common

common cauſe. If all perſons who are ſtill really attached to the Government, which protected them in the helpleſs and expoſed ſtate of infancy, and to the Religion, which they have been taught, from their tendereſt years, to conſider as their unerring guide, both to temporal and eternal felicity, were to raiſe their voice in ſupport of theſe invaluable Eſtabliſhments, and to avow a juſt and manly indignation againſt every attempt to ſubvert them, a new impulſe would be given to ſociety, and the danger would be inſtantly, and almoſt incredibly diminiſhed. But ſuch perſons, if they really mean to ſecure the bleſſings which they wiſh ſtill to enjoy, and to tranſmit them to poſterity, muſt not be ſatisfied with raiſing their voice, or giving vent to their indignation; they muſt conſider themſelves as engaged in a conflict, in which defeat muſt be fatal, not only to themſelves but to all for whom they have any regard.—They muſt take care to be armed at all points, and, by the utmoſt circumſpection in the whole of their conduct, they muſt be cautious not to give the enemy any advantage. They muſt remember that they are combating with an adverſary, who ſeeks to pierce the vitals of ſocial order, through the ſides of Chriſtianity and good morals; which, therefore, it is neceſſary, in a peculiar manner, to guard and to ſtrengthen. For this purpoſe, they muſt be more than ordinarily mindful of their own deportment, and deem it incumbent upon them to obſerve all the ordinances of Religion, and to perform all the duties of morality, with exemplary regularity; remembering that every neglect of thoſe ordinances, and every violation of thoſe duties, is an injury to that cauſe, which involves, in its iſſue, all their hopes and all their intereſts, at leaſt on this ſide of the grave. But in addition to theſe common and univerſal duties, ſtill higher duties devolve upon all who are endowed with any extraordinary talents or opportunities beyond the uſual lot of mankind. Every talent, which, at a time like this, is buried, will certainly riſe up in condemnation againſt him to whom it is entruſted. Every one who would eſcape ſuch condemnation, ſhould

be ſtudious to diſcover how he may beſt exert the powers, which Heaven has given him. He ſhould, after great and unwearied exertions, think that he has done nothing, ſo long as any thing, within the compaſs of his ability, remains to be performed. He ſhould conſider every ſituation which may afford him peculiar means of utility, as impoſing upon him the moſt ſolemn obligation to improve it to the utmoſt. The poſſeſſion of wealth, rank, office; the functions of the Magiſtrate or the Legiſlator; ſhould be conſidered by him as an imperious call for eminent and appropriate ſervices.

Moſt of all the ſacred profeſſion obliges its members to great and peculiar exertions. At all times it is incumbent on a Chriſtian Miniſter to recommend, with all the earneſtneſs in his power, the performance of every duty, Religious, moral and civil, preſcribed by the Chriſtian Code, and particularly of thoſe in which the age may happen to be remarkably deficient. Now, beſides a general corruption of Religious and moral principles, and a conſequent depravity in practice, the preſent age is peculiarly deficient in its attention to the obligations of ſubjects to Government, and even in a knowledge of thoſe obligations—though clearly unfolded in the ſacred volume, which is the unerring rule both of principle and of practice. Nay, ſo far has human preſumption extended itſelf on this important ſubject, that ſyſtems are openly promulgated, even as a part of education, which, in direct contradiction to the expreſs declarations of Scripture—that all Power is of God—as well as to the invariable courſe of nature and of experience, (which would itſelf be ſufficient evidence of the Divine Will), teach the prepoſterous and moſt diſorderly doctrine, that the origin of power is the will of the many. The conſequence of ſuch doctrines has been a diſpoſition to diſregard, and even to deſpiſe the Divine commands, by which the governed are moſt ſolemnly enjoined to obey and to honour their governors; and this diſpoſition is one of the prevailing ſins of the age. A Miniſter of Religion would, therefore, be guilty of a groſs neglect of duty if he did not at

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ſuch a time moſt emphatically enforce the neceſſity of obedience to thoſe commands.

The introduction of ſuch topics into the Pulpit is often invidiouſly cenſured by means of the miſapplication of a remark, very vague and ſuperficial in itſelf, that the Pulpit is not the proper place for Politics. But what muſt be that perverſeneſs, or that ſtupidity, which cannot diſtinguiſh between thoſe temporary queſtions—which excite the animoſity of contending parties, and which afford the proper definition of the term politics, in its uſual acceptation—and thoſe univerſal and permanent obligations, which are not only preſcribed by morality, but clearly and poſitively enjoined by Divine Authority.

As Chriſtian Miniſters are bound to excite to the performance of every duty, whether Religious, moral, or civil, which is inculcated by the Sacred Scriptures, it is alſo incumbent upon them to improve all opportunities, which are peculiarly calculated to give effect to their exhortations. When the mind is ſoftened by calamity, and alarmed by danger, then may the functions of the Pulpit be exerciſed with the greateſt hopes of ſucceſs; in warning men, by repentance and amendment, and particularly by laying aſide thoſe ſins, of whatever kind, by which the times are diſtinguiſhed, to avert the diſpleaſure of that Being, who, either by the ordinary, or the extraordinary diſpenſations of his Providence, is ſure to requite great wickedneſs by ſevere ſuffering. Never was an opportunity for ſuch warnings ſo favourable—never was their urgency ſo great—as at this moment. The mind of man muſt be impenetrable as the adamantine rock, if it be not now ſuſceptible of admonition. And while, on the one hand, the extreme depravity of the age muſt be conſidered as the great ſource of its misfortunes, there ſeems, on the other, abundant reaſon to conclude, that the Supreme Diſpoſer of all things is ſpecially interpoſing, to viſit the ſins of the world with the heavieſt afflictions. At ſuch a time, ſhall not the ſacred monitors cry aloud, and warn men of the evils by which they are ſurrounded? Shall

Shall they not explain the moral cauſes which have led to ſo awful a ſituation, and point out thoſe means of deliverance, which they are authorized, by their miſſion to offer? Shall they be deterred, by cavils, from deſcribing, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the perils, to which the Religious as well as the civil eſtabliſhments of ſociety are expoſed? Shall the Pulpit be ſilent when the Altar is attacked? Or ſhall its miniſters fail to animate their auditors to ſtand forward, in defence of Chriſtianity itſelf, againſt the hoſt of enemies by which it is aſſailed? But, particularly, when the rare and awful period of a change of Century is enveloped in ſo deep and portentous a gloom, ſhall they not avail themſelves of the ſolemnity of ſuch a moment, to conjure the human race to pauſe in their career of folly, diſſipation and wickedneſs; and to prevent, by an inſtant and thorough reformation, the century, on which they are entering, from being filled with miſeries, which the tongue of man cannot expreſs, nor even his heart conceive?*

But a conteſt ſo important and ſo arduous, calls for more than individual exertions. It demands all the aid which ſympathy and co-operation can afford it.

* It is impoſſible to witneſs the extraordinary efforts of many Miniſters of the Church of England to produce ſuitable impreſſions, at this alarming criſis, upon the minds of the people of this country, without indulging the pleaſing hope that, under Divine favour, we may yet be ſpared. The Charges which have been delivered by ſeveral of the Biſhops to their Clergy, and which have alſo been made public, afford the happy preſage, that the ſalutary impulſe will pervade the whole of the ſacred Order. Thoſe Charges, though ſtrictly confined to topics which are clearly within the Province of a Chriſtian Biſhop, caſt ſuch a light upon the preſent ſtate of ſociety—upon the cauſes which have reduced it to ſo melancholy a ſituation—and upon the means in which alone it can hope for ſafety—that they deſerve the ſerious attention of the Stateſman and the Legiſlator.

Among the Laity too, notwithſtanding the general inſenſibility which prevails, there are encouraging inſtances of ſuitable impreſſions, and of ſeaſonable exertions. Societies have alſo been formed, conſiſting both of Clergy and Laity, which have a moſt beneficial tendency at a time like the preſent. One of theſe, the Society for the Reformation of Principle, has done much good, and will, it is hoped, do much more. Another, an infant ſociety, called the Endeavour, embraces the important object of adminiſtering relief to diſtreſs when accompanied with merit, and, by means of the circulation of cheap tracts, to promote the general diffuſion of good principles.

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The cauſe is general—the danger is univerſal.—The aſſailants ſet an example of the cloſeſt union and concert. They act upon a regular and thoroughly digeſted ſyſtem. They ſacrifice all private differences to their common object. Shall their opponents be deſtitute of the ſame advantages? Shall they who defend their Altars and their Thrones, be ſatisfied with ſeparate and unconnected endeavours? Shall they be outdone, either in vigour or in harmony, by the agents of infidelity and anarchy? Shall they not ſmother their mutual differences; and regarding all who are engaged with them in the ſame cauſe, as united by the ſtrongeſt ties of reciprocal duty and of congenial feeling, reſerve all their animoſity for the common enemy and his coadju-

At a period of darkneſs and barbariſm, the friends of ſociety ſucceſsfully encountered the evils of the times by a regular, well-cemented, and durable Aſſociation, which corrected the manners of the age, and diffuſed the moſt valuable bleſſings over ſucceſſive generations. An Aſſociation which, while by its heroic achievements it afforded protection to the feeble—deliverance to the oppreſſed—and ſecurity to the innocent—cultivated the moſt refined ſentiments, and rendered urbanity, honour and juſtice, objects of univerſal admiration. Does not the preſent period imperiouſly demand a ſimilar reſource? Should not the friends of Religion, of virtue, and of ſocial order, throughout the Chriſtian world, conſider themſelves as forming, from this moment, A GRAND ASSOCIATION for the preſervation of thoſe ineſtimable bleſſings? Should they not conſider themſelves as pledged to each other, and to ſociety at large, by the ſtrongeſt ties of honour and conſcience—by the higheſt obligations of Religion and morality, to engage in a ſteady,

* All perſons who are engaged in ſupporting the great cauſe, on the ſucceſs of which ſo much depends, ſhould, with regard to one another, adopt the reſolution of the Pſalmiſt, "Let the righteous ſmite me, "it ſhall be a kindneſs, and let him reprove me, it ſhall be an ex-"cellent oil:" but of thoſe who are hoſtile to that cauſe, inſtead of acting upon the puſillanimous and treacherous ſyſtem of modern liberality, they ſhould ſay, "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate thee, "and am not I grieved with them that riſe up againſt thee?"

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reſolute and interminable conflict with infidelity, vice, and anarchy—and to cultivate, to the utmoſt of their power, both by precept and example, thoſe ſentiments, principles and qualities, the prevalence of which would afford the beſt ſecurity againſt the attacks of the above foes to ſocial happineſs? If even the comparatively few and unconnected individuals, who, in different countries, have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their endeavours to ſtem the torrent which threatens to overwhelm the world:—if thoſe perſons were animated by the confidence which is produced by a certainty of mutual ſupport—if they were inſpired by that generous and emulative ardour, which the conſciouſneſs of being jointly and ſolemnly engaged in ſo glorious a cauſe, could not fail to inſpire; and if their efforts were harmoniouſly and ſyſtematically directed, by an unity of means, to a common object, they would form a ſocial phalanx, which it would be out of the power of the enemy to pierce, and around the ſtandard of which the friends of lawful government would every where rally and unite.

But whoever enliſts in this great cauſe, muſt be careful not to forget, even for a moment, the awful truth, that the preſent calamitous and perilous ſituation of the world is chiefly owing to its moral depravity. For, from this truth it follows, as a neceſſary conſequence, that there can be no effectual remedy, but a thorough and radical reformation—a general correction both of principle and practice. Every other expedient will be, at beſt, but a palliative, and will leave the cauſe of the evil untouched. Although the impending dangers ſhould be averted—although ſociety ſhould be reſtored to the ſtate of apparent ſafety, which it enjoyed before the French Revolution—although the reſtoration of lawful Government in France, ſhould inſpire mankind with the moſt confident expectation of general and permanent ſecurity, yet nothing more than a tempory eſcape will be effected, unleſs the baneful influence

ence of infidelity, immoral philoſophy, and luxury be overcome. Nay, the general ſatisfaction and confidence which would be inſpired, by a deliverance from thoſe political dangers, that fill every reflecting mind with conſternation and horror, and the proſpect, which the too ſanguine eye of hope would diſcover, of a long enjoyment of general and uninterrupted proſperity, would infuſe freſh vigour into the above implacable enemies of ſocial order, and free them from that partial reſtraint, which a ſenſe of preſent and extreme danger may have impoſed on their progreſs. The cauſes which have enabled the French Revolution to menace the earth with univerſal anarchy, will give the ſame force to future convulſions, when Society ſhall be leſs able to withſtand the ſhock; and political events will never be wanting, to afford occaſion for diſturbance, when all the principles of ſocial order ſhall be ſtill more enfeebled, and thoſe of ſtrife and confuſion ſhall have received further acceſſions of ſtrength. If, therefore, the exiſting ſocial eſtabliſhments, the overthrow of which would involve the human race in calamities, which, for extent and duration, ſurpaſs all powers of thought—if thoſe eſtabliſhments ſhould eſcape the perils to which they are now expoſed, they would not attain any ſecurity beyond the actual moment; nay, they would be ſpeedily expoſed to freſh danger, unleſs their natural bulwarks—Religion and morality, be greatly ſtrengthened: unleſs a thorough change take place in the morals and manners of ſociety.

The nature of this neceſſary change muſt be obvious to every one, upon a moment's reflection. It is not, like that propoſed by the abſurd ſyſtem of human perfectibility, incompatible with the nature of man, at variance with his original feelings and his earlieſt habits, and hoſtile to all his inſtitutions as a ſocial being. No; it has for its object the attainment of practicable ends by natural means; it would not profeſs to render him a perfect—but only an improved being; it is to be produced by the aid of original

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impreſſions and early attachments, which for that purpoſe muſt be reinforced; and it is friendly to all the inſtitutions to which he has been accuſtomed from his birth. Neither would it tend to alter his condition, or to deprive him of any advantage which he now poſſeſſes. On the contrary, its effect would be, to render him more fit for that condition, and for thoſe advantages—it would qualify him for that ſtate of high proſperity, in which he has been placed by wealth and civilization, and which has hitherto proved his greateſt misfortune, becauſe it was not accompanied with a proportionate improvement in his moral character. That, without ſuch an improvement, proſperity is a curſe inſtead of a bleſſing, is a truth too obvious to require illuſtration. What is it which renders a ſudden acquiſition of fortune highly dangerous, and often deſtructive, to the individual who is thereby, in general eſtimation, rendered an object of envy, but that his mind and heart have not been trained for his new ſituation? What is it but a difference in Religious and moral principles and habits, which renders the poſſeſſion, even of *inherited* opulence, in one man a bleſſing to himſelf and others, and a ſource of the moſt exalted pleaſures—the pleaſures of benevolence; and in another, the cauſe of debauchery, infamy, miſery, remorſe, and premature death? Nay, even in the humbleſt ſtations, how is the ſame truth exemplified in the profligate lives, in the miſerable exiſtence, phyſical and moral, of thoſe manufacturing labourers, whoſe high wages enable them to ſupport their families by the induſtry of four days in a week—when contraſted with the comparatively virtuous and happy lives of the cultivators of the ſoil, whoſe utmoſt hope never extends beyond the procuring of a tolerable maintenance, by the unremitting labour of ſix days in ſeven throughout the year. In ſhort, as an Engliſh writer, eminently diſtinguiſhed for the profundity of his reſearches into human nature, obſerves, " Proſperity itſelf, whilſt any thing, ſup-
" poſed deſirable is not our own, begets extravagant
" and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is alto-
" gether

" gether as much a ſource of diſcontent as any thing " in our external condition*."

Society, like an individual, is a moral being, and ſubject to the operation of the ſame cauſes; with this material difference, however, that thoſe cauſes operate with encreaſed influence, in proportion to the number of perſons on whom they collectively act; but in a ratio greatly exceeding the progreſſive encreaſe of thoſe numbers. Therefore, general proſperity, ſtill more than that of an individual, requires a correſponding degree of moral improvement; not merely to render it a bleſſing, but to prevent its being an inexpreſſible, nay, a fatal misfortune. We have ſeen, in the foregoing reflections, that the proſperity of modern times has been attended, not with a ſuitable improvement, but with a dreadful deterioration of the moral ſtate of man†. And unleſs that beneficial change, which

ſhould

* Butler's Analogy, c. 5.

† The effect of abuſed property is to diſqualify alike for proſperity and adverſity. It has pleaſed Heaven to afflict this country with two ſucceſſive ſeaſons of ſcarcity, and the latter is, as might be expected, the moſt ſeverely felt. Though this calamity produces a degree of alarm and agitation, much beyond what would have attended a ſimilar dearth in former times, yet the feelings it has excited are, ſtrange and inconſiſtent as it may appear, inſufficient to call forth reſolution and virtue to ſubmit to privations, which would afford almoſt certain relief. For while the human mind has loſt much of its ſenſibility to crimes, to the ſufferings of others, and even to great and general dangers, both of the political and moral kind, it has acquired an extreme and morbid ſenſibility, which makes it tremblingly alive at the very apprehenſion of perſonal inconvenience.—While mankind ſee with indifference all the ſecurities of ſocial life gradually undermined, they cannot endure the thoughts of loſing, or even of ſuſpending any gratification, the continued enjoyment of which, as well as of every other comfort, depends upon the ſtability of ſuch ſecurities. Hence it is, that ſuch difficulty attends the adoption of thoſe meaſures of economy and frugality, which would immediately leſſen, in a great degree, the evil which fills us all with the utmoſt alarm. Nay, though a poſitive law has been made, prohibiting the ſale of new bread—a law which when, by the aid of firſt impreſſions, it was obſerved for a few weeks, was found, according to authentic report, to produce the effect intended to be derived from it in a remarkable degree—this law has ſince been evaded in ſuch a manner, as to be almoſt totally inoperative: ſo that new bread is publicly conſumed with as much unconcern as if the

ſhould have gone hand in hand with proſperity, can now be brought about, the advantages which we poſſeſs beyond our anceſtors, and on which we ſet ſo high a value, will plunge us into an abyſs of miſery, which will ſwallow up the happineſs of the preſent generation, and the hopes of generations yet to come.

It is plain, then, that the propoſed change, if it could be accompliſhed, far from being attended with a ſacrifice of our preſent proſperity, would be favourable to its continuance, and that the moral improvement of mankind, in proportion to its degree and its permanence, would tend to perpetuate their welfare. It would be conducive to ſocial happineſs in all its forms. It would be friendly, in the higheſt degree, to good order and general tranquillity. It would be peculiarly favourable to freedom; for it is obvious, that in proportion to the prevalence of irreligion and licentiouſneſs, the natural force of government muſt be enfeebled, and it muſt be driven to maintain itſelf by extraordinary reſtraints*. The real ſource of deſpotiſm is not the depravity of governors, but the corruption of the governed. Nor let it be ſuppoſed that ſuch a change would interfere with

the uſe of it were not a violation of an exiſting and moſt ſalutary law. Who can refrain from exclaiming, Quid leges ſine moribus! At length, the duties of economy and frugality in the uſe of bread are enforced by a call which, unleſs the country be, indeed, thoroughly depraved, will inſtantly produce its due effect. A gracious and affectionate Sovereign, the Father of his people, at the requeſt of his Parliament, has by Proclamation ſolemnly enjoined his ſubjects to reduce their conſumption of bread, in families where ſubſtitutes can be procured. Every maſter of a Family who does not inſtantly and ſtrictly obſerve ſuch an injunction, muſt be alike inſenſible to decency and duty, and in caſe ſtill heavier misfortunes, than thoſe we now experience, ſhould await us, he will have his ſhare of them greatly aggravated by the reproaches of his own conſcience.

* This has been clearly exemplified in the effects produced, in this Country, by the diſorganizing and licentious principles of the French Revolution, which have rendered neceſſary, for the preſervation of Government, thoſe additional reſtraints, of which thoſe perſons who are fettered by them, complain as infringements on their liberty, but which the well-diſpoſed cordially approve, becauſe neceſſary, at ſuch a time, to the exiſtence of freedom.

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any of the enjoyments of life. On the contrary, it would, in an unſpeakable degree, encreaſe the ſum of thoſe enjoyments. By the irrevocable decrees of him who gave to man all his powers and faculties, there is no happineſs for moral agents without virtue. The licentious ſenſualiſt may, indeed, for the moment, fancy himſelf the ture voluptuary—he may appear ſatisfied, nay, delighted with his gratifications—ſo does the voracious ſwine with his feaſt of garbage—nay, the ſordid brute has the advantage; he has no apprehenſion to embitter his meal—he wants no internal ſatisfaction to give it a reliſh. But man is doomed, by the conſtitution of his nature, to be a ſtranger to true enjoyment, unleſs it be accompanied with the approbation of his own mind; and this, however callous the conſcience may become, can never be the companion of vice. The virtuous man, on the contrary, has that within him which ſweetens all his pleaſures. He is not, as ſome ſuppoſe, debarred of any of the comforts of life. He rather thinks it his duty to enjoy them all, in their place and ſeaſon. It is one of his maxims, "to enjoy is to obey." Virtue is not an auſtere monkiſh ſyſtem of harſh ſeverity and rigid mortification; neither does it in the leaſt ſavour of the formal ſtiffneſs of puritanical affectation. It is, indeed, a ſyſtem of ſelf-government, and, whenever neceſſary, of ſelf-denial. It often demands ſevere ſtruggles. But it preſcribes no rules which have not happineſs for their object. It impoſes no reſtraints which are not neceſſary to prevent miſery. It requires no ſtruggles which are not eſſential to ſafety. It abundantly compenſates for all the ſtruggles it occaſions, for all the prohibitions it enjoins, by giving to all the pleaſures of life a higher reliſh, and to all the beauties of nature a brighter hue. Thoſe enjoyments which, when illicitly obtained, are accompanied with the reproaches of conſcience, and followed by the pangs of remorſe, afford, when received at the hands of virtue, a pure and unalloyed, though certainly an imperfect gratification. In fine, the yir-

tuous man alone can bring to the banquet of life that frame of mind, without which no banquet can afford any real ſatisfaction; and provided his virtue be founded upon Religion, his pleaſure is heightened by knowing that he has ſtores behind which will enſure him ſtill higher and more permanent delights. The ſcene before him is ſerene and unclouded, and the proſpect opens ſtill brighter views, and enlivens enjoyment by the cheering rays of hope.

But deſirable, in every point of view, as this great moral change may be, it is ſo difficult of accompliſhment, it is ſo ſtrongly oppoſed by inveterate habits, that the propoſal may ſeem to many to be abſolutely chimerical. The taſk is, indeed, truly Herculean; ſo foul are the Augean Stables of modern depravity. Yet, let it be remembered, that the object is indiſpenſable—that nothing elſe can enſure the preſervation of civil ſociety—that nothing elſe can warrant a parent to look forward, without horror, to the future exiſtence, even in this life, of thoſe whoſe happineſs is dearer to him than his own—while the impreſſions and diſpoſitions, which are neceſſary to produce ſuch a change, would be the moſt effectual, perhaps the only preſervative or ſecurity againſt ſpeedy and general deſtruction; they would give a new energy to virtue, and enable it to cope with the energy of crime, which threatens to reduce the whole world to its dominion. In ſuch a caſe difficulty ſhould only invigorate reſolution, and ſtimulate to exertion. It ſhould induce every one to ſet about the arduous taſk without delay—to form the fixed and unalterable determination that the moral improvement of mankind, as far as he can, by any means, contribute to promote it, ſhall be the great buſineſs of his life.

The firſt ſtep towards the attainment of this moſt important object, obviouſly muſt be to check that contagion, by which the mind of man has been already ſo far contaminated, as to endanger his ſocial exiſtence. Numberleſs are the channels through which the moſt deſtructive poiſon is conveyed into his

his mind; innumerable are the communications by which he is taught to diſbelieve Chriſtianity—to doubt even the exiſtence of a God—to deſpiſe the obligations of morality—to contemn the authority of government and of law—to diſlike his place in Society—and to pant, with inceſſant reſtleſſneſs, for a change, of which he cannot form any idea, and which would involve the deſtruction of every eſtabliſhment that can afford him protection, and would expoſe him, without the ſmalleſt defence, to the outrages of ruffian violence, and ſavage cruelty. The preſs is the chief vehicle by which theſe miſchievous impreſſions are produced. Other means are certainly reſorted to for the ſame deteſtable purpoſe; but none is ſo much calculated for the univerſal circulation of bad principles as the preſs, which is inceſſantly employed, at once to corrupt the fountains of ſcience, and to ſtimulate the lower orders to tumult and inſurrection. To theſe baneful effects it is made ſubſervient by every mode and ſpecies of publication—by grave and ſolemn eſſays on education and morality—by works of hiſtorical compilation*, by novels teeming not only with allurements to vice, but with the horrors of blaſphemy†, by new Annual Regiſters, by Monthly Magazines, and Critical Reviews, by cheap tracts, and by Jacobin Newspapers—and even by reports of Parliamentary Speeches—which reports often contain matter of the moſt inflammatory nature, evidently calculated to promote ſedition, to excite to treaſon, and to render the very labours of Parliament, for the relief of the Country from the preſſure of ſcarcity, a ſource of diſcontent, diſaffection, and outrage.

* It is not merely by new publications of an hiſtorical kind, like the New Annual Regiſter, that the public mind is infected, but old ones of good authority, and of unexceptionable principles, are continued to the preſent time, and thereby made inſtrumental to the perverſion of the youthful mind. Of this deſcription is the new edition of Guthrie's Grammar.

† A work of this ſort has been unblushingly avowed by a Member of Parliament; for its merits ſee the Purſuits of Literature.

It is, therefore, of the firſt and moſt urgent neceſſity to check and counteract the various endeavours, which are uſed to corrupt mankind, to render their principles depraved and their paſſions ungovernable. Every perſon who really wiſhes, not merely for the ultimate eſcape, but for the immediate preſervation of ſociety, ſhould exert all his vigilance and all his activity for the above purpoſe. He ſhould particularly ſet his face againſt every publication which has a pernicious tendency*. He ſhould be conſtantly on the watch, to guard

* It is a truth which would ſcarcely obtain belief were it not confirmed by daily experience, that the prints, which have for years outraged every Religious, Moral, and Social feeling, which have teemed with blaſphemy and treaſon, and which, though more guarded ſince they have been ſubjected to an encreaſe of legal reſponſibility, are ſtill labouring inceſſantly to inflame the public mind, to corrupt the public principles, and to diſſolve all the ties which connect Government and ſubjects—it is equally true, and aſtoniſhing, that theſe execrable prints are enabled to purſue their miſchievous purpoſe, by the encouragement they receive from perſons, who deteſt the cauſe which is thus promoted: for otherwiſe thoſe prints would not have a ſufficient ſale to defray their neceſſary expences. In defence of ſuch ſuicidal encouragement, the common place, though prepoſterous excuſe, is urged, that it is deſirable to ſee what can be ſaid on both ſides of the queſtion—as if the cauſe of infidelity, treaſon and anarchy, were ſupported by fair diſcuſſion, inſtead of depending for its ſucceſs on falſehood, miſrepreſentation and ſophiſtry; as if, while ſome minds may be capable of detecting the fallacy of ſuch artifices, others are not in danger of being miſled by them; as if the poiſon which may be repelled by a vigorous conſtitution, or a powerful antidote, could not be fatal where the conſtitution is feeble, or no antidote can be adminiſtered.

Another circumſtance, by favouring the impunity, promotes the encouragement and ſupport which theſe miſchievous prints receive from the well diſpoſed part of the public. It is a prevailing, though a very erroneous opinion, that all reſtrictions upon the preſs would be injurious to the cauſe of freedom. Such reſtrictions are undoubtedly abridgments of liberty—ſo are the laws againſt robbery, forgery and murder—ſo is the decalogue. But it is licentious liberty that is thus abridged; and thereby better protection is afforded to that ſalutary freedom, which conſiſts in an undiſturbed right to do whatever is not injurious to ſociety. If it can be proved that it is not thus injurious to diſſeminate the worſt ſpecie of poiſon, that which corrupts the mind, then it muſt be admitted, that reſtraints on the preſs are tyrannical. But if, on the contrary, ſuch diſſemination be one of the deepeſt injuries (perhaps the deepeſt) which can be inflicted on ſociety, then it follows that it ought to be checked by adequate reſtraints; and every true friend to civil liberty is bound to exert the utmoſt vigilance, to promote the efficacy of thoſe reſtraints. It proves a remarkable want of ſuch vigilance, that the public-houſes reſorted to by the lower

guard every avenue by which the foe to ſociety makes his approaches to the human mind, and determined, in whatever ſhape that enemy may appear, to oppoſe his progreſs—to expoſe his miſchievous attempts to the execration of the wiſe and good, and, wherever that is poſſible, to ſubject ſuch attempts to legal retribution.

Thus, perhaps, the great moral plague, which threatens ſociety with ſpeedy diſſolution, may be happily ſtayed, and freſh vigour may be acquired to encounter the political evils, which that plague has rendered ſo formidable. But at beſt the danger will be only protracted—the ruin will be only delayed, unleſs the force of vitiated habits can be broken—unleſs the dominion of luxury can be overthrown—unleſs man can be qualified for his preſent highly cultivated and proſperous ſtate, by the infuſion of virtuous principles, the cultivation of virtuous diſpoſitions, and the formation of virtuous habits. The only courſe, in the nature of things, by which theſe ends can be attained, is EDUCATION. Not, indeed, in the ſenſe in which this term is generally underſtood, and in which, unfortunately, it is almoſt excluſively applied, a cultivation of the mental faculties. This has been the fatal error, to which the world is chiefly indebted for its preſent calamities. The education of man has been principally, and, indeed, almoſt ſolely directed to the formation of his mind, to the purpoſes of literary inſtruction and ſcientific attainments: objects undoubtedly of vaſt importance, and which, it is to be hoped, will continue to be purſued with undiminiſhed ardour; but which are abſolutely inſignificant in value when compared with the higher and nobler purpoſe of education—the Cultivation of the Heart. It is this which alone can improve thoſe qualities that are neceſſary to render mankind fit for ſocial intercourſe—qualities, which are ſo

lower claſſes, particularly in the metropolis, though under the immediate controul of the magiſtrates, almoſt invariably take in newſpapers of a pernicious tendency!

eſſential, that Providence has ordained them to ſpring out of the original feelings of the human breaſt, and to be foſtered by the domeſtic relations in which we are placed, by our very birth. But theſe qualities, the exiſtence of which is thus wiſely ſecured, becauſe they are abſolutely indiſpenſable, are ſure to degenerate, unleſs they receive a moſt careful and unremitting culture. The infirmities of our nature, its proneneſs to evil, its tendency to ſelfiſhneſs, the violence of paſſion, the force of temptation—cauſes which "grow with our "growth, and ſtrengthen with our ſtrength"—are ſure to give a perverſe bias to the mind, and a corrupt propenſity to the heart, except the character and diſpoſition be trained to virtue. It is by the aid of ſuch a training alone that the ſocial affections can be preſerved in due vigour—that the ſocial duties can be made to take deep root—that conſcience can acquire its due authority—that the auxiliary virtues, ſuch as gratitude and humility, can be formed, to guard and cheriſh virtues of a higher claſs—that, above all, Religious ſentiments can be ſo ſtrongly impreſſed, as to maintain an aſcendancy through the whole of life. In ſhort, it is by ſuch a training alone that man can be qualified either for happineſs or utility; that he can become a good member of ſociety, even in its moſt ſimple ſtate. But when, without ſuch a training, he arrives at a high degree of civilization—in which every object tends to inflame deſire—in which every acquiſition tends to excite covetouſneſs—in which every attainment, even of the ſcientific kind, tends to inſpire confidence and preſumption—then, indeed, his ſtate is inexpreſſibly deplorable and perilous. He is like a veſſel in a tempeſtuous ſea, without a rudder and compaſs, without a ſkilful maſter and experienced mariners—he is expoſed to be daſhed in pieces on the rock of univerſal contention, or to be ſwallowed up in the unfathomable gulph of anarchy.

To remedy as ſoon and as completely as poſſible the dreadful omiſſion which has been attended with ſuch fatal conſequences, that of preparing man for improved

ſociety, a regular and ſyſtematic courſe of Religious and moral education, ſhould be the ſerious endeavour of every one who feels the ſmalleſt ſolicitude, either for the preſent age or for poſterity. Every care ſhould be taken, and every exertion made, to form the riſing generation for the arduous part which they will have hereafter to act, and on their qualifications for which (ſuppoſing the preſent age to eſcape the fury of the ſtorm, which has burſt over its head) it will depend, whether their exiſtence be a ſcene of as much happineſs as man can hope to enjoy in this imperfect ſtate, or of a degree of miſery which would exceed all powers of deſcription.

But without the ſuperintending care of Government, it will be vain to hope for the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a ſyſtem of education. To the want of ſuch care, properly exerciſed, may, in a very great degree, be attributed the evils under which the preſent age is now ſuffering. It is aſtoniſhing, and, indeed, almoſt inconceivable, that the moſt important of all the concerns which can engage the attention of Government, ſhould have been almoſt wholly neglected by it—that while it has every where been exerting its utmoſt endeavours to render the nation under its direction great and proſperous, it has omitted the means moſt neceſſary to make its ſubjects happy, by training them to virtue—to the knowledge and the practice of their Religious and Moral duties.* To ſuſtain fleets and armies for the protection of the ſtate—to raiſe taxes for its defence—to enact laws for the puniſhment of criminals, or for the ſecurity of property, while education is left to take its chance, is a folly no leſs egregious, than it would be to preſerve with great expence and care the fences of a cultivated encloſure, to guard it againſt "the boar out of the wood," and "the wild beaſt "of the foreſt," while the tender plants, on which

* The folly and the miſchievous conſequences of this omiſſion are diſplayed in a maſterly manner by M. Gentz, Conſeiller de Guerre à Berlin, in a work entitled Journal Hiſtorique; quoted in the Mercure Britannique of the late M. Mallet du Pan.

depend the hopes of the year, are periſhing for want of attention—while they are ſuffered to be choked by the luxuriant weed, or ravaged by noxious vermin.

Of all the errors which lead to ſocial infelicity, no one can be more miſchievous than that which ſeems, for centuries, to have generally prevailed in the civilized world, that education is not a ſtate concern. If there be one duty belonging to Government, more important than all the reſt, it is that of preſerving the riſing generation from the infection of bad principles, and of preparing them, by the implanting of good ones into their tender minds, for the important character of members of ſociety. The manner in which this duty ought to be performed, in a free and highly cultivated ſtate, without appearing to put any violence on domeſtic feelings, or diſturbing the ſacred connection between parents and children, deſerves the moſt ſerious conſideration. The difficulty is greatly encreaſed by the almoſt total neglect of that duty which has prevailed, and by the great degree of depravity which exiſts in conſequence, chiefly, of ſuch neglect—and which unavoidably pervades the eſtabliſhed ſyſtem of education. The object, which in this reſpect it would be deſirable to attain, is that, without any interference with fatherly care and authority, education ſhould be rendered the certain means of preparation for a virtuous life, as far as ſuch preparation can operate with certainty upon a creature like man. The attainment of this object would involve ſo great a change from our preſent ſtate and habits, that it can only be brought about by ſlow degrees. But every perſon, who really wiſhes well to the next generation, muſt deſire, at leaſt, that the Legiſlature ſhould inſtantly take effectual means to reſtrain the very groſs abuſes of education which actually exiſt—to prevent ſuch perſons from being entruſted, by inconſiderate parents and guardians,* with the care of

* The inconſideration of parents in this reſpect is alike aſtoniſhing and lamentable. Some, indeed, are guilty of a worſe fault, than inconſideration, for they purpoſely ſelect as inſtructors for their children,

of youth, as would teach them to deſpiſe the duties of ſubjects—duties, as we have ſeen, of Religious and moral, as well as of Civil obligation—and to provide, particularly, that the children of the poor, throughout the kingdom, ſhall be brought up in the practice of attending Divine worſhip every Lord's day, with ſufficient inſtruction to enable them to underſtand and join in that worſhip. It is a moſt lamentable conſideration, that a ſmall, a very ſmall proportion of the labouring poor, ever attend the public ordinances of Religion—and that their children, as far as depends upon them, are moſtly deſtitute of all Religious inſtruction. Can it excite wonder that their morals are ſo depraved? This is an evil which calls for an inſtant and effectual remedy. The inſtitution of Sunday ſchools, if not, under that name, carried to ſuch an extent as to interfere with the duties of humble life, may be of admirable utility. But even thoſe ſchools have, in ſome inſtances, been perverted to the purpoſe of diſſeminating pernicious principles, and they, therefore, require legal ſuperviſion, as well as legiſlative encouragement.

Happily no one can be at a loſs to find a perfect model, by which not only the education, but the entire conduct of man, throughout life, ſhould be directed, in order to qualify him for ſocial happineſs here, as well as for a far higher degree of felicity hereafter. It has pleaſed the all-bountiful Creator to communicate to his creature, Man, ſuch a ſyſtem—the choiceſt gift, ſurely, which infinite goodneſs could beſtow; and the abuſe or neglect of which in-

dren, men who are diſtinguiſhed for their diſloyalty. But others, without any enquiry as to principles, ſend their offspring to ſeminaries where it would be a miracle if they were not trained to become diſaffected ſubjects, and, if occaſion ſhould offer, rank traitors. Parents of a third claſs, make full enquiries of every kind; but, finding a man of deep and extenſive erudition, but whoſe principles they deteſt, they ſacrifice every conſideration to the fond, and, when prudently indulged, the laudable wiſh of ſeeing a favourite ſon make a brilliant figure in life, and reſolving to run all riſks, they truſt him in the very midſt of contagion, in the preſumptuous hope that he may not be infected.

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wives the deepeſt and moſt accumulated guilt of which human nature is capable. What a dreadful aggravation is it of the depravity of mankind, that it has encreaſed to ſuch a degree as to endanger the very exiſtence of ſociety, while they were making a ſolemn profeſſion of Chriſtianity. A Religion the purity and perfection of which would fully demonſtrate, if other proof were wanting, its divine origin—a Religion which contains a perfect rule of conduct, and inſtructs us how to act in every condition and character—a Religion which inculcates with clearneſs and preciſion the duties of Rulers and ſubjects—of Parents and Children — of Huſbands and Wives—of Maſters and Servants — of Friends and Neighbours —of Paſtors and Flocks—of the Affluent and the Needy—of the elevated in Rank and the induſtrious Poor. It is impoſſible to conceive a ſituation in which man can be placed, but he may be ſure of finding directions for his conduct in the ſacred code of this Religion. Nay, it is impoſſible for him to act wrongly in any one reſpect, without violating ſome injunction of that code*. By the aid of Chriſtianity, he may even be prepared for all the viciſſitudes of life; an advantage of peculiar value in times of calamity. Whatever may be the reſult of this awful and eventful period, the true Chriſtian may look forward, even to the worſt, with fortitude and compoſure. He may be confident of ſupport under any trials which he may be deſtined to undergo. He is ſure of conſolations, more than ſufficient to counter-balance the weight of the heavieſt afflictions. He may defy the wrath and fury of his enemies, for the intereſts which he moſt values are

* An attention to the duties of Chriſtianity would tend exceedingly to promote an unity reſpecting its doctrines and worſhip. If true Chriſtian purity were to prevail, the doctrinal errors which exiſt (for in every diſputed point one party muſt be in error) would moſtly be done away. What but a diſpoſition to evil works could produce a belief in that moſt dangerous of all doctrines—a doctrine as repugnant to Scripture as it is favourable to practice—that Faith without Works is ſufficient to Salvation.

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out of their reach. At the ſtake or on the ſcaffold he triumphs over his perſecutors. How enviable the ſufferings of a Charles the Firſt, or a Louis the Fourteenth, when compared with the proſperity of a Cromwell, a Robeſpierre, or a Buonaparte!

To the groſs neglect and abuſe of ſo high and ineſtimable a privilege may juſtly be attributed the extraordinary calamities and perils, which diſtinguiſh the preſent criſis from all former periods. By the irrevocable decrees of Heaven, miſery is inevitably the conſequence, both in individuals and ſtates, of vice—and in proportion to the value of the Religious and moral advantages which are abuſed, that miſery muſt be expected to be ſevere. But the events of this wonderful time are of ſo aſtoniſhing a nature, and of ſo uncommon a magnitude—they lead apparently to conſequences ſo vaſt and tremendous—they have been brought about by cauſes which, in their operation, have ſo completely violated all the rules of probability, and ſet all calculation at defiance—and they are attended with circumſtances ſo ſtrange and unaccountable, that it is impoſſible for the ſerious mind not to conſider them as marks of Divine diſpleaſure, manifeſted by an extraordinary interpoſition, for the puniſhment and correction of guilty man. To ſuppoſe that ſuch events can happen without the immediate agency of a ſuperintending Providence, would be almoſt to preſume that the Ruler of Heaven takes no concern in the government of the Earth. Without, indeed, the reflection that the Deity is now ſpecially interfering in the affairs of the world, for purpoſes known only to himſelf, but which we may with certainty conclude to be ultimately directed to the welfare of his creatures, it would be beyond human fortitude to ſupport the ſcenes which excite ſenſibility, or to endure the proſpects which embitter expectation.—But while we find relief and even conſolation from the thought, that we are in the hands of Him who

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can ſay to the deſolating torrent, *thus far ſhalt thou go, but no farther*, and who undoubtedly deſires the happineſs of thoſe, whom he has made with a capacity for happineſs, it is impoſſible to ſay to what extent his juſtice, nay, even his general goodneſs, may require the puniſhment of thoſe who now inhabit the earth. If, as there ſeems abundant reaſon to conclude, he be now diſplaying, in a ſignal manner, his vengeance againſt a guilty world, if he be vindicating his Laws, which have been broken, and his Religion, which has been contemned, if he be inflicting his fatherly chaſtiſement for the correction and improvement of his diſobedient children—we may be ſure that his preſent awful diſpenſations will, like all his means, be adequate to the accompliſhment of the end which they are intended to produce. But how far, both in ſeverity and duration, they are to be carried before they anſwer their intended purpoſe, is a conſideration which, at all events, muſt inſpire us with dread, but which is peculiarly calculated to excite alarm, if we reflect on their failure, hitherto, to produce any material effect. This is, perhaps, the moſt awful ſymptom attending our ſituation. Already has the viſition laſted ten years—already has it laid in ruins half the eſtabliſhments of the civilized world, and convulſed all Society to its foundations. Already has it produced carnage, and deſolation, and anarchy, not to be equalled in the hiſtory of the world—and yet mankind do not ſeem to be rouſed—luxury and diſſipation have experienced no abatement, and vice has not ſlackened her career. Even in the moſt virtuous country of Europe, in the very midſt of ſo dreadful a ſcene, incredible to relate, an attempt to paſs a law to reſtrain the crying ſin of adultery, has failed of ſucceſs! In ſhort, in the midſt of all its ſufferings, the world ſeems to exhibit the ſhocking ſpectacle of a hardened and impenitent race, determined to brave the vengeance of the Almighty—to deſpiſe his threats, and to defy his wrath.

If

If this ſtatement were not confirmed by the evidence of our ſenſes, it could not gain the ſmalleſt degree of credit. It would appear abſolutely impoſſible, that ſuch ſignal marks of Divine diſpleaſure, as are diſplayed in the preſent ſtate of the ſocial world, could fail to impreſs the human mind with the moſt ſerious alarm, to produce an inſtant change in the manners of Society, and to fill the churches with devout and earneſt ſupplicants, of every rank and condition, imploring Heaven, at leaſt to ſuſpend its vengeance, and vowing, with the deepeſt contrition, to ſeek its favour by a thorough amendment of heart and life. But, alas! no ſuch propitious ſymptoms as yet appear.—Nay, it is impoſſible to diſcover any ſymptoms which indicate that mankind are even at all aware of their real ſituation.

Still, however, thanks to the indulgence of Heaven, we have reaſon to hope that the door is open. Hitherto, amidſt all its dangers, Society has been ſaved from deſtruction by the magnanimous efforts of a country, which, becauſe it poſſeſſes more Religion and virtue than any other, ſeems to have been the choſen inſtrument of general preſervation. To that country it properly belongs to ſet an example, without which all its efforts will be ultimately of no avail—of GENERAL REFORMATION. Unleſs ſuch an example be ſet, and unleſs it be followed, all the miſeries which mankind have hitherto experienced are, to judge from appearances, but a ſlight fore-taſte of thoſe which are ſtill in ſtore for them. But if the ſevere chaſtiſement, with which they are now viſited, ſhould at length produce its due effect—if it ſhould excite them to ſerious reflection—if it ſhould inſpire them with heart-felt compunction for the impiety and vice, which have drawn ſuch ſevere judgments upon their heads, and make them loathe, and for ever abjure, thoſe accurſed ſyſtems of infidelity and immorality, which they have ſuffered to acquire ſo dreadful an aſcendancy—if they determine, with unalterable reſolution, ſtrictly to conform to the Holy Religion which is given

given them as the rule of their conduct, and the ſtandard of their lives—if, by means of education, they render that Religion an object of early veneration and attachment, and thus eſtabliſh its empire in the human heart, and ſecure its influence in Society—then may they reaſonably hope that this night of blackneſs, and tempeſt, and horror, will be followed by a bright and glorious day—then may they, without preſumption, expect the nineteenth century, not only to be ſignalized by the Greateſt Deliverance ever yet experienced by the human race—but alſo to be diſtinguiſhed by a great and progreſſive encreaſe of ſocial happineſs.

ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

It has been noticed in the former part of this publication, that Citizen Talleyrand, in his letter to Lord Grenville, aſcribed the exiſtence of the war, and "the "evils which have afflicted Europe," to "the pro- "jects of ſubjection, diſſolution, and diſmemberment "which were prepared againſt France."

Although this charge has been repeatedly advanced, and as often repelled, it acquires freſh importance by being renewed on ſo ſolemn an occaſion. Being connected with overtures for pacification, it ſeems deſigned to involve us in the double guilt of an unjuſt commencement, and of an obſtinate continuance of the war. As Citizen Talleyrand was a public character, in the confidence of the Revolutionary Rulers of France, at the beginning of hoſtilities, he muſt be ſuppoſed to have it in his power to ſubſtantiate it, if true, by incontrovertible evidence; and when could he have ſo ſtrong an inducement to bring forward ſuch evidence, as when he undertook to repel the charge of French aggreſſion, which had been pointedly advanced by Lord Grenville? Such an occaſion is therefore peculiarly favourable for an inveſtigation of the grounds, on which the origin of the War is aſcribed to the adverſaries of France. But another conſideration preſents itſelf to induce ſuch an inveſtigation at the preſent moment. An eminent Engliſh Orator and Stateſman has taken upon himſelf to repeat, in ſubſtance, the charge of the Citizen Miniſter. Mr. Fox, during

his coruſcation in Parliament, at the beginning of the preſent year, took the opportunity which the diſcuſſion of the recent overtures from France afforded him, to declare his opinion, that Great Britain and her Allies were the aggreſſors in the war *; and in ſupport of that opinion he relied with much triumph on a document which had recently tranſpired. That document was the declaration at Mantua, which Mr. Fox quoted from M. Bertrand de Moleville's "Annals of the French Revolution." This reference produced a correſpondence (ſince publiſhed) between Mr. Fox and M. Bertrand de Moleville, in which the latter Gentleman principally confined his attention to the exculpation of his late Sovereign Lewis XVIth, from an imputation which was caſt by Mr. Fox on the memory of that Monarch, and which M. Bertrand de Moleville obſerves, is the "point moſt intereſting" to him. But Mr. Fox, in this correſpondence, perſiſted in the opinion he had delivered in Parliament reſpecting the origin of the war, and he contended ſtrenuouſly that the declaration at Mantua amounted to a deciſive proof that Auſtria and Pruſſia were the aggreſſors, and that France was perfectly juſtifiable in declaring war againſt thoſe Powers. The great importance attached by Mr. Fox to this document renders it a matter of much curioſity; but the opportunity which that Gentleman has thus afforded of aſcertaining the grounds, which he conſiders as concluſive of the great queſtion of aggreſſion, is too valuable to be loſt. It is but ſeldom that he or his friends are to be found within thoſe liſts, in which they may be fairly met and encountered.

* "I continue to think, and, until I ſee better grounds for changing my opinion, than any that the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) has this night produced, I ſhall continue to think and to ſay, plainly and explicitly, that this country was the aggreſſor in the war."—"But for Auſtria and Pruſſia, is there a man, who for one moment, can diſpute that they were the aggreſſors?" And again, "that Auſtria and Pruſſia were the aggreſſors, not a man in any country, who has given himſelf the trouble to think at all upon the ſubject, can doubt." Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, No. 99. p. 349, and 353.

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The reaſoning which is contained in Parliamentary ſpeeches, is out of the reach both of general and of deliberate diſcuſſion. It has its effect, indeed, far beyond the walls of Parliament; but it cannot be brought within the pale of regular controverſy. The Senator is not, like the writer, amenable to the Tribunal of the public. When, therefore, Gentlemen who, as Parliamentary leaders, have great weight in ſociety, come out of their entrenchments, and appear upon the arena of literary diſcuſſion, ſuch an opportunity of aſcertaining the ſolidity of their doctrines, and the force of their reaſonings, ought not to be neglected. Another honourable Gentleman had the candour thus to ſubmit his opinions reſpecting the preſent war to the fair teſt of public inveſtigation. And although the reſpectability of his name, aided by that ſympathetic zeal, with which all perſons, who are hoſtile to Government, propagate writings which, in any reſpect, favour their views (a zeal, unfortunately, peculiar to perſons of that deſcription), gave an aſtoniſhing currency to his publication, yet the controverſy to which he afforded occaſion, has, in the reſult, contributed ſtill more firmly to convince the people of this country of the juſtice of their cauſe. Mr. Fox does not, indeed, in the letters which appear with his name before the public, enter ſo fully into the cauſes and conſequences of the war as his learned and honourable friend has done. But he concurs with Citizen Talleyrand, in aſcribing, in the moſt poſitive terms, the origin of the war to the Powers allied againſt France, and in aſſerting that their conduct was ſuch as to juſtify that country in declaring war; ſhould it appear that ſuch perſons, with all their zeal, and with all their information, have not been able to adduce any ſolid grounds in ſupport of this charge, the moſt incredulous muſt be convinced that it is unfounded, and that the enormous crime of aggreſſion is imputable only to Revolutionary France. The propoſed

inveſtigation will lead, and by a proceſs the moſt favourable to the cauſe eſpouſed by the advocates of France, to an examination of the various topics involved in the queſtion reſpecting the origin of the war: but, in the firſt place, thoſe advocates ſhall be ſeverally heard; and it will be readily admitted that priority of attention is due, at leaſt from an Engliſh writer, to Mr. Fox.

MR. FOX.

SOME obſervations made by that Gentleman in Parliament (as has been already obſerved) gave riſe to a correſpondence between him and M. Bertrand de Moleville, which has been ſince publiſhed. And as M. B. de M. in the firſt letter of that correſpondence, quotes (from the Morning Chronicle) the paſſage in queſtion in Mr. Fox's ſpeech, that quotation, being admitted, by Mr. F. with a trifling alteration, muſt, when ſo corrected, be conſidered as a faithful and accurate report. It is given as follows in the tranſlation of M. B. de M's. letter which is publiſhed with the original.

" It would be vain to ſet up long and ingenious " reaſonings againſt the evidence of documents which " are in every one's hand, and which demonſtrate, " beyond all refutation, that the unfortunate Mo- " narch himſelf (Louis XVIth) and his confidential " adviſers had entered into negociations with foreign " powers, not to partition France, but to dictate by " force of arms to France, and to compel them " to depart from the ſyſtem which they thought " neceſſary to their happineſs. Are Gentlemen

" pre-

" prepared to deny the truth of the declaration made " by the Emperor at Mantua? Are Gentlemen pre- " pared to deny the ſtory as it is related by M. Ber- " trand de Moleville *?" Of this quotation Mr. Fox only objected to the one expreſſion, and thereby gave his ſanction to the reſt. In a poſtſcript to his ſecond letter to M. B. de M. he ſays,. " on re-peruſing " your former letter, I ſee that the laſt expreſſion in " the report of the Morning Chronicle is not correct. " I did not ſay, " *to compel them to depart from a* " *ſyſtem which they thought neceſſary to their own* " *internal happineſs.* I think I ſaid, *to dictate by* " *force of arms changes in their internal Govern-* " *ment;* or *to interfere by force in their internal Go-* " *vernment.*"

It appears then that the charge which Mr. Fox advances againſt foreign Powers, and which he conſiders as involving the crime of aggreſſion, is, that they entered into negociations with Louis XVIth, not *to partition France*, but to *dictate by force of arms to the French people changes in their internal Government;* or *to interfere by force in their internal Government.* And he is reported to have ſaid in Parliament, that this, though not " a plan for the partition of France," was, "in the eye of reaſon and common ſenſe, " an aggreſſion againſt France†." A ſentiment which is entirely in uniſon with his reaſoning in the correſpondence, in which he ſays that " the declaration made " there (at Mantua) with other circumſtances, which, " as well as that declaration, were not known till a " long time after, furniſh inconteſtible proofs that " the Auſtrian Government had taken a part in " hoſtile deſigns, that had in view the internal Go- " vernment of France, which is in my opinion a very " juſt cauſe of war: I ſay hoſtile deſigns, becauſe to " declare war and advance troops, appear to me une- " quivocal hoſtilities."

* See Correſpondence, &c. p. 9.
† See Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, No. 99, p. 349.

It is a circumſtance which deſerves particular attention, that Mr. Fox here expreſsly acquits the confederated Powers of a deſign *to partition France*. In this reſpect he not only differs with Talleyrand, who accuſes thoſe Powers of "projects of ſubjection, diſſolution and diſmemberment;" but he candidly lends his authority to prove, that all the accuſations which have imputed ſuch projects to the Powers of Europe, and which have ſometimes been even ſanctioned by his name, are entirely deſtitute of foundation.

In ſupport of the charge of confederating, not to partition, but to dictate by force of arms changes in the internal Government of France, Mr. Fox quotes the declaration of the Emperor of Germany at Mantua; and he calls as a witneſs, to prove that declaration, M. Bertrand de Moleville. It is therefore neceſſary to hear the evidence of this Gentleman. In his account of this tranſaction, M. B. de M. repreſents the King of France, who had been dragged by a ſanguinary and ferocious mob from his Palace at Verſailles, as a priſoner in his capital, expoſed to the outrages of popular tumult, and obliged for the immediate ſafety of himſelf, his family, and his faithful adherents, to comply with the demands of the factious demagogues, in whoſe power he was. The Palace where he reſided, ſays the author, "began to "aſſume all the marks of a State priſon, into which, "as was formerly the caſe with the Baſtile, only the "Governor, the guards, and the ſervants were ſuf-"fered to paſs*."

Such was the ſituation of the King. What was that of the country? M. de la Fayette himſelf has thus deſcribed it: "Paris was divided by factions, and the "Kingdom oppreſſed by anarchy." The ſame nobleman adds, in relation to his impriſoned Sovereign, whoſe *Gaoler* he was, "The King wiſhed only for the "happineſs of his people, and for the general tran-"quillity to begin his own†."

* Annals of the French Revolution, Vol. III. p. 390.
† Ib. p. 396.

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It was natural for the unfortunate Monarch to be desirous of effecting his deliverance from such a situation. And surely so staunch a friend to freedom as Mr. Fox will not deny him, because he was a King, that common privilege of humanity. Nay, when it is considered that the great wish of his heart was the happiness of his people, and that he had no means of accomplishing the noble and generous wish, unless he could escape from confinement, his endavour to attain that object must appear to be even meritorious and praiseworthy.

Various plans suggested themselves to the King and his friends, as calculated to deliver the Royal Family from imprisonment, and the Kingdom from "anarchy." But that which relates to the present enquiry, as being quoted by Mr. Fox in support of his charge, was the one proposed by M. Montmorin. The object of that plan was "to invite the Emperor of Germany to form "a feigned coalition with the Empire, Prussia, Russia, "Spain, and the King of Naples and Sardinia, *to* "*declare*, but *not to make* actual war against France*." It was proposed that this coalition, "once formed, should "publish a Manifesto, the chief grounds of "which should be the maintenance of the rights of "the Princes who had possessions in France, and the "common interest of all the Powers to stop a Revo-"lution, the principles and manœuvres of which "tended to nothing less than the subversion of all "the Governments of Europe."†

By the influence of such a coalition, and of the formidable preparations which it was proposed to make, it was expected that the King would be enabled to regain his liberty, and to resume his lawful prerogatives, which were to be employed in their very first exercise, in removing all apprehension of war, by obtaining "an armistice," and concerting with the National Assembly "conditions of Peace." Nay, so far was he and his advisers from wishing to employ force against the nation, that it was part of the plan

* Ibid vol. v. p. 9. † Ibid.

to convoke, as ſoon as the tyranny of "Faction" and "Anarchy" ſhould be ſuppreſſed, the Bailiwick Aſſemblies throughout the Kingdom, that they might "be conſulted not only reſpecting the demands of the "different Powers, but reſpecting the plan of a De-"claration drawn up according to the deſires, contain-"ed in the majority of the inſtructions to the De-"puties, and which was no more than a ſummary "of the ancient Monarchical Government, cleared "from all its abuſes, and improved on principles the "moſt prudent, and the moſt proper to ſecure the "ſtability of the French Conſtitution*."

Such was the plan which was ſuggeſted by M. Montmorin, and which was propoſed, through the intervention of M. de Mercy, to the Emperor. To this propoſal that Monarch returned "the moſt ſatisfactory "anſwer," promiſing that "without delay he would "enter upon the negociation propoſed to him." In the performance of this promiſe M. Bertrand de Moleville ſays "he did not loſe a moment;" and afterwards, on the 20th of May, in an interview with the Count d'Artois, at Mantua, he made the famous Declaration, on which ſo much ſtreſs is now laid, and which is thus deſcribed by the author of the annals:—"The "joy and ſurpriſe of his Royal Highneſs" (the Count d'Artois) "were extreme, when he learned "that a powerful coalition was forming for the relief "of the King and Queen; that the Emperor was "already aſſured of the concurrence of the Circles, "Switzerland, Spain, Sardinia, and other Powers; "and that it only remained to determine, by a well-"concerted plan, the moſt advantageous manner of "employing their forces, and the meaſures to be "taken in the interior to ſecond this movement, and "enſure its ſucceſs, without their Majeſties being "reduced to the neceſſity of executing the project of "retreating to Metz, of which M. de Mercy had in-"formed the Emperor†."

* Ibid. p. 14. † Ibid. p. 65.

Some

Some doubt has been thrown upon the above ſtatement by the author of the Mercure Britannique, No. 34, in which the whole ſtory is treated as chimerical, on account of the pacific ſyſtem which the Cabinet of Vienna had unalterably adopted. But the ſtatement ſhall be taken for granted in all its circumſtances, that the caſe may be conſidered in the light moſt favourable to France, and that it may be aſcertained whether the facts moſt relied on by her advocates, afford any juſt cauſe for her declaration of war: and ſhould it appear that they do not afford ſuch cauſe, it muſt, of neceſſity, be allowed that ſhe was the aggreſſor.

In the proſecution of this enquiry, it is immaterial what opinion any one may form of the policy and expediency of the plan of M. Montmorin. Some may think a more manly and open aſſertion of the King's rights would have been preferable to ſo complicated and circuitous an attempt to effect his deliverance. It ſhould not, however, be forgotten, that this Prince, virtuous as he was, and hiſtory ſcarcely records a character, public or private, more eminent for virtue, unfortunately for himſelf, his adherents, his people, and, indeed, the whole world, was deſtitute of that firmneſs, deciſion, and energy of mind, which are at all times eſſential requiſites in the character of a Monarch, and which were peculiarly wanted in the extraordinary circumſtances in which Louis XVIth was placed. The fate of this Monarch, and of his country, will be, to the end of time, an inſtructive leſſon in the ſchool of Princes; inculcating, by the moſt dreadful experience, that a wavering and inconſtant policy, though proceeding from an amiable diffidence, and a conſcientious fear of acting wrong;—that a diſintereſted and conciliating readineſs to concede rights which may ſeem to be perſonal, but which are attached to the ſtation of a Prince;—that a compaſſionate reluctance to employ juſt ſeverity, and to ſhed that blood which is due to the law and to the general ſecurity;—that theſe qualities are infinitely more miſchievous, both

to

to Prince and people—more productive of miſery, oppreſſion, carnage, and ruin, than the moſt ferocious, ſanguinary, and tyrannical diſpoſition.

In enquiring whether the declaration at Mantua juſtified the ſubſequent declaration of war by France, which is the real point in iſſue, the caſe ſhall firſt be conſidered without any particular alluſion to the danger, to which all ſtates were expoſed by ſo violent and outrageous a Revolution, as that which had broken out in France, or to the juſt alarm which all Princes might feel, leſt their own authority ſhould be diſturbed by the principles, upon which that Revolution was founded. Laying aſide, for the preſent, ſuch conſiderations, it muſt, on general principles, be admitted, that Foreign Powers were entitled, by the laws of nations, to give aſſiſtance to the King and the Royaliſt party in France, againſt the adherents of the Revolution. Even in the caſe of a civil war, ſuch Powers may lawfully "aſſiſt the party "which they ſhall judge to have right on its ſide, in "caſe this party ſhall requeſt their aſſiſtance, or accept "the offer of it*." And Mr. Fox himſelf, on the occaſion of our interfering, in the year 1787, in favour of the Stadtholder of the United Provinces, admitted in the Houſe of Commons, that *when two parties divide a State, a Foreign Power may lawfully interfere, to ſupport the party which is friendly, and to oppoſe that which is hoſtile to its intereſts. A fortiori*, then, was it lawful for the Powers of Europe to aſſiſt a legitimate Sovereign, whoſe right was acknowledged by the whole nation, but whoſe authority was overborne by faction, and whoſe country was oppreſſed by anarchy. The requeſt, or the acceptance of ſuch aid, by the King, would have rendered the interference perfectly juſtifiable, and have prevented it from being in the leaſt hoſtile to the independence of the country.

* Vattel. B. iii, Sect. 296.

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If, therefore, inſtead of acceding to a plan, the object of which was, not to make, but only to declare War, the Emperor had, with the approbation of the King, ſent his armies into France, for the purpoſe of reſcuing the Royal Family, and of reſtoring the Royal authority, ſuch a meaſure would have been completely juſtified by the law of nations, even without any reference to the peculiar and unprecedented circumſtances which called upon Foreign Powers, for their own preſervation, to put a ſtop to a Revolution, which endangered the exiſtence of every Government, and the tranquillity of every State, and which has actually convulſed the whole fabric of civil ſociety to its very foundations. In regard to ſome of the Powers of Europe, it was not only a right but a duty to lend their aid to the King of France, under the circumſtances in which he was placed. At the treaty of Utrecht, the Proteſtant ſucceſſion to the Throne of Great Britain, and the ſucceſſion of the reigning branch of the Houſe of Bourbon to the Throne of France, were mutually recognized by the Sovereigns of the two Kingdoms: and by the 7th article of the Triple Alliance between France, England and Holland, ſigned at the Hague in 1717, it was ſtipulated that if the ſtates of any of the Allies ſhould "be diſturbed by inteſtine quarrels, or "by rebellions, on account of the ſaid ſucceſſions, or "under any pretext whatever," the Ally thus in trouble ſhould have a right to demand of his Allies the ſuccours ſtipulated in the treaty. Further, by the 4th article of the Quadruple Alliance, ſigned in 1718, between England, France, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, the contracting parties (that is England, Holland, and the Emperor) engage "to "guarantee and defend the right of ſucceſſion to the "kingdom of France," according to the tenor of the treaty of Utrecht, "againſt all perſons whatſoever "who may preſume to diſturb the order of the ſaid "ſucceſſion." Theſe treaties have been confirmed by every

every ſubſequent treaty between Great Britain and France, down to the laſt definitive treaty in 1783, of which thoſe treaties, with others therein ſpecified, are declared to ſerve as the baſis, and in which they are alſo declared to be renewed and confirmed in the beſt form *.

Now

* In the pamphlet already noticed, written by the Rev. John Brand, the obligation incurred by England, by virtue of the above treaties, is ſhewn to be not merely of the *poſitive*, but alſo of the *moral* kind: for, at the time the treaties were made, the ſucceſſion to the Throne of France was expoſed to no danger, and, in fact, it has derived no actual aid from the guarantee. But the Proteſtant ſucceſſion in England was then expoſed to the utmoſt danger, and (as Mr. B. has ſhewn), it was, in all appearance, preſerved by the faithful adherence of France to her engagements. "By the terms of the treaty (ſays this writer) the advantage to both ſeems to be mutual, but the circumſtances of the period conſidered, when no danger menaced the Throne of France, and that of the Hanoverian Family in England was aſſailed by a ſtrong domeſtic faction, and by the coalition of the two moſt able Sovereigns who have reigned in Europe in the preſent century," (Charles the XIIth and Peter the Great, who ſecretly combined againſt George I. and whoſe conſpiracy was revealed to that Monarch by the Regent of France), "the benefit of this mutual guarantee was entirely on our ſide."—And *again*, "Theſe treaties were in terms equal; as preſerving to each Sovereign the honourable appearance of being ſeated with an equal ſtability on the Throne. In effect, they bound France to the ſupport of the Hanoverian Family; at firſt, certainly, not firmly eſtabliſhed here, and at that particular juncture in much additional hazard; and Britain to the ſupport of the Crown of France, ſeemingly in the firmeſt ſecurity. This obligation, as undertaken ſpontaneouſly, was almoſt a *nudum pactum*, and conventional only upon the latter; whereas on the ſide of Britain it was conventional and moral. And the nation thereby came under a moral obligation, to give to the Prince reigning in France the ſame ſupport the King of Great Britain had received, the circumſtances being the ſame; that is, to aid him againſt all rebels during the time of peace: for it is dormant, from its nature, in every war, and revives on its termination. It was, therefore, in force in the year

Now as poſitive engagements exiſted to aſſiſt the Houſe of Bourbon in caſe France ſhould be diſturbed by inteſtine quarrels, or rebellions, on account of the ſucceſſion of that houſe, or under any pretext whatſoever, and ſtill more particularly to defend that ſucceſſion againſt all perſons who ſhould preſume to diſturb it, it is undeniable that the *caſus federis* occurred at the time of the French Revolution; for no perſons could more effectually diſturb the order of the ſuc-

year 1792, when Louis was depoſed: and not having been diſcharged to him, is yet due to his heirs."

Mr. B. afterwards applies this ſubject to Mr. Fox, who was in office when the Definitive Treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and France, was ſigned; by which Treaty the Triple and Quadruple Alliances, containing the mutual guarantee, *were renewed and confirmed in the beſt form.* The inconſiſtency of Mr. Fox is then diſplayed in a ſtrong point of view; as that Gentleman, after having, as a Miniſter, contributed to bind the Crown of Great Britain to the performance of the above guarantee, and having, as a Member of Parliament, ſpoken in favour of the Preliminary Articles, and voted for a reſolution, purporting that the public faith, which had been pledged by thoſe Articles, ought to be preſerved inviolate, has ſince, as a Member of Oppoſition, laboured to force the Crown to violate its faith, by endeavouring, during the preſent war, to obtain from Parliament declarations that the war ought not to be directed to the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon.

So far Mr. Brand. But this ſubject, as it regards Mr. Fox, is open to another obſervation. That Gentleman has not merely endeavoured to prevent the Crown of Great Britain from preſerving that faith, which he contributed to make it pledge, but he has been diſtinguiſhed as a moſt violent, a moſt rancorous enemy of the Houſe of Bourbon, the ſucceſſion of which he engaged the Britiſh Crown ſolemnly to guarantee. In the teeth of ſuch an engagement, he has openly exulted in the overthrow of that Houſe! He has moſt vehemently deprecated its Reſtoration! He has neglected no opportunity of declaring it to be the object of his utter abhorrence; not, indeed, on account of any thing it has recently done, but for tranſactions which had occurred in remote times, and of which he was fully apprized when he renewed the above ſtipulations in its favour.

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only repugnant to the law of nations, but it is abſolute nonſenſe, to deſcribe the interference of Foreign Powers, at his requeſt, as an attempt to dictate, by force, changes in the internal Government of France. But if, on the contrary, the caſe be decided upon the principles of the Whig Club in England and the Jacobin Club in France, the charge is perfectly comprehenſible, and the interference in queſtion, in favour of a lawful government, to ſuppreſs rebellion, and to prevent revolution, is a groſs infraction of the ſovereignty of the people—an unpardonable violation of that beautiful ſyſtem which inverts the ancient order of ſociety, by making the people ſupreme, and their Rulers ſubordinate; and, according to which, there are ſcarcely one hundred ſubjects in the world who are ſo wicked as to hold above one thouſand millions of their ſovereigns in bondage.

It cannot, ſurely, be neceſſary, after the experience of the laſt ten years, to enter a formal proteſt againſt this ſyſtem, or to ſhew that the doctrine of the Sovereignty of the People is alike abſurd and miſchievous—that it is at total variance with the nature of man as a ſocial being, and with the law of God, who gave to all being its eſſential nature—that an attempt to reduce it to practice tends only to involve mankind in miſeries, of which they would not otherwiſe be able even to form an idea—miſeries ſo great (as France can teſtify) that, in exchange for them, the moſt unjuſt, violent, and degrading tyranny of an individual uſurper, would prove a welcome deliverance. Neither can it be neceſſary to remind the reader, that the French Revolution, inſtead of being an effort of the people to reſume a Sovereignty, alike incompatible with their duty as ſubjects, and with their nature as men, was in no reſpect *their act*—that they did no more than nominate, at the call of their Sovereign, their Deputies to the lawful States of the Kingdom—not for the purpoſe of producing a Revolution, which never entered into their imagination, but of ſupporting and aiding their lawful Government—that they

expreſsly ordered their Deputies, under the ſanction of an oath, to maintain and preſerve the ancient Conſtitution of France—but that a factious, though, unfortunately, a major part of thoſe Deputies, in direct violation of the mandates which they had ſworn to obey, conſpired againſt the Government, ſubverted the Conſtitution, denominated themſelves a National Aſſembly, ſubmitted themſelves to the direction of Clubs, impriſoned the King, and, by the confeſſion of M. de la Fayette himſelf, who had a great ſhare in theſe atrocious tranſactions, "involved the country in all the horrors of anarchy."

But notwithſtanding the full refutation which experience has given of that ſyſtem on which alone Mr. Fox's charge, againſt Foreign Powers, of an unjuſt interference in the affairs of France can be ſupported—notwithſtanding the clear and deciſive evidence by which it appears, that the French Revolution, far from inveſting the people with the Sovereignty, counteracted their wiſhes, violated their mandates, and compelled them to exchange the mild rule of a lawful, a virtuous, and a beloved Sovereign, for the galling yoke of blood-thirſty demagogues, and the inſufferable oppreſſion of anarchy—ſtill, however, in order to ſhew that the advocates of France cannot maintain her cauſe even on their own grounds, the caſe ſhall be conſidered upon Revolutionary principles. It ſhall be aſſumed that the rights of Government were lawfully veſted, by the people, in the National Aſſembly—that the authority of that body, though directed by factions and clubs, was ſacred as well as ſupreme—that its power, though derived from inſurrection, was more holy and inviolable than that of a Monarch, recognized by ancient law—even the authority which the new Conſtitution allotted to the King, ſhall be left out of the queſtion, and the unfortunate Monarch ſhall be conſidered, as he was meant to be, as a mere cypher. In return for ſuch conceſſions, nothing more is aſked than that theſe Sovereigns by Revolt and Revolution ſhall be conſidered as bound, towards Foreign Powers, by the ſame rules as other Sove-

reigns. Otherwiſe, they would not only overthrow all eſtabliſhed authority at home, but ſuperſede all the maxims which regulate the mutual intercourſe of States.

See then the Revolutioniſts of France in poſſeſſion of the Sovereignty—ſee them declaring War againſt the Emperor, becauſe that Prince, as appears from the Declaration of Mantua, had concerted with the King of France for the reſtoration of the Royal Authority, and the overthrow of their uſurpation—an interference which Mr. Fox declares to be *a very juſt cauſe of War*. But it happens, unfortunately, that however *juſt* a cauſe of war ſuch interference might be, it was not, in point of fact, the *real* cauſe of the War declared by France; for it was not known to exiſt by any individual of the Aſſembly which decreed the Declaration of War. M. Bertrand de Moleville ſays, "Both the project and the Declaration" (at Mantua), "remained buried in the moſt profound ſecreſy, and "were known neither in France nor England till "publiſhed in my laſt work*;" that is to ſay, till the year 1800. This, it is apprehended, is not quite accurate; as the Declaration at Mantua is ſtated in the volume of the Annual Regiſter for 1792, which, however, (being part of a work friendly to Order and good Government), was not publiſhed till 1798. But it is quite enough for the argument, that the Declaration at Mantua was not publiſhed previouſly to the Declaration of War; and Mr. Fox, in his ſecond Letter to M. Bertrand de Moleville, admits that what paſſed at Mantua was "not the *motive* by which "France was determined to declare War." Now, if this was not her motive, it ſurely cannot be pleaded in her juſtification; for the true queſtion is, whether the motive by which ſhe was induced to act on that occaſion was a juſt one? But what was unknown to her could not poſſibly be her motive. Such a caſe muſt

* See Correſpondence, page 47.

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be decided by the rule "*de non existentibus et de non "apparentibus, eadem est ratio:*" and as the motive in question did not exist, it could not operate, and it devolves upon France and her advocates to assign another in her vindication. This they have not done; of course, it must be concluded that she declared War without a justifiable motive, or, which is the same thing, that she was the aggressor.

But, says Mr. Fox, "France, though ignorant of "the Declaration at Mantua, had many reasons for "believing a league of that kind, which has been "since demonstrated. It seems to me that, in be-"lieving it, she had good grounds; she declared War "upon appearances more or less convincing; and the "Declaration at Mantua, among other facts, proves "that she was not deceived in those appearances*."

Here is a new code of Political Morality, promulgated by the *zealous* advocate of Peace. To justify a Declaration of War, it seems that nothing more is wanting than "appearances, more or less "convincing," provided it turn out that the party was not deceived by those appearances;—that suspicion is a good ground for War, provided that it ultimately appear that there was good ground for that suspicion.

If the greatest slave to warlike ambition had endeavoured to frame a doctrine favourable to his predominant passion, he could not have contrived one better calculated to answer that purpose, than this of Mr. Fox. What could tend so much to encrease the frequency of Wars, as the admission of the principle that States may lawfully resort to hostilities, without any other ground than appearances, leaving it to futurity to shew that they *were not deceived by those appearances?* What could be so copious a source of contention as a principle, which would afford a never-failing pretext for

* Correspondence, page 48.

Nations to have recourſe to arms upon mere ſuſpicion? What would avail the apparent reſtriction that a War ſo begun would not be really juſt, unleſs it ſhould ultimately appear that there exiſted at the time a good cauſe for hoſtilities? The party commencing the attack would always aſſert the exiſtence of ſuch a cauſe. He might, even with the beſt intentions, deceive himſelf, and be induced to act raſhly upon unfounded apprehenſions of leagues and conſpiracies againſt him. He would be freed, in a great meaſure, from that powerful check, the reſtraint of public opinion, at the moment when that check is of the greateſt importance—the moment of action; for it would be unjuſt to condemn him, while it remained poſſible for circumſtances to tranſpire which might eventually juſtify his conduct. He would be ſole judge in his own cauſe, inſtead of ſtanding before the tribunal of the world; and his prejudices and paſſions would be releaſed from all external reſtraint, by ſuch a ſuſpenſion of reſponſibility to that tribunal. But if actuated by evil diſpoſitions—if urged by ambition or avarice to diſturb the peace of others—what a cloak would the doctrine in queſtion afford him for the gratification of ſuch propenſities! Nay, what means would it furniſh for the accompliſhment of his miſchievous purpoſes! How would it ſupply him with pretexts to attack the moſt inoffenſive States, to ſurprize them when off their guard, and to prevent other States from affording them aſſiſtance! To the moſt ſerious and preſſing remonſtrances he might reply, that his attack would be juſtified *in future*; that he made War *upon appearances more or leſs convincing*, and though thoſe appearances were viſible only to himſelf, it would afterwards be proved that *he was not deceived by them*. In the mean time, he would eaſily find colourings and pretences to render his conduct plauſible. In proportion to his guilt, he would be loud in accuſation, and the world has lately ſeen with what audacity the moſt atrocious cri-

criminals can perſiſt in accuſing thoſe who are moſt deeply injured. In ſhort, the doctrine in queſtion would be an inexhauſtible ſource of ſelf-deception, chicane, injuſtice and War.

Happily for mankind, this pernicious doctrine is as much at variance with the law of nations as with the peace of the world. It is one grand object of that law to prevent States from going to War upon appearances—to reſtrain them from having recourſe to arms, without the moſt clear and urgent neceſſity. It was the principle of this ſalutary ſyſtem, even before the benign influence of Chriſtianity had ripened it into a complete Code of Humanity, that *War is juſt only when it is neceſſary—that arms are lawful only when there is no other reſource.*—" Juſtum bellum " quibus neceſſarium; et pia arma quibus nulla niſi " in armis relinquitur ſpes*." In modern times a more preciſe Code has been formed, the authority of which was conſidered as indiſputable, until Revolutionary France aſſumed a right to ſuperſede all the principles, which had been recognized in the intercourſe of mankind, in their various relations, public and private.

It is a fundamental principle of that Code, according to the writers whoſe authority upon the ſubject is univerſally admitted to be concluſive, that no War is juſtifiable unleſs it be neceſſary either to redreſs or to prevent an injury. "Cauſa juſta belli ſuſcipiendi nulla eſſe " alia poteſt niſi injuria†." And in order to preclude, as much as poſſible, all uncertainty in the motives which may induce States to engage in War, in order to prevent them from acting in ſuch a caſe upon " *appear-* " *ances more or leſs convincing*," the fear of uncertain and diſtant danger is expreſsly declared to be inſufficient, and it is required that the danger be not only real, but *immediate*, and that there exiſt a moral

* Tit. Liv. L. 11.

† Grot. de jur. bel. & pac. L. 2. c. 1. § 2.

certainty of the hoſtile intention of the party to be attacked. "Periculum præſens hic requiritur et quaſi "in puncto*"—"Quod ſi quis vim non jam præ- "ſentem intentet ſed conjuraſſe aut inſidiari com- "pertus ſit, hunc nego jure poſſe interfici ſi aut "aliter evadi periculum poteſt †."—"Adverſus in- "certos metus non a vi præſidium petendum eſt ‡."— "Metus rei incertæ jus ad vim dare non poteſt ‖."— "Ut juſta ſit defenſio neceſſariam eſſe oportet, qualis "non eſt niſi conſtet, non tantum de potentiâ, ſed et "de animo; et quidem ita conſtet, ut certum id ſit eâ "certitudine, quæ in morali materiâ locum habet ¶."

"The cauſes of every War, eſpecially of the offen- "ſive, ought to be evident, and without mixture of "doubt and uncertainty: for it is very uſual in caſes "of this nature, for doubts to ariſe, either perhaps "out of ignorance of matter of fact, when it is not "*abſolutely certain whether it was done or not*, or "*with what intention* it was done, &c. ¶"

But to juſtify an appeal to arms, it is not ſufficient that the injury to be redreſſed, be certain, or the danger to be repelled, immediate—that the cauſes of War be evident, without any mixture of doubt: it is alſo neceſſary that all poſſible endeavours be uſed to remove thoſe cauſes—that all other means to obtain ſatisfaction or ſecurity be employed in vain and exhauſted, before it can be lawful to reſort to hoſtilities. This principle, indeed, flows from the fundamental rule, inculcated by reaſon itſelf, and recognized by the ancients, that "War is juſt only when it is neceſſary **:" for it cannot be neceſſary if its object may be otherwiſe obtained. Therefore whatever provocations may have taken place, it is not lawful to reſort to arms, without endeavouring to the utmoſt to accommodate differences, in a peaceable manner: and every

* Grot. de jur. bel. & pac. L. 2. c. 1. § 5. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid, § 17. ‖ Ibid, § 18. ¶ Ibid, c. 22. § 5.
¶ Puffendorff, Law of Nature and Nations, B. 8, c. 6. § 4.
** See ante, p. 21.

death produced by War is a wanton murder, chargeable on the party *commencing* hoſtilities, if that party neglected any thing in his power to preclude the neceſſity of ſo dreadful an expedient. On this ſubject the law of Nations is no leſs explicit than on the other:—

"As no uncertain pretenſions ought to be made uſe "of, ſo neither ſhould men immediately ſeek redreſs "by arms, but ſincerely endeavour to compoſe the "differences, before they break out into a War*."— "Two things are neceſſary to render offenſive War "juſt: firſt, a right to be aſſerted; that is, that the "demand made on another Nation be important and "well-grounded; ſecondly, that this reaſonable de- "mand cannot be obtained otherwiſe than by force "of arms. They who, without trying pacific mea- "ſures, on the leaſt motive run to arms, ſufficiently "ſhew that juſtificative reaſons in their mouths are "only pretences; they eagerly ſeize an opportunity "of indulging their paſſions, and of gratifying their "ambition, under ſome colour of right †."

What a contraſt to this wiſe, cautious, and pacific ſyſtem is exhibited in the doctrine of Mr. Fox, that *France was juſtified in "declaring War upon "appearances, more or leſs convincing;"* and that, although ſhe did not know of the league proved by the Declaration at Mantua, but had only "reaſons "for believing a league of that kind;" that is to ſay, had grounds for ſuſpicion; yet as ſome years afterwards evidence tranſpired to ſhew that "ſhe was "not deceived in thoſe appearances" to which ſhe truſted, ſhe was not the aggreſſor, but the whole guilt of the War is chargeable upon thoſe whom, under ſuch circumſtances, ſhe attacked.

Such, in the very teeth of the law of Nations, is the opinion of an Engliſh Orator and Statesman: but in giving ſuch an opinion that Orator and Stateſman

* Vattel, Law of Nations, B. 3. c. 3. ſect. 37. † Ibid.

not only ſet at defiance the public Code, but ſinned againſt his own knowledge, unleſs all the reports of his ſpeech, on the occaſion alluded to, are groſsly incorrect: for in that ſpeech he is reported, in alluſion to the conduct of this country, which *did not declare War*, thus to have expreſſed himſelf:—"A Nation, "to juſtify itſelf in appealing to the laſt ſolemn reſort, "ought to prove that it had taken every poſſible "means, conſiſtent with dignity, to demand the re- "paration and redreſs which would be ſatisfactory; "and if ſhe refuſed to explain what would be ſatis- "factory, ſhe did not do her duty, nor exonerate "herſelf from the charge of being the aggreſſor*."

If Mr. Fox really expreſſed himſelf in this manner, what a melancholy inſtance does he exhibit of the inconſiſtencies, contradictions and abſurdities, into which the greateſt talents may be betrayed, by an implicit ſubmiſſion to the blind impulſe of party zeal!—Not only did he, in the character of a friend to Peace, maintain doctrines which, if once admitted, would remove all the ob-

* See Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, No. 99, page 351. This obſervation was made by Mr. Fox, by way of criminating Great Britain for not explaining what would be ſatisfactory to her before the War. Any one, judging merely from ſuch a charge, would ſuppoſe that ſhe had commenced the War: for otherwiſe ſhe could not be culpable towards France for not explaining what would be ſatisfactory to herſelf. But, though under no obligation to explain demands which ſhe did not attempt to enforce, ſtill the ſtatement that ſhe did not explain what would be ſatisfactory to her, is completely diſproved by the following paſſages of Lord Grenville's letter to M. Chauvelin, dated Dec. 31, 1791.—"This Government, adhering to the "maxims which it has followed for more than a century, will never "ſee, with indifference, that France ſhall make herſelf, either directly "or indirectly, Sovereign of the Low Countries, or general Arbitreſs "of the Rights and Liberties of Europe.

"It France is really deſirous of maintaining friendſhip and peace "with England, ſhe muſt ſhew herſelf diſpoſed to renounce her "views of aggreſſion and aggrandizement, *and to confine herſelf* "*within her own territories*, without inſulting other Govern- "ments, without diſturbing their tranquillity, without violating "their Rights."

Theſe demands were at once ſo explicit, and their object was ſo indiſpenſable, that a refuſal on the part of France to comply with them, would have juſtified Great Britain in declaring War.

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ſtacles which the law of Nations has interpoſed to prevent unneceſſary War, but, for the purpoſe of condemning his own country, he aſſerted the authority of that law which he had juſt before, in the very ſame breath, endeavoured to ſuperſede in order to vindicate the conduct of France. When Great Britain is *attacked*, ſhe is the aggreſſor becauſe ſhe does not explain *what would be ſatisfactory to her*. But when France *declares War*, ſhe is juſtified in doing ſo *upon appearances*; and, far from being bound to make any explanation, *ſhe* is authorized to kindle the flames of War, without even a knowledge of the cauſe, the exiſtence and ſubſequent diſcovery of which are pleaded by her own advocate as her ſufficient juſtification.

But had France been fully informed of the interview and Declaration at Mantua, would ſhe have been entitled to declare War on thoſe grounds? Mr. Fox has anſwered this queſtion, unleſs he mean to conſider France as abſolved, by virtue of her Revolution, from the rules which are obligatory on other States: for, in conformity with the public law, he has declared it to be neceſſary for "a Nation, in order to juſtify "itſelf in appealing to the laſt reſort, to take every "poſſible means, conſiſtent with dignity, to demand "the reparation and redreſs which would be ſatis-"factory." Before, then, ſhe could have been juſtified in making the Declaration at Mantua, and the league of Princes, cauſes of War, ſhe muſt have uttered her complaints, and have *demanded the reparation and redreſs which would have been ſatisfactory to her*—and only in caſe "her reaſonable demands "could not be obtained otherwiſe than by force of "arms*," would ſhe have been authorized to reſort to hoſtilities?

The explanations, however, which muſt have taken place, had France, knowing the Declaration of Mantua,

* Vattel, ante p. 23.

made the circumſtances contained in it a formal ground of complaint, would have precluded all neceſſity of appealing to arms. For it would then have appeared, ſuppoſing the truth to have appeared, that the project ſpecified in that Declaration, had been propoſed by her King, and could not be carried into execution without his co-operation; conſequently, it was not directed againſt her independence as a Sovereign State—that it was not a hoſtile project, to be effected by force; but that its utmoſt object was to feign or declare War, for the purpoſe of procuring for the King ſecurity of perſon, and free exerciſe of the authority which was nominally veſted in him by the new Conſtitution. But perhaps ſhe might have ſaid, like Mr. Fox, "to declare War and advance troops are un-"equivocal hoſtilities*." Admitting the applicability of this doctrine, however foreign from the caſe, ſtill the facts would have furniſhed a moſt ſatisfactory anſwer. The King, who had requeſted the interpoſition of foreign powers, inſtead of relying upon their aſſiſtance with that unſteadineſs of mind by which he was unfortunately diſtinguiſhed, purſued other meaſures, attempted to eſcape to his frontiers, and, failing in that attempt, accepted the Conſtitution, and withdrew himſelf entirely from the project, which could not be purſued without his co-operation; that project, therefore, became impracticable, and was neceſſarily abandoned: and it deſerves particular notice, though it ſeems entirely to have eſcaped the obſervation of Mr. Fox, that the Declaration at Mantua, which is the document chiefly relied on by that Gentleman, to juſtify the declaration of War by France; was made on the 20th of May, 1791, and War was not declared till the 20th of April, 1792. During which interval of 11 months, none of the meaſures which Mr. Fox conſiders as "unequivocal hoſtilities," and which had never been more than *projected*, were carried into act.

* Correſpondence, p. 47.

never

A conclusive proof that nothing was to be apprehended from a plan which was framed and calculated only for immediate execution, independently of the change of circumstances which rendered its execution impossible.

The facts, therefore, by means of which, though unknown by France before the War, Mr. Fox endeavours to defend the conduct of France in declaring War, would not, if fully disclosed, in consequence of those explanations which she was bound to require before she could lawfully appeal to arms, have justified her in resorting to that extremity. Those facts did not amount to any actual injury—they did not expose her to any danger—they had not even subjected her to any insult, for which her nice sense of honour could require satisfaction: for the only proceedings of which she could complain were, in their essential nature, altogether private, and did not come to light till long after hostilities—and her security was not in the least affected by a project, which was stifled in embryo, and laid aside many months before she saw any necessity for drawing the sword.

Thus the Declaration at Mantua, when viewed in its true light, and in its connection with concomitant circumstances, far from proving, as Mr Fox asserts, that France "was not deceived by appearances," would operate as the severest condemnation of her conduct in trusting to appearances on so momentous a subject; if, indeed, it could be supposed that she drew from them those conclusions which are supposed to have directed her conduct. But it will appear hereafter that she was actuated by other and still more unjustifiable motives. So much for a document which has been caught at most eagerly, to save, if possible, the reputation of Revolutionary France; but which, instead of affording her any support, serves only to plunge her still deeper in disgrace and infamy.

The reader will not, it is hoped, think that too much notice have been taken of the correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Bertrand de Moleville, since that

that correſpondence has afforded an opportunity of expoſing one of the moſt ſpecious pretexts, which the advocates of France have yet diſcovered, to juſtify her conduct in commencing hoſtilities. Nor will it be thought a trifling advantage, if an opportunity has been afforded of reſcuing from perverſion and ſophiſtry, and of diſplaying the wiſdom and utility of that ſound and ſalutary ſyſtem of public law, the authority of which has been long recognized by all civilized States. But a peculiar advantage ariſes to the people of this country from the diſcuſſion which has been purſued ſo much at length. That people are enabled thereby to form a juſt eſtimate of the principles of the party now in oppoſition to his Majeſty's Government. The leader of that party, Mr. Fox, whoſe ſentiments muſt be ſuppoſed to be thoſe of all who acknowledge him in that character (and the other Members of Oppoſition are known to pride themſelves in having ſuch a head) has, on this occaſion, avowed doctrines which are at direct variance with the moſt ſacred and valuable principles of the law of Nations—in order to juſtify the enemies of Great Britain, he has pleaded for their right to infringe that law with impunity; while, to criminate his own country, he has *moſt unjuſtly* accuſed *her* of its violation—proving thereby that he was perfectly well acquainted with the ſpirit and proviſions of that law, of which he was ready to make a ſacrifice at the ſhrine of Republican France. But this is not all. Profeſſing to ſtand forward in the character of a ſincere and zealous friend of Peace, he has invented a ſyſtem, never before thought of, which would, if generally adopted, prove a never-failing ſource of War, by diſſolving all the reſtraints which, for the ſake of general tranquillity, have been impoſed on the ambition or injuſtice of States. Such are the men who would make the world believe that the War would not have exiſted if they had been in office! Such are the men who would now gladly co-operate with Buonaparte in the great work of general Pacification! Such, when

they

they come to be analyzed, are the reaſonings, to which men of the firſt talents are driven, when they undertake to prove that Great Britain and her Allies were the aggreſſors in the preſent War!

CITIZEN TALLEYRAND,

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT PARIS,

THIS Miniſter, like Mr. Fox, aſcribes the War to the formation of a hoſtile league againſt France. He ſays, "As ſoon as the French Revolution had broken "out, almoſt all Europe entered into a league for its "deſtruction*." So far the French Secretary and the Engliſh Stateſman agree tolerably well; but theſe authorities are very ſoon at variance. For Talleyrand proceeds—"Thus it is to the projects of ſubjection, "diſſolution and diſmemberment, which were pre-"pared againſt her, that France has a right to impute "the evils which ſhe has ſuffered, and thoſe which have "afflicted Europe." On the contrary, Mr. Fox declares, that the project of the confederated Powers was "*not to partition France*, but to dictate by force "of arms changes in her internal government †.

When two witneſſes contradict each other in a material part of a criminal charge, they not only deſtroy each other's teſtimony, but invalidate the charge itſelf. For it is the nature of truth to be conſiſtent, though told by a thouſand mouths. When therefore Mr. Fox and Citizen Talleyrand ſtand forth to prove the exiſtence of a hoſtile league againſt France, previouſly to the War, and differ eſſentially reſpecting the nature and objects of that league—when one of them repreſents it

* Note from Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, dated Paris, January 14, 1800.

† See ante, p. *5.

as " founded in projects of ſubjection, diſſolution and diſmemberment," and the other declares that its object was " not to partition France," but " to dictate " by force of arms changes in her internal govern- " ment;" it would be a juſt preſumption, without any further inveſtigation, that the league itſelf had no exiſtence, and that the charge is falſe and malicious. This preſumption would be greatly ſtrengthened, if indeed it could want any additional ſupport, by the conſideration that as ſuch a league muſt, if real, have been formed above eight years ago, the proofs of it would, in all human probability, have been by this time in every one's hands: but certainly two ſuch eminent characters in the political world, as Mr. Fox and Citizen Talleyrand, muſt have had it in their power to ſtate it with the utmoſt preciſion, and to prove it by the moſt concluſive evidence. The variance of two ſuch men on ſuch a ſubject muſt be admitted by every candid mind to be fatal to the charge of a hoſtile league againſt France before the War.

But as the ſtatement of Mr. Fox has been diſtinctly examined, that of the French Miniſter ſhall be noticed in like manner. There exiſts indeed a particular reaſon to induce ſuch an inveſtigation. Talleyrand has peculiar advantages, even beyond Mr. Fox, to enable him to elucidate the political tranſactions of the period to which he alludes. He then held a public ſituation, and he appeared in this country as a diplomatic character. He took a very diſtinguiſhed and leading part in the French Revolution, and he muſt be ſuppoſed not only to have been privy to the motives and the views which directed the conduct of France, but alſo to have watched, with the cloſeſt attention, and with the beſt poſſible means of information, that of neighbouring countries. He muſt, therefore, have it in his power to adduce the fulleſt proof of the aggreſſive league againſt France, if ſuch a league was the real cauſe of the War.— And on no occaſion could he feel a ſtronger inducement to bring forward ſuch evidence, than when he undertook to prove that Lord Grenville's official Note, containing

ing the rejection of Buonaparte's overtures for negociation, reſted upon " an opinion which (as he aſſerts) is " not exact reſpecting the origin and conſequences of " the preſent War."

It was, beſides, *incumbent* upon Talleyrand to eſtabliſh, by clear and irrefragable proof, the exiſtence of the league to which he aſcribed the War. For he does not attempt to deny that France attacked every one of the powers with which ſhe has been at War; and it cannot be diſputed that ſhe thereby became the aggreſſor, unleſs ſhe was obliged to reſort to that extremity by ſome actual injury, for which ſhe could not otherwiſe procure ſatisfaction, or by ſome immediate danger, againſt which ſhe could not otherwiſe obtain ſecurity. If therefore the alleged league be pleaded as the provocation which induced her to commence hoſtilities, it devolves upon her advocate to maintain, by proof, the truth of that plea: otherwiſe it cannot conduce either to her juſtification, or to the condemnation of her adverſaries.

There is not, however, throughout the letter of the Republican Secretary, one tittle of evidence in ſupport of the plea, on which he reſts the defence of France. Inſtead of reſorting to proof he confines himſelf to vague and general allegations, which have been worn threadbare by repetition; and he advances thoſe allegations in a more indiſtinct form than they had before aſſumed, and without giving them the ſmalleſt particularity of time or circumſtance. In fine, a French Miniſter can find no better means of juſtifying the hoſtile attack made by France upon every European State, excepting only two, and upon part of Africa and of Aſia, than the following looſe, declamatory, and totally unſupported aſſertions:

" Very far from its being France which provoked it " (the War) ſhe had, it muſt be remembered, from the " very commencement of her Revolution, ſolemnly " proclaimed her love of Peace and her diſinclination " to conqueſts, her reſpect for the independence of all " Governments; and it is not to be doubted that, oc-

" cupied

" cupied at that time entirely with her own affairs, " ſhe would have avoided taking a part in thoſe of " Europe, and would have remained faithful to her " declarations.

" But from an oppoſite diſpoſition, as ſoon as the " French Revolution had broken out, almoſt all Eu- " rope entered into a league for its deſtruction. The " aggreſſion was real long time before it was public; " internal reſiſtance was excited; its opponents were " favourably received; their extravagant declamations " were ſupported; the French Nation was inſulted in " the perſon of its agents; and England particularly " ſet this example by the diſmiſſal of the Miniſter ac- " credited to her. Finally, France was in fact attacked " in her independence, in her honour, and in her ſafety, " long time before the War was declared.*"

And is it by ſuch looſe and ambiguous declamation that we are to be convinced that the party attacked was the aggreſſor in the War? Is France, by the force of ſuch mere allegations, to be juſtified for going to war with more than one half the civilized world? A murderer is detected in the very perpetration of the crime. He is covered with blood. He has the deadly weapon in his hand. He is ſtanding over his ſlaughtered victims. He is proved to have been the aſſailant, to have butchered all who were within the reach of his fury, and to have diſplayed a general and indiſcriminate malice againſt all mankind—And being put upon his defence, without bringing forward a ſingle witneſs, without ſtating one poſitive fact in his juſtification, he merely aſſerts, in the moſt general terms, that there exiſted a hoſtile diſpoſition againſt him; that a league was formed for his deſtruction; that the aggreſſion was real before it was public; that his enemies were favourably treated; that his agents were inſulted, and that he had been firſt attacked in his honour and ſafety. What jury would heſitate for a moment to pronounce a verdict of GUILTY?

* See Note from Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, No. III. dated Paris, 24th Nivoſe, 8th year of the Republic, or Jan. 14, 1800 of the Chriſtian æra.

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The only allegation advanced by Talleyrand which diſplays even an appearance of preciſion, is that by which he repreſents England as *ſetting the example* of inſulting France, in the perſon of its agents, by the diſmiſſal of the miniſter accredited to her. But as it is a notorious as well as an indiſputable fact, that the war had exiſted eight months before the diſmiſſal of M. Chauvelin (the perſon here alluded to as an *accredited Miniſter*) it required the aſſurance of a Jacobin to enumerate, among the cauſes of the War, the example ſet by England in that diſmiſſal. This *ex poſt facto* example exhibits, indeed, a curious ſpecimen of Jacobin reaſoning as well as of Jacobin aſſurance; and it affords juſt ground to regret that Citizen Talleyrand did not make more alluſions to matter of fact, inſtead of confining himſelf, except in this ſolitary inſtance, to general and indefinite deſcription.

It ſhould not, however, be forgotten on this occaſion, that the accredited Miniſter, whoſe diſmiſſal was ſo groſs an inſult, was really no more than a private individual. He had been, indeed, the accredited Miniſter of the French King; but he loſt that character, and ceaſed to be an Ambaſſador, upon the dethronement of his Sovereign, and the ſubverſion of the Monarchical Government in France. And the Republican Rulers, who uſurped the Supreme Power, were in no hurry to re-inveſt him with the character of Miniſter, for they themſelves date their abolition of Royalty on the 10th of Auguſt 1792, and Chauvelin did not apply to be received, at the Britiſh Court, as their accredited ambaſſador, till January 17, 1793, before which time it has been proved, by concluſive evidence, that they had reſolved on War with Great Britain *. It is true, though not an ambaſſador, he had very important ſervices to perform in this country, independently of his endeavours, by fallacious explanations, to amuſe the Britiſh Government reſpecting the intent of the

* See Mr. Herbert Marſh's Politics of Great Britain and France, c. 14.

Decrees of November 19 and December 15. For it cannot admit of a doubt that he was entruſted with the application of the five millions of livres, which Briſſot ſtates to have been depoſited, by the French Government, in the hands of Meſſrs. Bourdieu and Chollet of London; and alſo of the twenty-five millions of livres, which, according to the ſame good authority, were ſent to England from the national treaſury of France; as well as of any other part, which might have been ſent to this country, of the unlimited ſums which the Executive Council was by decree authorized to take for "ſecret expences, partly "for the purpoſe of dividing the cabinets, partly for "the purpoſe of exciting the people againſt their "tyrants," which ſums were ſaid to be wanted "for "the North, for the South, and for the Indies."* M. Chauvelin was alſo, doubtleſs, the organ employed by the French Government, for the purpoſe of making that ſolemn appeal to the Engliſh nation, of which Le Brun made his boaſt in the Convention†. And he himſelf urged to his Republican maſters the importance of his ſtay here, by repreſenting that though he was not well with the Engliſh Miniſter, yet he was perfectly ſo with Mr. Fox and ſome other Members of Oppoſition; and that it would not be prudent to loſe the fruit of his labours with thoſe Gentleman, and their ſubſequent ſervices, for a vain form of etiquette‡.

But although, with an exception to the above alluſion to the *example* of England, the French Miniſter does not advert to a ſingle fact or document in ſupport of his charge, that France was provoked to declare War by a hoſtile league againſt her ſafety, honour and independence; although he does not, like Mr. Fox, refer to any Declaration or Treaty by which the truth or falſehood of his accuſation might be aſcertained; it is impoſſible to read his ſtatement of the league and projects formed (as he ſays) for the purpoſe of ſubjection, diſſolution

* See Briſſot à ſes Commettans.
† See his Report to the Convention, Nov. 19, 1792.
‡ See Marſh's Hiſtory, vol. ii. c. 13. note 34.

and

and diſmemberment, without perceiving that it is an exact deſcription of the pretended treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; and it is alſo impoſſible to doubt that he intended to have all the benefit of an alluſion to thoſe treaties, without ſubjecting himſelf to the reſponſibility which would have attended an expreſs reference to them. This artifice, however, which exhibits a notable ſpecimen of Jacobin Diplomacy, will have no chance of ſucceſs, even with the moſt credulous, if the grounds, on which the above treaties lay claim to authenticity, be examined. Such an examination is therefore due to the cauſe of truth, which is now more than ever the cauſe of order; particularly as thoſe treaties are the only ones which have been announced to the world, in proof of a league for the ſubjection and diſmemberment of France*.

The report of a League for the above purpoſe was induſtriouſly propagated at an early period of the French Revolution, in terms very ſimilar to thoſe which have been employed by Citizen Talleyrand, in the year 1800. To obtain ſpeedy credit for ſuch a report, nothing could be better calculated than the production of a treaty, in full and complete detail, with a ſpecification of parties and dates, unfolding, article by article, an extenſive and ſyſtematic plan of partition, not only of a great part of France, but of other territories, which might be ſuppoſed to tempt cupidity, or inflame ambition. It was evident, indeed, that ſuch a fabrication was expoſed to ſpeedy detection; but, on the other hand, ſo circumſtantial a detail was calculated to make at once a ſtrong and univerſal impreſſion; and it ſeems to have been the opinion of the firſt Jacobins, that their doctrines were ſo faſcinating, and their arts ſo ſeductive, as to render all reſiſtance to their projected attack

* It has been ſaid that a treaty againſt France was formed at Vienna on the 18th of February, 1792: but this proved a Jacobin abortion; and it had beſides, for its profeſſed object, like the Declaration at Mantua, the Reſtoration of the French King to his Regal Authority.

unavailing, and that it was in their power to ſurprize both the principles and underſtandings of mankind, and to carry the fortreſs of civil Society by a *coup de main* :— an enterprize in which it is impoſſible to deny that they have been very nearly ſucceſsful. Beſides, the extent of Jacobin artifice and audacity was not then known, and it was much more probable that mankind, prejudiced as their minds had been, ſhould at the firſt moment believe in the exiſtence of a treaty, which, by its particularity of circumſtance, ſeemed to court inveſtigation, than that they ſhould ſuſpect it to be a fabrication. With ſuch views and advantages was the treaty of Pavia uſhered into the world, as an alliance formed at that place, in July 1791, between Auſtria, Ruſſia, Pruſſia and Spain, for the purpoſes above deſcribed ; and to which Great Britain was ſaid to have acceded in March 1792. This treaty was inſerted in all the publications which favoured the French Revolution, with as much confidence as if it had been officially communicated by the Miniſters of the ſuppoſed parties—and it was, for a time, quoted with as little reſerve as the treaties of Weſtphalia and Utrecht. It was to be found, not only in French Journals, but in Engliſh Regiſters*. Soon, however, its

* In a collection of State Papers relative to the War, publiſhed by Debrett, this treaty is the firſt document that preſents itſelf to the eye —and the recital of it is followed by a poſitive aſſertion that "the "King of England acceded to it in 1792." And the New Annual Regiſter (which has diſplayed a moſt indecent zeal for Jacobin politics) not content with detailing it fully as a matter of undoubted authenticity, gives it to the public for the avowed purpoſe of unveiling "the myſtery of iniquity" in which "the conduct of the allied "Courts" had been involved, and of rouſing, againſt thoſe Courts the "indignation of every friend of liberty and juſtice." Soon, however, it was mentioned in a very different manner, and thoſe who had formally regiſtered it among the public acts of the year 1792, were driven in 1793 to find a ſalvo for their own credit, by withdrawing the pledge they had unequivocally given for the authenticity of the document. In the New Annual Regiſter for the latter year, the treaty which had been before given in the moſt abſolute and unqualified manner, in a manner to involve the whole credit and authority of the work (which fortunately are circumſcribed within very narrow limits), is mentioned with an *if*—a word which, when uſed in ſuch a place, and under ſuch circumſtances, amounts to a complete direliction of the unfortunate treaty.

its credit was on the decline. Its progreſs, indeed, has been the very reverſe of that which it muſt have had, if founded in reality. In that caſe, conſidering the number of perſons who muſt have been privy to the arrangement, it could not have been long without the confirmation of indiſputable evidence, in ſpite of every precaution to keep it ſecret. Every day would have brought with it freſh proof of its authenticity; and long, ere now, it would have reſted on ſuch ſolid grounds, that no man could have doubted its exiſtence, without appearing to ſhut his eyes againſt the light. Inſtead, however, of this being the caſe, it was ſoon diſowned even by thoſe whoſe credit was ſtaked on its authenticity; and, at length, far from aſpiring to a place in the public Code, it is fallen into ſuch diſrepute, that its mention would throw diſcredit even upon the diſpatches of Citizen Talleyrand. To crown all, this daring impoſture, which, for a time, excited the moſt unjuſt prejudices againſt all the lawful Governments of Europe, and which greatly promoted the ſucceſs of that miſchievous cauſe, which has nearly proved fatal to civilized Society, far from being fabricated in an expert manner, contains, upon the face of it, proofs that it was a forgery; and a forgery too, of a very clumſy nature. Of this any one may be convinced by reading the letters ſigned Detector, in that valuable collection of Papers entitled the Anti-Jacobin, or Weekly Examiner, (long ſince, unfortunately for the public, diſcontinued) vol. i. p. 474. But without examining all theſe proofs, it may be ſufficient to know that of four perſons, who are ſtated to have concluded and ſigned the treaty of Pavia, in July 1791, (ſome of whoſe ſignatures are incorrectly given) it is aſcertained

treaty. Still, however, Editors of this miſerable and miſchievous work wanted the grace to make the *amende honorable* for their falſehoods. But to ſupply that deficiency, they had the aſſurance ſtill to inſiſt that ſome treaty had been concluded at Pavia, although they could not obtain knowledge of its contents; and to cite before *their* Tribunal the Powers whom they had aſperſed, giving them notice to produce the real treaty of Pavia, on pain of being convicted of that which was fictitious.

that only two were in any part of Italy in the year 1791, and that not one of them was at Pavia in the courſe of that year.

Jacobin ingenuity did not, however, confine itſelf to the fabrication of a treaty, in detail, which, neceſſary as it might be for temporary purpoſes, could not long impoſe upon mankind. A more laſting, though not ſo immediate and ſtriking an effect, might be produced by a treaty, of which not the articles, but only the purport ſhould be communicated to the world—of which only the outline ſhould be exhibited, and the contents be left to be ſupplied by fancy or convenience. Such a contrivance was calculated to ſecure a double advantage. The fraud was leſs expoſed to detection, and the ſhapeleſs maſs was capable of being moulded into any form, and even of changing its appearance, as time or circumſtances might require. Beſides, the uncertainty and obſcurity involving a treaty of that deſcription, by enabling it to elude inveſtigation, rendered it a document of which artifice might ſpeciouſly avail itſelf to an indefinite period; and the very myſtery in which it was enveloped was calculated to favour its operation with the bulk of mankind, always diſpoſed to credulity with regard to objects which they cannot ſee diſtinctly.

Such was the Partition Treaty, ſaid to be concluded at Pilnitz in Auguſt 1791. By this treaty is not to be underſtood the Declaration in favour of Louis XVIth, which was made at Pilnitz at the above period by the Emperor of Germany and the King of Pruſſia, and which, far from being ſecret, was openly and immediately avowed—but a ſecret treaty for the ſubjection and partition of France. This treaty may be conſidered as ſubſidiary to that of Pavia. Both are ſtated to have the ſame object; but the one having, in conſequence of its groſs and periſhable texture, ſoon fallen into decay, the other, being a mere incorporeal eſſence, continued long to ſurvive in the regions of deluſion and impoſture. What were the

expreſs

expreſs articles of this treaty no Jacobin authority has deigned to communicate; but great Orators * and eminent writers † have argued upon it with as much confidence, as if it had been already bound up in their *Droit publique de L'Europe*. Neither are we informed who were the preciſe parties to the engagement; but every Power which has been, or is, or may be hoſtile to Revolutionary France, muſt be allowed to participate of that honour. Great Britain has not been deprived of her right on this occaſion, any more than on that of the treaty of Pavia. But Lord Grenville, in his diſpatch to Lord Malmeſbury, when the latter was engaged in the negociation at Liſle, in June 1797, declared poſitively that "his Majeſty was no party to any ſuch treaty." Not content however with reſcuing Great Britain from ſuch an imputation, his Lordſhip alſo ſpontaneouſly ſaid, that the concluſion of any ſecret treaty at Pilnitz, between the late Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, was, "to *ſay the leaſt*, very doubtful in point of "fact." Such an obſervation, proceeding from ſuch high authority, when there was no occaſion to go further than an exculpation of this Country, and when, with regard to the other Powers thus mentioned, a Britiſh Miniſter could not with propriety aſſert a negative, much more than countervails all the unſupported aſſertions that have been made of the exiſtence of ſuch a treaty. It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that his Lordſhip would have committed himſelf and, indeed, the Britiſh Government, ſo far, if he had not been fully convinced that the report of the treaty was a fraudulent invention. If any doubt could ſtill remain that the treaty of Pilnitz, like that of Pavia, is an impoſture, ſuch doubt muſt be entirely removed by the conſideration that, during upwards of eight years, no one circumſtance has tranſpired in proof of its exiſtence, although ſome of its ſuppoſed principal parties have, during the far greateſt part of that time, been at open variance.

* Mr. Fox. † Mr. Erſkine.

It appears, then, that the allegation of Talleyrand, that " almoſt all Europe had entered into a league for " the ſubjection and diſmemberment of France," derives no ſupport from the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; treaties which, though clearly alluded to by that Miniſter, are too notoriouſly ſpurious to be even mentioned by him in his diſpatches. The fabrication of ſuch documents affords a ſtrong preſumption againſt the exiſtence of the League, the belief of which they were intended to promote. Truth does not reſort to forgery and impoſture—and the employment of ſuch means is ſufficient, not only to repel any charge, but to ſtamp it with infamy.

If, however, it could ſtill be ſuppoſed that ſuch a league was the real cauſe of the War, and " the ſource " of the evils which France has ſuffered, and which " have afflicted Europe," ſome proof of its exiſtence muſt ſurely be found in the Correſpondence, which took place between the French Government and the Court of Vienna, reſpecting the differences between thoſe Powers, and which was continued until a very ſhort time before the breaking out of the War. It cannot be imagined that France would ſuppreſs, on ſuch an occaſion, any complaint, which ſhe felt herſelf authorized to make, againſt the conduct of Auſtria, or that ſhe would fail to ſtate, in the ſtrongeſt manner, any ground of diſſatisfaction or apprehenſion, which either the real or the apparent views of that Power, could authorize her to bring forward. The violence and pertinacity with which ſhe urged her complaints againſt, not only the Court of Vienna, but almoſt the whole of Europe, preclude the ſuppoſition that ſhe omitted any thing, which ſhe could, with the leaſt colour of truth, make a ſubject of accuſation. Nor can it be argued that her ignorance of ſuch a league precluded her mention of it at that time. For the queſtion reſpects the motives by which ſhe was impelled to declare War; and nothing of which ſhe was ignorant could operate as a motive of her conduct.

duct. Beſides the report of the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz had then been long circulated by her; the firſt had been formally detailed in the *Moniteur*, an official paper, and the moſt violent invectives againſt the latter, reſounded daily from her Tribunes and her Clubs; and though ſhe had poſſeſſed certain knowledge that ſuch an alliance was formed, ſhe was bound to make it a ſubject of complaint, before ſhe could make it a ground of hoſtility. Admitting the league, which ſhe now pleads in juſtification of her attacks upon the Powers of Europe, to have really exiſted, ſhe would not have been entitled, on that account, to declare War, without previouſly endeavouring, by all means in her power, "conſiſtent "with dignity*," to obtain ſatisfaction and ſecurity. It was incumbent upon her, according to the eſtabliſhed law of Nations, to ſtate her cauſes of complaint, and to demand reparation, before ſhe could juſtifiably appeal to arms. She was, by that law, undoubtedly the aggreſſor, if ſhe went to War on account of any injury, or ſuppoſed injury, for which ſhe did not previouſly endeavour to obtain ſatisfaction. For "as no uncertain pretenſions "ought to be made uſe of, ſo neither ſhould men im- "mediately ſeek redreſs by arms, but ſincerely endea- "vour to compoſe the difference, before they break "out into War†." And "to take arms lawfully, it is "neceſſary that we have not only a juſt cauſe of com- "plaint, but that a reaſonable ſatisfaction has been "denied us‡."

But, ſtrange as it may appear, the Correſpondence in queſtion does not contain the leaſt notice of a league for the ſubjection and diſmemberment of France, although ſuch a league is now alleged to have been the cauſe of the War. There is not, throughout that Correſpondence, the ſlighteſt evidence to ſhew that any perſon in France had the leaſt ſuſpicion of ſuch a project. There is not even any reference to the

* Mr. Fox. ante p. *14.
† Puffendorff, B. 8. C. 6. S. 4. ‡ Vattel. B. 3. C. 4. S. 51.

treaties

treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, although thoſe treaties were then hot from the forge of Jacobin impoſture, and were conſidered as genuine by a great part of Europe.

Was France, then, ſilent, with regard to exiſting injuries or apprehended dangers? By no means. The correſpondence was, on her part, altogether expoſtulatory. She accuſed the Houſe of Auſtria, and other Powers, of unjuſt proceedings, and of injurious deſigns, though not of any attempt or intention to divide her territories, or to ſubject her to a foreign yoke. Her complaints and her demands, either of ſatisfaction or explanation, related ſolely to an encouragement ſaid to have been given by the Emperor and ſome German Princes, to the Emigrant Nobility, in their plans for reſtoring by force the ancient French Monarchy;—and to a Concert of Powers, which undoubtedly took place in conſequence of the French Revolution, which was not diſowned by thoſe who were parties to it, and of which the object was at no time alleged to extend further than the reeſtabliſhment of the French King, in the full poſſeſſion of his former power. Although theſe complaints are now abandoned, in order to make way for the more weighty charge of a project for partition and diſmemberment, and although France now eſtabliſhes, beyond all diſpute, her own aggreſſion, by aſſigning as the cauſe of her going to war, a league of which ſhe made no complaint, no remonſtrance whatever before hoſtilities; it may, nevertheleſs, be expedient to examine the grounds of thoſe complaints which ſhe did make, in order to do full juſtice to the queſtion reſpecting the real origin of the war.

As to the firſt of theſe grounds of complaint, the aſſembling of the Emigrant Princes and Nobility of France, there is no doubt that thoſe unfortunate exiles, the early victims of a Revolution which has ſince preyed upon every claſs and deſcription of people, ſought the aſſiſtance of Foreign Powers to enable them, in conjunction with the Royaliſts remaining

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in France, to reſcue their Sovereign and their country from the hands of a deſperate faction. If, indeed, they had omitted any thing in their power for the attainment of this object, they would have forfeited that honour and that reſpectability, which now ſhed a luſtre upon their misfortunes; and if their cauſe, and that of their King, had been ſupported by the Powers of Europe (which, as has been already proved, might have been done conſiſtently with the laws of nations), the calamities which have afflicted the world for the laſt eight years, in all human probability, would have been prevented, and millions of human beings, whoſe blood has been ſhed upon the ſcaffold or in the field, would have ſtill been in exiſtence. But ſo far from Revolutionary France having any cauſe to complain of the encouragement or ſupport given to this much injured body of men—ſo far was ſhe from having any ground for apprehenſion on their account—the greateſt number of them, who, previouſly to the war, formed themſelves into corps, under the King's brothers and the Prince of Condé, did not at any one time exceed 4700; a mighty force to frighten thirty millions of *men determined to be free!* and it appears from a report of the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, in the month of October, 1791, that no complaint was made againſt the Emperor for affording them countenance, but, on the contrary, that this Monarch had iſſued the moſt peremptory orders to prevent any Emigrant Aſſemblages in the Auſtrian Netherlands. For a time, indeed, they were permitted to aſſemble in the Electorate of Treves; but a remonſtrance having been made on that account, both to the Elector and the Emperor himſelf, in anſwer to the official communication made to the latter by the French Ambaſſador at Vienna, Prince Kaunitz, in a letter to that Ambaſſador, dated December 31, 1791, declared that the Elector had ſignified to his Imperial Majeſty that he had adopted, reſpecting the Emigrants, the ſame principles and regulations which had been put in force in the Auſtrian

Low Countries*. And accordingly, in a paper entitled "Subſtance of diſpatches from M. Sainte "Croix, Miniſter Plenipotentiary of France at "Treves," and communicated by order of the King to the National Aſſembly, that Miniſter declares that "the diſperſion was as real and as complete as the "Nation has deſired and the King directed;"—that "all hopes on the part of the Emigrants, of receiving "ſuccours from the moſt conſiderable Powers," were "*annihilated*;"—that "arrangements had been made "to produce the *removal* of all bodies of French-"men formed in the Electorate;"—that "many of "them were already removed;"—in ſhort, that "the "Emigrants were diſperſed on all ſides;"—that "they were upon their route by the moſt frightful "roads, in ſpite of the ſnow;"—that "no ammu-"nition or arms, no magazines of any kind remained "at their diſpoſal;—and that if they had any can-"non they had been obliged to ſell them." It alſo appears that the Prince of Condé, whoſe corps, according to the moſt exaggerated accounts, did not exceed 1100 men, having quitted Worms and retired to Eltenheim, was driven from this latter place upon the *requiſition* of the Emperor to the Cardinal de Rohan. Such, indeed, was the condeſcenſion of the above Monarch, ſuch his compliance with the requiſitions of France, that he was reproached with purſuing, from aſylum to aſylum, a Prince of the Houſe of Bourbon, who had eſcaped from the poniard of aſſaſſins, and who, forty years before, had fought gloriouſly for Maria Thereſa. It is true M. Deleſſart, in his above-mentioned diſpatch to M. Noailles, notices, in a ſtile of complaint, an order which had been given by the Emperor to Marſhal Bender, "to "march to the aſſiſtance of the Elector of Treves, if "he ſhould be attacked†." But as the Emperor

* Annual Regiſter, 1792, part 2, 209.

† See ib. page 209, part 2.

was

was certainly entitled to take precautions to ſuccour the States of the Empire in caſe of attack, ſuch a complaint was not only unjuſt, but impertinent and domineering in the higheſt degree: particularly as it was accompanied with an acknowledgment, on the part of the French Miniſter, that the order was made ſubject to the expreſs condition that the Elector of Treves ſhould imitate the example which had been ſet in the Low Countries reſpecting the Emigrants; and that "on the previous compliance with this condition "depended that aſſiſtance which General Bender was "to afford to the Elector in caſe of an ulterior attack "by France." Theſe conſiderations render a reference to the explanation, given on the ſubject of that order, by the Prince de Kaunitz unneceſſary, and they fully juſtify the remark with which that explanation is terminated, that "there was no ground for requiring the "explanation, if the French Miniſter had not been "abſolutely determined to ſtart objections."

It is not, however, to be ſuppoſed that the aſſembling of the Emigrants, or the conduct of the Emperor towards them, excited any real alarm in the minds of the French Revolutioniſts; loudly as the latter choſe to vent their complaints on the occaſion. Not only did ſome Members of the National Aſſembly openly declare that emigration was lawful, that the Conſtitution was impregnable, that millions of armed men had nothing to fear, and that there was not the ſmalleſt danger, but Briſſot himſelf acknowledged that he ſaw in the Emigrants of Coblentz, only knights-errant, weak men who were duped by the Emperor*. And even the Members of the Diplomatic Committee expreſſed the utmoſt contempt for the Emigrant Aſſociations, which they deſcribed as "ſoldiers of the Church and an Opera "fire†." Alſo the Miniſter for foreign affairs, M. Montmorin, reported to the Aſſembly, that "in the "Belgic Provinces the Emigrants were not permitted

* Sitting of December 29, 1791.—Lally Tolendal.
† Sitting of November 27, 1791.

" to aſſemble; that the Government of Bruſſels had " redoubled its precautions, that it might not afford a " pretext to conſider, as hoſtile to France, the hoſpitality " afforded them; that even at Coblentz they were " without arms."

But diſperſed and deſpiſed as the Emigrants were, they ſtill afforded a pretext for immenſe military preparations on the part of France. To face theſe wandering knights-errant, theſe ſoldiers of the Church, to put out this Opera fire, 240 battalions and 140 ſquadrons, with artillery for 200,000 men, were aſſembled on the borders of France, and magazines ſufficient for 200,000 men and 22,000 horſes for ſix months, were collected. To employ ſuch a force againſt the whole body of Emigrants, if they had been marſhalled in battle array on the French frontiers, would have been " to break a butterfly upon the wheel." It cannot be ſaid that theſe preparations were either required or warranted by any ſymptom of hoſtility in the dominions of the Emperor, whoſe military force in the Netherlands did not exceed the ordinary Peace eſtabliſhment, and, indeed, was not, when the War broke out, in a ſtate of readineſs to defend thoſe provinces.

It is plain, therefore, that the encouragement afforded by the Emperor to the unfortunate and perſecuted fugitives from France, inſtead of being a cauſe of the War, or even a juſt ground of complaint to the new French Government, ſcarcely amounted to a compliance with thoſe claims on hoſpitality, which are juſtly conſidered as ſacred, particularly among civilized nations. While on the other hand the immenſe hoſtile preparations of France, unauthorized as they were by any real or even apparent danger, nay, by any actual alarm, and burdenſome as they muſt have been to a country, which was ſtated to have been principally indebted to a deficiency of finances for its ſanguinary Revolution, unequivocally indicated a fixed determination for War. Conſidering, indeed, the internal ſituation of France, the mere circumſtance of making ſuch immenſe preparations rendered War on her part inevitable.

inevitable. The inactivity of such a force would have been fraught with the utmost danger to the newly constituted Powers. M. Roland, the Minister for the interior, is stated to have said on that occasion, "Peace "is out of the question, we have 300,000 men in arms, "we must make them march as fast as their legs will "carry them, or they will return and cut our throats." Thus, it appears, that the French Rulers, when they made hostile preparations, which were not at all wanted for the defence of the Country, and for which they had not even a plausible pretext, passed the Rubicon, and, in effect, plunged Europe in a War, the most bloody and destructive that is recorded in the history of the world.

But the complaint most insisted upon by the French Government, in its correspondence with the Court of Vienna, respected the Concert which had been formed between several European Powers, in consequence of the French Revolution. This is a much more important consideration than the assembling of the Emigrants, not only because it is still persisted in by the advocates of France, as the real cause of the war, but because it is insidiously confounded with the pretended league for the subjection and dismemberment of France, of which no evidence whatever has been produced.

The existence of a Concert of Powers, far from being denied, was made a subject of express communication by the Emperor himself, and the remonstrances of the French Ministers, on the subject, were actually founded upon that communication. In an official letter of Prince Kaunitz to the French Ambassador at Vienna, dated December 21, 1791, and communicated by a Royal Message to the National Assembly December 31, 1791, his Imperial Majesty, after alluding to the unsettled and agitated state of France, declared his apprehensions left, in spite of the King's intentions, the tranquillity of neighbouring States, and particularly of the Electorate of Treves, might be disturbed by acts of violence; and his Majesty further

further expreſſed an ardent deſire for "the prevention "of this extremity, and of the infallible conſe- "quences which it would produce, as well on the "part of the Chief, and the States of the German "Empire, as of other Sovereigns, who *have united in* "*Concert for the maintenance of the public tran-* "*quillity, and the ſafety and honour of Crowns**."

As the Concert which is here openly avowed is the only remaining topic which France made a ſubject of complaint, in her expoſtulatory communications with the Court of Vienna, the controverſy is now brought to this ſingle queſtion—did that Concert afford to the former Power a juſtifiable cauſe of war? If it did not, it neceſſarily follows that ſhe was the aggreſſor, by her commencement of hoſtilities. It will not be denied that a Concert really formed for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and the ſafety and honour of Crowns, far from affording any juſt ground for complaint to other Powers, is perfectly defenſible; and that a ſtate, in taking offence at ſuch a Concert, would only prove its neceſſity, by evincing a diſpoſition unfavourable to the public tranquillity and ſafety. It is neceſſary, therefore, to enquire whether the Concert complained of was ſincerely and honeſtly formed, for the ſake of the objects which it profeſſed to have in view, or whether it was directed, under the cover of ſuch profeſſions, to objects of an injurious nature.

The voluntary, frank, and open avowal of the exiſtence of a Concert of Powers, which is contained in the above mentioned letter of Prince Kaunitz, certainly affords a ſtrong preſumption that it had no other object, than is expreſsly aſſigned to it in that letter; for otherwiſe an acknowledgment of its exiſtence might have led to a diſcovery of its real tendency. Parties who confederate for a purpoſe they wiſh to conceal, are cautious not to divulge their connection. But if, notwithſtanding this preſump-

* See Ann. Reg. for 1792. Part II. p. 209.

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tion, any reaſons exiſted to induce the ſuppoſition that the Concert, inſtead of aiming at tranquillity, was directed to hoſtility, that inſtead of having for its object the ſafety and honour of Crowns, it ſought to moleſt and endanger France, ſuch reaſons muſt doubtleſs appear, in their full force, in the correſpondence which took place upon the ſubject; and in which, as has been already obſerved, ſhe was bound to ſtate, diſtinctly and fully, her cauſes of complaint, and to bring forward a ſpecific demand of ſatisfaction, before ſhe could be entitled to make an appeal to arms. But nothing appears, throughout the whole of that correſpondence, which ſhews that the parties to the Concert were actuated, or even ſuſpected of being ſo, by any other views than thoſe which they avowed.

In conſequence of the official letter from the Prince of Kaunitz, M. De Leſſart, Miniſter for foreign affairs at Paris, ſent inſtructions to M. Noailles, Ambaſſador from France at the Court of Vienna, directing him to obtain explanations reſpecting the Concert of Powers, and particularly as to the meaning of the above expreſſion, "*the ſafety and honour of Crowns.*" But even in theſe inſtructions, in which the declaration that gave occaſion to them, and which contained the avowal of the Concert, was repreſented as "*unexpected,*" nothing more than general expreſſions of uneaſineſs and apprehenſion are employed in reference to the "*article* of the note," by which the *Concert* of Sovereigns was made known, and the peruſal of which, it was ſaid, had produced "the greateſt number of reflections, and left the deepeſt impreſſion." It was intimated that the words "the Sovereigns who have united in Concert for the maintenance of public tranquillity, and the ſafety and honour of Crowns," were "conceived to be an index to a league formed without the knowledge of, and, perhaps, againſt France;" and that thoſe words had added a great degree of ſtrength to a previous apprehenſion—that "there did indeed exiſt a combination between the principal Powers of Eu-

" rope for the purpoſe of producing ſome change in " the French Conſtitution"—that " thoſe Powers " entertained a deſign of eſtabliſhing a Congreſs for " the *diſcuſſion* of that object"—and that " unit- " ing their power and their means, they would " endeavour to force the King and the Nation to " accept thoſe laws which they might make*." In ſuch vague and general terms did the French Miniſter expreſs the alarm occaſioned by an " unexpected declaration," which he ſaid " was con- " ceived to convey a degree of menace in its tone;" and of which it was the purport of his inſtructions to complain, and to require an explanation. No hint as to any project of ambition, ſubjection, or diſmemberment—no notice of the treaty of Pavia and Pilnitz, which had been in circulation for months; although, if ſuch treaties, or ſuch projects had been ſuppoſed to exiſt, the inducement to bring them forward, when *an actual Concert of Powers* was complained of, would have been irreſiſtible. In ſhort, all the dread which was entertained reſpecting the views of foreign Powers, and which had received a great acceſſion of ſtrength from a formal, and, as it was conceived, a *menacing* notification of a Concert between thoſe Powers, was confined to an " apprehenſion that " there did exiſt a combination"—for what? for the invaſion, reduction, and diſmemberment of France? No; merely " for *the purpoſe of producing ſome* " *change in her Conſtitution.*" An expreſſion which, when tranſlated from Revolutionary language, means nothing elſe than an exchange of that " ſtate of " anarchy by which" (as M. de la Fayette had acknowledged) " France was oppreſſed," and which could not but endanger other countries, for a ſtate more compatible with general ſecurity, as well as with the good order of France herſelf.

The remonſtrance made by the French Ambaſſador

* See the inſtructions in the Annual Regiſter for 1792. Part. II. p. 316.

at

at Vienna, in purſuance of his inſtructions, produced a very copious explanation from the Prince of Kaunitz, which ſhall be duly conſidered. But it may firſt be proper to trace the further progreſs of the correſpondence, on the part of France, relative to the Concert, which is ſtill conſidered by ſome perſons as the real cauſe of the war. If that really was the caſe, it muſt be preſumed that the complaints of France became more ſerious and more explicit as ſhe approached nearer to that criſis, when ſhe was induced (whether juſtly or not) by ſuch a provocation, to reſort to hoſtilities. But the very reverſe of this took place. In all the ſubſequent notes and other communications from France, the Concert of Powers, was not even made the ground of any diſtinct or ſpecific charge, and it was noticed in terms ſtill more vague and general than thoſe, which had been uſed in the firſt expoſtulation upon the ſubject; while the explanations which were given by the Imperial Miniſter, reſpecting the objects of that Concert, were not challenged as falſe or inſincere. The French Ambaſſador at Vienna, in a note addreſſed to the Imperial Miniſters, dated March 11, 1792, alluding expreſsly to the explanations given by the Prince of Kaunitz, merely ſays, "His Majeſty "cannot behold without uneaſineſs a confederacy, the "object of which appears to give juſt cauſe of "alarm;" and upon this weak and vapid declaration the King is made to demand of the Emperor, "to abandon "that Confederacy." In a letter from M. Dumourier, (the Jacobin Miniſter for foreign affairs, brought into office by Briſſot,) to M. Noailles, dated March 19, 1792, the intereſt and alarm excited by the Concert, inſtead of riſing, as the war, of which it was the pretended cauſe, approached nearer, ſeems to have conſiderably ſubſided. In that letter it is ſaid, "the Concert of Powers is evidently directed againſt "him" (the King)—to any but Jacobin optics the reverſe of this muſt be evident*—"this Concert," pro-

* Annual Regiſter for 1792. P. II. p. 233. Ibid. p. 238.

ceeds M. Dumourier, " can hardly exiſt beyond the " preſent moment :"—then, ſurely, it could not alarm a ſtout-hearted Jacobin—but the reaſon aſſigned for the impoſſibility of its exiſtence beyond the exiſting moment is curious, particularly in ſuch a mouth, " becauſe it ſtrikes at the root of order and " ſound policy." The concluſion, in regard to this moſt formidable Concert, is thus ſtated—" as to the " Concert of Powers, as it has only one object, which " will no longer exiſt, as it is a political Monſter, it " will deſtroy itſelf, and there will remain only the " means of better ſecuring the peace of Europe."

Enigmatical as all this may appear, one thing is extremely obvious, that the Concert of Powers, far from producing a neceſſity, did not even afford a pretence for war. In a ſubſequent diſpatch from M. Dumourier to M. de Noailles, dated March 27, the French Miniſter ſeems further than ever from being able to fix any charge upon the conduct of other Powers, or to allege any ſpecific complaint againſt the union they had formed. But to ſupply that defect he obliquely cenſures their union by means of a general and abſtract obſervation. " A league," ſays he, " formed againſt us, muſt be intended for the purpoſe " of dividing our ſpoils." This, however, is not a ſubſtantive propoſition, but an inference from premiſes which the reader will hardly be willing to admit; for (ſays M. Dumourier) " if we are plunged in anarchy we " cannot be formidable to foreign Powers*." Both reaſon and direful experience too fully refute this aſſertion, to render any expoſure of its fallacy neceſſary. The premiſes in this notable ſpecimen of Jacobin logic being falſe, both in theory and in fact, the inference, which is rather inſinuated than directly ſtated, that the Concert was *formed to divide the ſpoils of France*, falls of courſe to the ground. Can a better proof be wanted of the impoſſibility to arraign, with any effect, the Concert of Powers, than this faint and

* Ann. Reg. for 1792. P. II. p. 240.

diſtant

diſtant kind of attack? Even Jacobin ingenuity could aſſail it with no better weapon than a metaphorical concluſion, obliquely deduced from a propoſition notoriouſly falſe, and egregiouſly abſurd.

France is not, however, the leſs peremptory in her demands becauſe ſhe can exhibit no cauſe for complaint. "If the ſucceſſor of Leopold" (continues M. Dumourier), "be willing to obſerve his treaties "with France, he muſt, without heſitation, break "off thoſe which he has made unknown to her, and "with hoſtile intentions againſt her." That is, in more intelligible language, although the Concert which has been formed cannot be proved to afford any juſt cauſe of complaint or apprehenſion—although it can hardly exiſt beyond the preſent moment, and muſt indeed deſtroy itſelf—it muſt, however juſt, however prudent and neceſſary, be diſſolved, or France will make it a pretext for lighting up the flames of War. Such a menace is clearly implied in the above diſpatch, and it was ſo underſtood by the Ambaſſador to whom that diſpatch was addreſſed; for that Ambaſſador, in a letter to the French Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, dated April 5, 1792, repreſents himſelf as having ſignified to M. Cobentzel, the Auſtrian Vice Chancellor, that he had a poſitive order to demand a declaration, by which the Court of Vienna ſhould renounce her armaments *and the coalition*, or to make known, in default thereof, that the King would conſider himſelf as in a State of War with Auſtria. No other reaſons were aſſigned to Count Cobentzel, to juſtify this determination, than the general obſervation that "ſo many precautions" (alluding to ſome reinforcements ſent to the Briſgaw, while the Auſtrian Netherlands were almoſt uncovered) "*after the Concert* "*which was known to us*, juſtified our alarms." The Ambaſſador further reports, "that he inſiſted eſpecially upon the ceſſation of this Concert." But although Count Cobentzel refuſed to accede to ſuch a requiſition, declaring that "his Maſter could not withdraw himſelf, "but with other Courts, and that his Concert would

" continue to have the ſame object till what remained " to be ſettled with France was brought to a con- " cluſion;" ſtill M. de Noailles concludes his report of the interview with a moſt important Declaration—" According to all my notions, *the Court of* " *Vienna has adopted a plan* PURELY DEFENSIVE, " notwithſtanding the inſtances of the Court of Berlin " for the adoption of another*."

Two days after the date of the laſt-mentioned diſpatch, M. de Noailles wrote another letter to M. Dumourier; but he there merely ſtated that the Vice Chancellor Cobentzel had, in anſwer to the foregoing requiſitions, alluded to a former note, to which the Imperial Court adhered. This ſeems to have been the laſt communication between the two Courts, previouſly to the War; and it appears, from the whole correſpondence which took place, that no charge was urged by France againſt the Concert of Powers, which could in any reſpect juſtify her in making it a cauſe for War. The like obſervation has been ſhewn to apply to her complaints of the protection and encouragement, ſaid to have been afforded to the emigrants, and of the warlike preparations of the Emperor. Complaints ſo notoriouſly at variance with facts, that their being aſſigned (together with the Concert of Powers) as her pretexts for going to War, indiſputably proved, on her part, an abſolute and invincible determination for hoſtilities. Even the French Ambaſſador himſelf has, as we have ſeen, borne teſtimony to the aggreſſion of France; by declaring, in his concluding report, that, in his opinion, " THE COURT OF VIENNA HAD ADOPTED A PLAN " PURELY DEFENSIVE," notwithſtanding the inſtances of the Court of Berlin for the adoption of another.

This opinion was equally juſt with regard to both Courts: for the King of Pruſſia (ſtrange as it may

* Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II, page 242.

ſeem

ſeem to thoſe who conſider the preſent politics of the Pruſſian Court), and alſo the Swediſh Monarch, had a ſtrong ſenſe of the dangers which impended over all Monarchs, in conſequence of the French Revolution; and they were diſpoſed to repel at once thoſe dangers, inſtead of allowing them to become too formidable to be vanquiſhed. The invincibly pacific diſpoſition of the Emperor of Germany, unfortunately for mankind, reſtrained the ardour of thoſe Princes: a circumſtance which gave him a freſh title to the forbearance of the National Aſſembly. Nevertheleſs, on the 20th of April, 1792, that Aſſembly paſſed a Decree of War againſt the King of Hungary and Bohemia. And although, in that Decree, one of the principal reaſons aſſigned for ſo violent a meaſure was, that the King had excited, formed, and refuſed to renounce the Concert of Powers, no other accuſation was advanced againſt that Concert than the general one, that it was "formed againſt the indepen-"dence and ſecurity of the French Nation." Theſe words muſt find their explanation in the correſpondence that had previouſly taken place; and there it will appear that they are as devoid of truth as they are deſtitute of preciſion.

It ſhould not eſcape notice, that in a formal and official application, made by the French *chargé des affaires* at Turin, on the 28th of March, 1792, for the purpoſe of obtaining a categorical explanation of his Sardinian Majeſty's intentions, not one word is mentioned of this *formidable* Concert, which was about to involve Europe in the horrors of War; although it could not be doubted that his Sardinian Majeſty was a party to it, and although he had actually appeared as a party to the pretended treaty of Pavia. Such was the *real* importance attached to this Concert!—ſuch was the anxiety which it excited!

If further evidence were wanting to prove that the reaſons aſſigned for the War, by the French Councils, were fraudulent pretexts to cover their own unjuſt and ambitious projects, and that thoſe Councils, while they

affected the utmoſt alarm on account of the Concert of Powers, were firmly convinced that the views of the Cabinet of Vienna were entirely pacific, the teſtimony of M. *De Leſſart* (the late Miniſter for Foreign Affairs) would be concluſive on theſe points. That Miniſter, being under accuſation, (a very common caſe with French Revolutionary Miniſters), and being impriſoned at Orleans, addreſſed a private and confidential letter to M. Necker, dated July 8, 1792; in which letter, alluding to the documents on which he confidently reſted his defence, he ſays that thoſe documents afforded demonſtration that "the Foreign Courts were not "diſpoſed for War, and contained irrefragable proof "(preuve ſans replique) that it was France who "provoked the War, who had commenced it, who "ſet all Europe againſt her." Theſe documents were never produced; for M. *De Leſſart*, inſtead of being brought to his trial, was butchered in a maſſacre at Verſailles. But his deſcription of their effect muſt be conſidered as juſt, ſince he could have no intereſt in giving a falſe ſtatement to a foreigner, who, though once Miniſter himſelf, had no longer any connection with the affairs of France, and who lived privately in another country.

Hitherto the enquiry has been purſued in a manner the moſt favourable to France. Only her own documents, her own allegations, have been conſidered; and it thence appears, that ſhe commenced the War, without advancing any charge, or aſſigning any reaſon, which could, on the face of it, juſtify ſuch an extremity. For her condemnation, and for the exculpation of the Auſtrian Government, the firſt object of her fury, nothing more can be neceſſary: but in order to do full juſtice to the cauſe, in the defence of which, as well as to repel an actual attack, that Government was obliged to draw the ſword, as well as to place the atrocity of the French Revolutioniſts in a juſt light, it is neceſſary to examine the real cauſes and the objects of that Concert of Powers, in which his Imperial Majeſty was certainly a leading party.

The

The real motives which induced the Powers of Europe to form that union, which was the ſubject of diſcuſſion, and the pretence for War, were unfolded in the official communications that were made by the Auſtrian Miniſters to thoſe of France. And although, in the firſt inſtance, the explanations given by the Court of Vienna were not entitled to be conſidered as evidence in favour of that Court, yet as thoſe explanations were received without contradiction, and of courſe were tacitly admitted by the other party, to whoſe charge they formed an anſwer, they thereby certainly became very good evidence. They will acquire great additional weight if they be found to correſpond with circumſtances which were known to exiſt at the time, or which have ſince tranſpired. But their force will be irriſtible if they appear to be confirmed by the expreſs admiſſions of France herſelf. It has already appeared that the French Miniſter, at Vienna, was inſtructed by M. De Leſſart to demand an explanation reſpecting the meaning of the expreſſion, contained in a previous official letter of the Prince of Kaunitz, "the Sovereigns combined for the ſafety and honour of Crowns." The language of the Aulic and State Chancellor (the Prince of Kaunitz) was, indeed, more comprehenſive; for he ſtated the objects of the union to be *the maintenance of the public tranquillity*, as well as *the ſafety and honour of Crowns*. Whether the omiſſion of the firſt of theſe objects, by M. De Leſſart, was caſual or deſigned, it ſhould not be forgotten that both appeared in the original notification of the Concert of Powers. In reply to the above demand of explanation, the Prince of Kaunitz furniſhed the Imperial Miniſter at Paris with a very copious inſtruction (as has been already obſerved*), for the information of the French Court, containing a frank and open exhibition of the cauſes which had led to the combination of Sovereigns—of the objects which that combination originally had

* See ante, p. *51.

in

in view—and of the change which had taken place in thoſe objects, as circumſtances had occurred to render ſuch a change neceſſary.

From this important explanatory communication it appears, that the Concert of Powers took its riſe, at the ſuggeſtion of the Emperor, from the arreſt and detention of Louis XVIth and his family, after their unfortunate attempt to eſcape to Varennes, when, as it is forcibly expreſſed by the Prince of Kauntiz, "France exhibited to Europe the ſpectacle of a lawful "King forced by atrocious violence to flee," and when "he and his family were ſtopped and detained "priſoners by his ſubjects, it then did concern "the brother-in-law, and the Ally of the King, to invite "the other Powers of Europe to join with him in a de-"claration *to France*, purporting that the Sovereigns "of Europe viewed the cauſe of his moſt Chriſtian "Majeſty as their own—that they demanded liberty, "inviolability, and due reſpect for him and his "family—that they would avenge any further violence "againſt thoſe Royal Perſonages—that they would "not acknowledge, as conſtitutional laws in France, "any but thoſe which ſhould have the voluntary "acquieſcence of the King, enjoying perfect liberty—"and that, if theſe demands were not complied "with, they would, in concert, employ all the means "in their reach to put a ſtop to the ſcandalous uſurp-"ation of power, which, bore the appearance of an "open rebellion, and which, from the danger of the ex-"ample, it concerned all the Governments of Europe "to repreſs*."

This Declaration was propoſed by the Emperor in a circular letter iſſued from Padua, on the 6th of July, 1791, to be adopted as the baſis of a general Concert. It was ſimilar, in effect, to the Declaration which the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, at an interview between thoſe Sovereigns at Pilnitz in the

* See Ann. Reg. for 1792, part 2, page 221.

fol-

following month, made to the Count d'Artois, and which has been confounded with the ſpurious treaty of Pilnitz. It was alſo conformable in principle with the Declaration of Mantua; both having for their object the deliverance of the King from captivity: but theſe tranſactions differ in the following uneſſential reſpects—The Declaration of Mantua announced privately to the Count d'Artois that a powerful Coalition was forming for the relief of the King; that of Padua was only a propoſal to other Powers to interfere in his behalf—the former related to a concert which was projected at the expreſs deſire of his Majeſty, and in purſuance of a plan of joint co-operation which he had communicated, which Concert appears to have been abandoned on his change of plans, when he reſolved to attempt his eſcape by flight; the latter ſeems to have been made without his actual privity, though, from the *previous communication of his ſentiments and wiſhes*, his acquieſcence was certain—the former remained a ſecret for years after the war; the latter was publicly divulged before hoſtilities took place.

The Prince of Kaunitz, on notifying the Declaration of Padua, juſtly maintained that it was fully ſanctioned by the moſt ſacred principles of the law of Nations: a doctrine which, in the ſtronger caſe of the Declaration of Mantua, reſts, as we have ſeen, upon good authority, and which has been confirmed by Mr. Fox himſelf*.

A Defenſive Alliance is alſo ſtated by the Prince of Kaunitz to have been formed in July 1791, between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, upon the principle of the Declaration of Padua.

But before the Concert which it was propoſed to eſtabliſh could be conſolidated, the French King accepted the new Conſtitution, and was reſtored to a ſemblance of liberty. The Emperor inſtantly ſeized the opportunity afforded by this *apparently* favourable change, although he had not much confidence in its reſult, to propoſe to the Powers whom he had invited

* See ante, p. *10.

to

to form a Concert, to ſuſpend their deſigns, and to wait the reſult of the experiment, which the French King had determined to make of the new Conſtitution. But as that reſult was extremely doubtful; as the new appearances which had been exhibited could not "diſpel the apprehenſions which preceding events "did but too well juſtify;" as there was ſtill reaſon to fear that "the French nation would be plunged in "the moſt dreadful evil that can befal a great State— "popular anarchy;" and as that evil was alſo "the "moſt infectious towards other nations*;" it was only propoſed to *ſuſpend*, and not *diſſolve*, the Concert, which had been projected with a view to all theſe conſiderations. From that time (it is ſtated) the Concert of Powers "only eventually exiſted on account of the "apprehenſions which it was natural to entertain in "conſequence of the Revolution," and of the dangers with which that Revolution menaced every civilized State. It ceaſed to have for its object an active interference in behalf of the French King; it was merely "a Concert of paſſive obſerva- "tion;" it was a precautionary alliance, founded in a ſenſe of impending and common dangers; and it was intended to remain dormant, unleſs the apprehenſion of thoſe dangers ſhould be realized.

If the dangers which were apprehended from the French Revolution had been imaginary, ſtill the Concert of Powers would have afforded to France no juſt cauſe for offence, ſince, in that caſe, it would have been but nugatory. Being directed to general tranquillity and ſecurity, France would have had nothing to fear from it, unleſs ſhe diſturbed that tranquillity, or ſought to invade that ſecurity. States have, at all times, a right to render the bulwarks of their common ſafety as ſtrong as poſſible; and the preſervative ſyſtem, denominated the balance of power, is founded upon this very principle.

* See Explanation of the Concert of Powers by the Prince of Kaunitz, Ann. Reg. ibid. page 221.

But

But it is impoſſible to contend that the French Revolution was not a juſt cauſe of the moſt lively alarm to other countries. The connection, which unites the different States of Europe in one body politic, is ſo powerful, and the mutual dependance of thoſe States is ſo intimate—they are ſo ſimilar in their origin, ſo uniform in their manners, habits, and fundamental principles of religion, morals, and government, that a revolution which tends to diſturb and unſettle any one of them, in all its ſocial relations, cannot fail to agitate, diſquiet, and endanger all the reſt. This was more particularly true with regard to the French Revolution, both on account of the great preponderance of France in the ſyſtem of Europe, and of the direct and obvious tendency of that Revolution to operate externally, and to extend its influence to other countries. How could neighbouring nations behold, without terror, a Revolution, which the French Miniſter himſelf (M. De Leſſart) in the very act of demanding an explanation, reſpecting the new combination of Sovereigns for their mutual ſafety, deſcribed as "one "of the greateſt Revolutions that ever happened," and one which, "in its eſſential characteriſtic, wrought "with an extreme rapidity;" adding, that "it was "impoſſible that ſuch oppoſition, and ſuch effects, "ſuch innovations and ſuch diſaſters, ſhould fail of "producing long agitations*." Who can deny that all the European States had an intereſt in ſuch a Revolution, and a right, not only to watch it with apprehenſive vigilance, but individually and collectively to adopt every poſſible precaution to preſerve themſelves from its contagious influence. But the above mentioned Miniſter went ſtill further in his conceſſions. He expreſsly recognized the intereſt of all Sovereigns of Europe in the cauſe of the King of France and of the Royaliſt party. "There was," (he admits) "without doubt, an epoch" (before the King's ac-

*See Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II. p. 214.

cept-

ceptance of the Conſtitution) "in which their cauſe" (that of the Emigrants) "*connected with that of the* "*King*, might have excited the intereſt of Sovereigns, "and more particularly of the Emperor*." If this intereſt exiſted at the above epoch, the Concert of Sovereigns which was then formed, had an additional ground of juſtification, beſides the common principle (already noticed) of the law of Nations, which "when "two parties divide a State," permits a foreign Power to interfere "to ſupport the party which is friendly, and "to oppoſe that which is hoſtile to its intereſts"—And as that intereſt was, at moſt, but *ſuſpended* by the King's acceptance of the Conſtitution; as it might return, with increaſed weight, by the failure of that Conſtitution to protect the cauſe and the perſon of the King; and as the event has proved that the apprehenſion of ſuch a reſult was but too well founded; it follows, that in ſuſpending only, and in refuſing to diſſolve the Concert, the Sovereigns, who were thus united, acted in conformity with the dictates both of prudence and juſtice.

It appears, however, that not only the moſt notorious dangers, but even the admiſſions of France herſelf, fully authorized the Prince of Kaunitz, in his explanatory inſtructions to aſſert, that "there never "did exiſt a motive of alarm, and a general Concert, "more juſt, more urgent, and more eſſential to the "tranquillity of Europe†." Nor ſhould it be forgotten that the grounds of that alarm, and the neceſſity of ſuch a Concert, were greatly ſtrengthened by the immenſe warlike preparations which France was making, under the direction of that violent Republican party, whoſe aſcendancy, as the Aulic and State Chancellor obſerves, was "viewed with dread by all who "had the good of France," (and, he might have added, of Europe) "at heart;" and who had "induced the

* See M. De Leſſart's Inſtructions to M. de Noailles, Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II. page 214. Vattel ante p. *10.

† See Ann. Reg. ibid. page 224.

"Govern-

" Government to laviſh the public revenue, inſuf-
" ficient as it was for the current expences, and the
" ſupport of the credit of the State, in a War Eſta-
" bliſhment of 150,000 men, under the pretext of
" making head againſt about 4000, whom the emi-
" grants had aſſembled, but whom they did no longer
" aſſemble in Germany*."

To this ſhould be added the ſerious and juſt appre-henſion which, as the Aulic Chancellor further ob-ſerves, " Foreign Powers entertained on account of the " dark, yet detected projects" of that party, " of ſe-" ducing other nations to anarchy and revolt," of which he mentions, as one inſtance, " their protecting " and ſupporting the new conſpiracy of a revolt, which " had lately been diſcovered in the Low Countries, " and of which it was known, beyond the poſſibility " of a doubt, that the focus exiſted at Douay, and " that the whole ſcheme was founded on the " aſſurances of aſſiſtance from the Republican party in " France.†"

* Ann. Reg. for 1792, P. II. page 225.

† The endeavours of the Republican party in France to ſtir up the people of other Nations to revolt againſt their Governments, have no where aſſumed more activity, or produced a greater ſenſation, than in this country. In the years 1791 and 1792 a moſt ſympathetic correſpondence took place between the French and Engliſh patriotic clubs. Some parts of that correſpondence are detailed in the Annual Regiſter for 1792, Part 2d; the peruſal of which is well calculated to convey a juſt idea of the extreme danger to which all Governments were expoſed by the ſeductive principles, the artful machinations, and the indefatigable activity of the French Revolutioniſts. In an Addreſs (ſigned John Cartwright, Chairman) from the Society for Conſtitutional Information at London, to " the Friends of the Conſtitution, commonly called *Jacobins*," at Paris, after many Revolutionary effuſions, the French Jacobins are told that they have no means of defence equal to that of eſtabliſhing the *general freedom of Europe*; and the Engliſh Jacobins moſt heartily wiſh their brethren " ſucceſs" in this *general* cauſe;" and in ſaying this, they declare their belief that they "*utter the voice of millions*." A congenial ſentiment, avowed by authority in the National Aſſembly in the ſame year, proves that the chief promoters of the French Revolution had originally in view the ſubverſion of all exiſting Governments. In a formal Report to that Aſſembly the Reporter concluded by ſaying—" It is to you that future ages, " that *the univerſe* will be indebted for beholding the *yoke* of error, " deſpotiſm, ſuperſtition, and ignorance broken by all men, who, " tired like us, of the debaſement and inertneſs into which the " people had fallen, ſhall *annihilate every ſpecies of tyranny*."

Here was a direct charge againſt Revolutionary France, which, if true, not only authorized the utmoſt alarm on the part of the Emperor, but alſo amounted to an injury of the deepeſt kind, and, unleſs followed by full ſatisfaction, to a juſt cauſe of war. The truth of this charge might be inferred from its paſſing without refutation or denial by France, who, by a ſimilar omiſſion, ſanctioned all the allegations and ſtatements of the Prince of Kaunitz. It is true, in a ſubſequent letter from M. Dumourier to M. de Noailles, the accuſation of attempting to excite a revolt in the Netherlands is alluded to, but in ſuch a manner as very much to aggravate the previous cauſe for complaint, by adding inſult to injury. Inſtead of attempting to deny that the revolt was excited by the Republican party in France, M. Dumourier pretended to account for it, in the new Revolutionary ſtile, by aſcribing it to the oppreſſive conduct of Government. "Allow," ſays he, "the Belgic Provinces to "be happy, and to maintain their conſtitution; and "they will remain in tranquillity*." This kind advice, which ſavoured rather ſtrongly of an impertinent interference in the affairs of the Low Countries, was preceded by an intimation, that "a ſpirit of inſurrection "would not be prevented from penetrating into thoſe "provinces by keeping there a large body of troops;" for "*armies cannot reſtrain a people if they wiſh to* "*be free.*" Thus, in order to repreſs or prevent revolt, the Emperor was not even at liberty to make uſe of military force, leſt he ſhould give umbrage to France; but he was to truſt ſolely to Gallic aſſurances that *his people would be dutiful, if he would allow them to be happy.* Soon afterwards the Jacobin Miniſter makes a declaration of a moſt ſingular nature. "The Court of Vienna knows well that the "Conſtituent Aſſembly *rejected the Belgic Pro-* "*vinces* becauſe their *theocratic* conſtitution was the

* See Annual Regiſter, 1792, Part II. page 237.

"re-

"reverſe of ours." This is not only a daring acknowledgment, that the Conſtituent Aſſembly had been engaged in communications with the Belgic inſurgents, but it involves the aſſertion of a right in that Aſſembly to take, at pleaſure, the Netherlands into their own hands. To aſſign, as the *reaſon* of their rejecting thoſe Provinces, a particular form of conſtitution, was to declare that they paid no regard to the Sovereignty of the Emperor, and that they were ready to violate that Sovereignty, whenever it might ſuit their convenience ſo to do. The impediment ariſing from a *theocratic*, or any other conſtitution, could be no very ſerious obſtacle to ſuch conſummate conſtitution-mongers; but, at all events, no Government could be ſafe for a moment, if its exiſtence depended upon the Conſtitutional notions, or the forbearance of the Conſtituent Aſſembly. This very curious paſſage in M. Dumourier's letter, may be conſidered as highly important, both as it proves that the principles, upon which France afterwards regulated her conduct towards other countries, were adopted at a very early period; and as it affords a reaſonable ground to preſume, that the annexation of the Auſtrian Netherlands to France was actually in contemplation before the war, and probably one of the objects which induced France to commence hoſtilities.

If any doubt could remain that the Republican party in France had fanned the flames of revolt in the Netherlands, that doubt would vaniſh upon the peruſal of the following letter of M. Rochambeau, Preſident of a Club at Maubeuge, calling themſelves the Friends of the Conſtitution, and addreſſed to the Patriots of the Low Countries, who had for a time emigrated into France, and were returning into their own country:—

"To the Patriots of Brabant.

September 18, 1791.

"You know how to value liberty; you have deſired it, and unfortunate events have prevented you

from conquering it. The Friends of the French Conſtitution *embrace the whole world in their ſyſtem of philanthropy*, and under that title they expreſs a hope that, returning to your own country, you will ſcatter the ſeeds of our benevolent projects, that they may produce an abundant harveſt.

(Signed) ROCHAMBEAU, Preſident.

Printed by Order of the Committee.

(Signed) MOREL, ALEXANDRE,
PHILIPPE, Secretaries."

The reflections which this letter neceſſarily excites extend far beyond the object for which it is here introduced. But it certainly affords unequivocal proof, not only that the charge brought, by the Prince of Kaunitz, againſt the Republican party in France, of endeavouring to excite an inſurrection in the Netherlands, was well-founded, but alſo that the Emperor and every other Sovereign had abundant reaſon to form a Concert, to preſerve themſelves from the dangers, with which the French Revolution threatened "*the whole world.*"

There is, however, ſtill better evidence, if poſſible, to ſhew that ſuch a Concert was not merely juſtifiable, but indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſecurity of all regular Governments. In the ſitting of the National Aſſembly, January 14, 1792, on the occaſion of bringing up the report of the Diplomatic Committee, reſpecting the official diſpatch of the Prince of Kaunitz, and after the reading of diſpatches from the French Miniſter at Treves, who ſtated that the emigrants in that Electorate were totally diſbanded, Briſſot, fearing it ſhould ſeem that this act of ſubmiſſion, on the part of the Elector, might pacify the Aſſembly, repreſented the Electors, to whoſe proceedings the greateſt conſequence had before been attached, as unworthy of the anger of that auguſt body; but to make amends, the Emperor, at whoſe inſtance the Electors had complied with their wiſhes, was their irreconcile-

able

able enemy; and deſerved all their reſentment. The reaſon for thus exhibiting that Monarch as the proper object of their jealouſy and hatred, (the moſt profligate, ſurely, that was ever avowed in the face of day) was, that the ſyſtem which the Aſſembly had adopted—that the Conſtitution which they ſought to eſtabliſh—tended to the deſtruction of his Throne, and to that of every Throne; that, therefore, he and every Sovereign muſt, upon principles of ſelf-defence, be hoſtile to that ſyſtem—to that Conſtitution. Of courſe, it was neceſſary to treat him as an enemy, ſince it was determined to make him one; it was prudent to anticipate thoſe meaſures of ſelf-defence, to which he muſt ultimately reſort for his own preſervation, and to begin with enſuring his deſtruction, leſt, by delay, he might find means to avert it. The following paſſages of Briſſot's well-known ſpeech, on that occaſion, will prove, that the above ſtatement is not an exaggeration. "The Electors are not worthy of your anger. "Fear has proſtrated them at your feet. The Emperor is "now your enemy. Examine his ſituation and your "own, and take advice from your principles and "ſtrength. Strength will avenge you; principles will "abſolve you. The nature of your enemy's hate "muſt not be diſſembled, if you would meaſure the "extent of it. *Your Conſtitution is an eternal anathema againſt all abſolute Thrones.* ALL KINGS "MUST HATE YOUR CONSTITUTION. IT BRINGS "THEM TO THEIR TRIAL. IT PRONOUNCES THEIR "SENTENCE. IT SEEMS TO SAY TO EACH OF THEM, "TO-MORROW THOU SHALT BE NO MORE, OR," (which indeed is juſt as bad, as Louis XVIth fatally experienced) "THOU SHALT BE A KING OF THE "PEOPLE'S CREATION. *This truth has ſunk deep "into Leopold's heart. He ſtrives to ward off the "fatal moment;* and *ſuch is the ſecret* of his hatred "for the French Nation, of the protection which "he has granted to the emigrants and to the Electors, "*and of the league of Kings*, whom he endeavours "to excite againſt us. No, it is not the French no-

" bility that he would re-eſtabliſh. It is not the pre-
" rogative of a political phantom which he wiſhes to
" defend. LEOPOLD FEARS FOR HIS THRONE. IT
" IS HIS THRONE THAT HE ENDEAVOURS TO
" MAINTAIN *by a vain league againſt the torrent of*
" *liberty**."

It may appear ſurpriſing that a man of even common diſcretion ſhould venture to make ſuch plain confeſſions, in ſo public a manner. But it was found neceſſary to ſtimulate the Aſſembly to declare War againſt the Emperor, and the conduct of that Prince, inſtead of ſtimulants, exhibited only palliatives and mitigants. It was therefore neceſſary to ſhew that, at all events, there muſt exiſt an hoſtility between him and the new French ſyſtem. But as no proofs of ſuch hoſtility were to be found in his meaſures, it could exiſt only in the ſyſtem itſelf; and it was ſo predominant in that ſyſtem, and ſo inſeparable from it, as neceſſarily to overpower all the exertions of the Court of Vienna to preſerve peace. This was the only argument which Jacobin ingenuity could find for immediate war; and the Orator, whoſe fancy, doubtleſs, anticipated, from the united force of war and inſurrection, the ſpeedy overthrow of all Thrones, little cared for the infamy which ſuch reaſoning would ſtamp upon himſelf, and his revolutionary coadjutors, to the end of time. But certainly he did not conſider it as poſſible, that, after a ſeries of years, when the edifice of civil ſociety, though ſtill aſſailed, ſhould ſtand firm againſt all attacks, men ſhould any where be found, and particularly in a Britiſh Senate, to juſtify him and his flagitious cauſe, and to contend, in ſpite of his open and unbluſhing acknowledgments, that the war was produced by the aggreſſion of the enemies of France.

The arguments of Briſſot, enforced by Condorcet, and other philoſophers of the ſame ſchool, notwithſtanding the ſubmiſſive conduct of the *deſpiſed* Elector

* See Annual Regiſter for 1792. Part II. p. 273.

of

of Treves, and the peaceable diſpoſitions of the more formidable Emperor, prevailed upon the Aſſembly to addreſs the King, requiring him to demand of his Imperial Majeſty to renounce all treaties and conventions againſt the Sovereignty, independence, and ſafety of France, (that is, the Concert of Powers) and to intimate that evaſion, delay, or ſilence, would be conſtrued into a Declaration of War.

The unfortunate King was not in a ſituation to reject any demand of the Imperious Aſſembly, although, on this occaſion, he obſerved that they exceeded the Powers veſted in them by the Conſtitution, according to which they were reſtricted from making War the ſubject of their deliberations, except upon the formal propoſition of the King. He interpoſed all the delay in his power before he authorized his Ambaſſador to deliver the hoſtile *ultimatum* which had been impoſed upon him; but, at length, M. Dumourier, by his diſpatch, dated March 27, directed the French Ambaſſador at Vienna to tender to the Imperial Court the fatal alternative of War, or a diſſolution of treaties which, it was well known, would not and could not be diſſolved. The reſult could not but be anticipated; and the flames of War ſoon burſt forth, which have continued to rage, for nearly eight years, with inextinguiſhable violence.

It has been made manifeſt by documents which no man can deny, and the effect of which, it is conceived, no man can ſeriouſly diſpute, that the pretexts which have been urged, either by France, or her advocates, to juſtify her Declaration of War, are totally inſufficient for that purpoſe; that the conduct of the Emperor, far from amounting to a cauſe of War, did not afford her any juſt ground of offence; and that her Revolution, and the views and conduct of its promoters, were ſo hoſtile, and fraught with ſo much danger, to all eſtabliſhed Governments, that not only the Emperor, but all the Sovereigns in Europe would have been fully juſtified, upon principles of ſelf-defence, in taking up arms for the overthrow of her

new ſyſtem, and of the factions by which it was ſupported.

It muſt not, however, be ſuppoſed that the reaſons which France aſſigned for her declaration of war were, according to any views which, even in her ſtate of inflammation and effervescence, ſhe formed upon the ſubject, the real motives by which ſhe was induced to reſort to that extremity. The ſpeech of Briſſot, which has been juſt quoted, and indeed the whole tenor of her language and conduct, fully evince that ſhe was not miſled by a blind and overheated zeal, that ſhe had not even the merit of deceiving herſelf, that ſhe aſſigned all her unfounded pretexts for hoſtility, with a full knowledge of their being abſolutely falſe, and that ſhe ruſhed into the War for the purpoſe of effecting the main object of her Revolution, the deſtruction of all regular Government. Of this, in addition to the proofs which have already appeared, the moſt convincing evidence is upon record. The beſt evidence, indeed, which, according to the eſtabliſhed rules of evidence, can poſſibly be produced—the teſtimony of France herſelf againſt herſelf—the confeſſions of thoſe very perſons, who conducted her revolutionary concerns, who knew all the ſprings of her conduct, and all the ſecrets of her domeſtic and foreign plans.

Briſſot, than whom no individual had greater influence on the councils and conduct of France, at the period in queſtion, and who diſplayed, as we have ſeen, in ſtrong and juſt colours, the dangers with which the French Revolution menaced all the Monarchs of the world, was no leſs explicit in unfolding the real cauſes of the War, and in proving that the motives, to which it was aſcribed, had no ſhare whatever in producing it. So far from its having been the reſult of any apprehenſions, true or falſe, of the hoſtile views of the Emperor, Briſſot, on the 20th of October 1791, when the conference and declaration of Pilnitz had been univerſally known for almoſt two months, told the National Aſſembly, "I can aſſure you there is no

"reaſon

" reaſon to be alarmed at the conduct of the Court " of Auſtria. Its Sovereign loves Peace, and wiſhes " for Peace. All circumſtances unite to induce Leo- " pold to abſtain from diſplaying the force of arms." On the 29th of December following, the ſame man ſaid in the Aſſembly, " The wavering mea- " ſures of the Cabinet of Vienna afford us no reaſon " to apprehend a War on the part of the Emperor. " As Prince, he wiſhes for Peace, as head of the Ger- " man Empire, he gives himſelf the air of wiſhing for " War." In the ſame ſpeech, not content with ex- culpating the Court of Vienna from all hoſtile diſpo- ſitions, he poſitively, though unguardedly, declared that " War was a real benefit to the nation, and that " the only evil which they had to dread was their not " having War." In what manner War was to prove a real benefit to the nation, was a few days afterwards ex- plained by Iſnard, who told the Aſſembly, that " War " was indiſpenſable to perfect *(conſommer)* the Revo- " lution." And after the Revolution of the 10th of Auguſt, when the War had exiſted ſeveral months, Briſſot ſtill more explicitly acknowledged that the War had been declared by France, for the expreſs purpoſe of overturning the Monarchy and of eſtabliſhing a Repub- lic. " Without the War," ſaid he, in his paper entitled *Journal du Patriote Francais*, September 22, 1792, " without the War, the Revolution of the 10th of " Auguſt would not have taken place; without the " War, France would not have become a Republic." And in an Addreſs to all the Republicans of France, publiſhed about the ſame time, he ſaid, " We made " him (the King) declare War in order to put him to " the teſt. But for the War, France had not been a " Republic. It was the abolition of Royalty I had in " view in cauſing War to be declared." Another diſ- tinguiſhed commentator upon he War, the Revolution, and the Republic, Louvet, in a work addreſſed to Robeſpierre, ſaid, " We wiſhed for War, we genuine " Jacobins, becauſe Peace was inevitably *(a coup ſur)*

" deſtructive to the Republic*. Republicans, who were " worthy of the name, demanded the War; they dared " to aſpire to the laſting renown, to the immortal honour, " of aboliſhing Royalty itſelf, of aboliſhing it for ever, " firſt in France, and then throughout the world." In the ſame ſpirit the ſanguinary Collot d'Herbois ſaid, " We were deſirous of War, becauſe War would de- " ſtroy Royalty." And Cambon (a miniſter) declared to the three united Committees of War, Finance and Diplomacy, that the object of the War was " the " abolition of all privileges." He is alſo reported by Briſſot to have expreſsly ſaid, " It is neceſſary to break " with all the Cabinets." Briſſot himſelf went ſtill further, by declaring that it was reſolved to ſet all Europe at defiance; and afterwards, on another occaſion, he expreſsly ſaid, " We muſt ſet fire to the four corners of Eu- " rope." Such is the teſtimony of the very men who compelled their Sovereign, much againſt his will, † to draw the ſword—teſtimony which would be abſolutely concluſive, though it were not ſupported by other evidence—though it were not confirmed by that exact correſpondence with every known fact, however minute, which never did and never can belong to any thing but truth, and by a moſt perfect conſiſtency with all the events which have ſince occurred, and with all the documents which have ſince tranſpired. To ſuppoſe that ſuch confeſſions are falſe is ſo monſtrous an abſurdity, that it would be an inſult on common ſenſe to attempt its expoſure. It is not in the nature of things for men to invent lies ſo injurious to themſelves, and to the cauſe which they ardently eſpouſe. But that bad men ſhould declare their own guilt and infamy, is a ſtriking proof of the *moral* government of

* May not this be ſaid, with equal truth, at the preſent moment; and if ſo, can the pacific proteſtations of the Rulers of France be entitled to any credit?

† A ſtronger proof could ſcarcely exiſt that Lewis XVI. was compelled, againſt his will, to declare War, than the ſingular circumſtance of his requiring all his Miniſters to ſign their names to the opinion, which they gave in favour of the Declaration. Well then might Briſſot ſay, " We forced him to declare War."

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the world. The various and clashing interests, which are continually arising in the pursuit of vice, tend to the prevention of its complete success, and to the detection and punishment of its votaries. Not only do the different individuals, who seem to start with the utmost cordiality and confidence in the career of profligacy, soon find it necessary to thwart, betray and even destroy each other, but the very same persons are often obliged, in order to encounter the difficulties of the moment, to expose their own councils and to defeat their own projects. Thus are wicked men the instruments in the hand of Providence of their own disappointment, disgrace and ruin.

The foregoing investigation of the origin of the War, though necessarily dry and unentertaining, has not, it is trusted, been unprofitable. It has enabled us, not merely to expose error, but to elicit truth; not merely to disprove the various false statements, which have been circulated with indefatigable industry, and which still continue to mislead the minds of many, but to attain the utmost certainty respecting the real causes of the War. It now appears, by the most incontrovertible evidence, that the War was altogether produced by the Jacobin Rulers of France; who pretending dangers, provocations and injuries, which they have since acknowledged to have had no existence, exerted the predominating influence which, unfortunately for mankind, they had acquired by means of the Revolution, in exciting a contest, for the avowed purpose of establishing their intended Republic, and of destroying Royalty, first in France, and then throughout the world. They perceived that War was the natural element of Jacobinism—that it would assist them in keeping up and increasing that fermentation which was necessary to the success of their schemes—that it would afford them additional pretexts for calumniating the King, and the means of accelerating his destruction—that it would enable them to excite a national spirit, which they well knew how to direct against their enemies at home as well as abroad, and to obtain the possession

of an immenſe force, without the aid of which all their plans of foreign inſurrection would be ineffectual.

Such, according to the depoſitions of its very authors, were the cauſes and the original objects of that War, which has convulſed, to its foundations, the whole ſocial world. Such was the ſource of that enſanguined and deſolating torrent, which, after overwhelming a very large portion of Europe, has ſpread, with reſiſtleſs fury, to the deſarts of Egypt, extended itſelf to the venerable and hallowed plains of Paleſtine, and which, but for the aſtoniſhing valour and almoſt incredible perſeverance of a Chriſtian Knight, would probably have ſwept away the immenſe maſs of the Ottoman Empire. *Hoc fonte derivata clades.*

It appears alſo that the War poſſeſſed, at its very commencement, the ſame character which it has exhibited in the moments of its greateſt fury and ſucceſs. It was from the firſt, on one ſide, a Revolutionary War, and, on the other, a War in defence of every thing that can be moſt dear to ſocial man. It was commenced for the deſtruction of all Thrones. It was directed againſt all the inſtitutions of ſociety. Its primary object was, not merely the eſtabliſhment of the French Republic, but the communication of the diſorganizing influence of the French Revolution to the whole world. Before a drop of blood was ſhed, before the ſword was drawn from the ſcabbard, its promoters had formed plans, not, indeed, ſo minutely arranged, but as extenſively deſtructive, as any which their ſucceſſors have diſplayed in the fluſh of victory and the exultation of triumph. Time has only matured thoſe plans, but it has not in the leaſt altered their nature or their tendency. All the crimes, perfidies and cruelties—all the ſchemes of rapacity, aggrandizement and ſubverſion, which have rendered this War perfectly anomalous in the annals of the world, were contained in the folds of that ſyſtem, which was laid open to the view of mankind at the very commencement of hoſtilities. " Una et ea vetus bellandi cauſa—profunda

" cupido

" cupido imperii et divitiarum *"—nay, rather; " no-
" cendi cupiditas, ulciſcendi crudelitas, implacatus et
" implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido domi-
" nandi, et ſi quæ ſunt ſimilia †."

The hiſtory of the War is nothing elſe than a hiſtory of the attempts of the various parties, who have ſucceſſively gained the aſcendancy in France, to realize by force of arms, and by Revolutionary arts, the original and avowed projects of its firſt exciters, the early Jacobins.

In a very few months after its commencement, it enabled this deſperate party to attain one of their main objects, the deſtruction of Royalty in France. Emboldened by ſo great a triumph, and by ſome military advantages which, about the ſame time, they moſt unaccountably obtained, they inſtantly endeavoured to make their ſphere of action commenſurate with the extent of their views. At that time their confidence of immediate ſucceſs in their plan of univerſal ſubverſion ſeems to have been unbounded. That confidence was derived, not from a conſideration of the phyſical force at their command, which certainly was not adequate to the overthrow of the Powers, with which they were then engaged, but from a knowledge of their moral reſources, of the efficacy of thoſe means of excitement and ſeduction, by which they ſought to undermine the foundations of all authority. Nor did they rely ſolely for that purpoſe on the efforts of ordinary ſedition, on the co-operation of that part of every State which is diſaffected to the lawful Government, and which, by their emiſſaries, they rouzed into the moſt vigorous action. They placed much of their reliance on the dazzling and ſeductive influence of their ſyſtem of liberty and equality—a ſyſtem which promiſed to render the condition of mankind inexpreſſibly more comfortable than it had ever been, or than, without ſuch extraordinary aid, it could hope to ever be. The effect of ſuch a promiſe was greatly promoted by the themes of human

* Salluſt. Fragm. † St. Auguſtin.

per-

perfectibility, by which the profeſſors of the new philoſophy had prediſpoſed the minds of multitudes to embrace any propoſal, which had for its object to realize ſuch extravagant expectations. And theſe impreſſions were favoured by the incredible rapidity and force of the firſt movements of a Revolution, which preſented ſuch brilliant proſpects of unbounded felicity, and which, overpowering the faculties of mankind with aſtoniſhment, diſpoſed them to believe that a great and univerſal change was about to take place in human affairs, and to ſurrender themſelves to a force which they deemed irreſiſtible.

The Jacobin rulers of France, fully aware of the value of ſuch advantages, loſt not a moment in improving them to the utmoſt. They were ſenſible, not only that the effect of their revolutionary operations depended upon promptitude, but alſo that it was neceſſary for them to act openly, to throw off the maſk, and to diſplay their confidence of ſucceſs, in order to inſpire their adherents with boldneſs and enthuſiaſm, to overcome the timid, to attach the wavering, (ever ready to join the ſtandard to which victory ſeems to incline) and to intimidate, every where, even Government itſelf, into conceſſion, or, at leaſt, into inaction. They therefore openly ſounded, to the whole world, the trumpet of revolt, and, by a public Decree, (that of Nov. 19, 1792) they made a direct offer of their fraternity and aſſiſtance to every people, who ſhould be deſirous of recovering their liberty; that is, of ſubverting their Government. And it was provided, by the ſame Decree, that the French Generals ſhould receive "orders to give aſſiſtance to all people who "ſhould be ſo diſpoſed." To preclude the poſſibility of a doubt that this Decree was meant to be univerſal in its operation, it was tranſlated into all languages: and, a few days afterwards, a Member of the Convention, M. Baraillon, who was deſirous of reſtricting it to the Powers with which France ſhould be at open war, moved that after the words "to a

"peo-

" people," ſhould be added the words, " with whom " France may be at war," the Convention gave another proof of its *unlimited* views, by decreeing that there was no room to deliberate.*

This Decree, though infinitely the moſt flagitious act which had ever occurred in the intercourſe of States, was but a practical expoſition of the doctrine of Rochambeau, " that the French Revolutioniſts em- " brace the whole world in their ſyſtem of Fra- " ternity;" and of the Declaration of Louvet, that the French " Republicans aſpired to the immortal " honour of aboliſhing Royalty throughout the world." To paſs ſuch a Decree was not only to draw the ſword againſt every exiſting Government, but to throw away the ſcabbard. It was not only to invade the frontiers of all lawful authority, but, like the Romans who burnt the veſſels which had brought them to the coaſt of Britain, to render retreat impoſſible. It was to declare, in the moſt unequivocal terms, that the French Republic and the Governments of other States, could not exiſt together; a doctrine which has ſince been expreſsly applied, by the authority † of Buonaparte, to the Britiſh Government. But no deſcription can expoſe the atrocity of this Decree more effectually than the ſubſequent acknowledgement of Briſſot, that it was " an abſurd and impolitic Decree, which juſtly " excited the diſquietude of Foreign Cabinets;" or the admiſſion of Mr. Erſkine, that " no conſideration " can juſtify it." How glaring and conſummate muſt be that guilt which extorts ſuch confeſſions from the mouths of the party, and the advocate‡!

* See Annual Regiſter for 1792, part 2, page 356.

† Through his agent Monge.

‡ Mr. Fox, indeed, is reported to have got rid of this ſtumbling block to the advocates of France with great facility, by denominating the Decree of Fraternity *a ſilly Decree**. His expoſition of this daring attack on the rights of every Government, and the good order of every State, needs no better refutation than the above admiſſions of Briſſot and Mr. Erſkine.

* Debrett's Parliamentary Regiſter, page 98.

In

In leſs than a month, the French Republicans, already in a ſtate of open and declared hoſtility againſt all eſtabliſhed Governments, paſſed another Decree, by which they unfolded ſtill more explicitly the objects of the Decree of Fraternity, as well as the manner of its execution. By the Decree of Dec. 15, after announcing that their principles would not allow them to acknowledge any of the inſtitutions militating againſt the Sovereignty of the People, they ordain that in all countries which were or ſhould be occupied by their armies, (by which they clearly meant all the countries in the world,) their Generals ſhould proclaim the abolition of all ſuch inſtitutions, and "the ſuppreſſion of all exiſting authorities;" and they even go the length of declaring that they would treat as enemies the people who ſhould be deſirous of preſerving their Prince and privileged caſts, or of entering into an accommodation with them.

Having thus, by their public acts, thrown off the maſk, and rendered it impoſſible for ſcepticiſm itſelf to doubt of the nature and extent of their views, theſe univerſal Revolutioniſts were every day giving vent to their fury and rancour againſt Monarchical Government. Every Commander of the French armies was furniſhed with a blank *formula* of a letter for all the nations of the world, to be filled up by him as occaſion ſhould offer:—"The People of France to the "People of Greeting. We are come to "expel your Tyrants." On the 21ſt of November, 1792, the Abbé Gregorie, Preſident of the Convention, delivered an Anſwer to a Deputation of the National Aſſembly of Savoy, which was decreed to be tranſlated into all languages, as the Manifeſto of all nations againſt Kings. In that Anſwer are to be found the following expreſſions, among many others of a like tendency:—"It was a glorious day for the univerſe when the "National Convention of France pronounced theſe "Words—'Royalty is aboliſhed.'—Nations are now "beginning to exert their collective ſtrength for "cruſh-

" cruſhing Kings. Like gun-powder, the more Li-
" berty is compreſſed, the more terrible is its ex-
" ploſion. It will ſoon explode in both worlds to
" overturn Thrones*."

On the 28th of November the Preſident of the Convention, in reply to an Addreſs delivered by Deputies from the Society for Conſtitutional Information in London, ſaid, " Royalty in Europe is either de-
" ſtroyed, or on the point of periſhing on the ruins of
" Feodality." In the following month (Dec. 3), Barrere, the then Preſident, ſaid, " Our principles and
" our hatred to Kings are our Miniſters Plenipoten-
" tiary." Even ſo early as the month of September, the National Aſſembly (the Convention not being then formed, with one voice, at the inſtance of Chabot, who called upon them to declare their hatred to Royalty, cried out, " Yes, yes, we ſwear it!" And Danton, immediately after the murder of the King of France, ſpeaking of Kings, ſaid to the Convention, " You have thrown down the gauntlet; this gauntlet
" is the head of a King, it is the ſignal of their ap-
" proaching death." The ſame ſanguinary demagogue alſo ſaid, that " the National Convention
" ſhould be a Committee of Inſurrection againſt all
" the Kings of the Univerſe"—a character which not only the Convention, but every other aſſembly which has ſucceeded to it in France, has moſt conſiſtently maintained.

The French Republic, however, not content with proclaiming, in the moſt unqualified terms, its irreconcileable hatred to Royalty, and its deſign to bring all Kings, like the unfortunate Lewis, to the ſcaffold, diſplayed at a very early period the principles which it had adopted, and to which it has ever ſince adhered with regard to foreign Treaties; proving that it was determined to be bound by no engagements, and to acknowledge no law in its dealings with other States,

* The whole of this Anſwer is inſerted in the Annual Regiſter for 1792, part 2, page 356.

whatever

whatever might be their form of Government, but its own arbitrary and capricious will. In the Report made to the Convention by Briſſot, in the name of the *Diplomatic* Committee, on the 21ſt of November, relative to the convention with Geneva, a Republic, it is ſaid, " Without doubt the queſtion will be con-" ſidered, whether a free people can and ought to " bind themſelves by treaties; whether they are not " uſeleſs with Republics, which a community of " intereſts ſhould always govern; whether they are not " indecorous with every Government which does not " hold its powers of the People; for that is, perhaps, " the ſecret of your Revolution, and of thoſe you are " preparing." And in another part, " What ſignifies " the reſerve of treaties—puerilities of the ancient " diplomacy?" Theſe queſtions, in 1792, were a very fair and explicit promiſe of the numberleſs perfidies and violations of faith, by which the French Republic has ſince endeavoured, and is ſtill endeavouring to ſubject all nations to her accurſed yoke. Theſe queſtions diſplay very legibly the treacherous character which has invariably diſtinguiſhed that Republic, from her infancy to the military deſpotiſm of Buonaparte, who has done more than any other individual to carry that character to its greateſt poſſible extent, and to render it the grand inſtrument of univerſal deſtruction.

But although the French Revolutioniſts thus openly manifeſted their deſigns againſt every throne, and indeed againſt every people, although they made ſo public a profeſſion of their principles, nay, although in ſome inſtances they had already carried into execution their ſchemes of aggreſſion, aggrandizement and ſubverſion*; although, in ſhort, both their conduct and their language were ſtrongly marked with univerſal hoſtility, with boundleſs ambition, with the moſt atrocious in-

* Particularly in their uſurpation of the Auſtrian Netherlands, of Avignon, and of the Dutchy of Savoy and the County of Nice, which were all ſeized upon by France before the year 1793.

juſtice,

juſtice, and with the moſt deſtructive rage, ſtill they found it worth their while to accompany ſuch language and conduct with profeſſions of moderation, juſtice, love of peace, reſpect to other Governments, and of a determination to renounce ambition and to refrain from conqueſt. It ſeems, indeed, impoſſible that ſuch profeſſions ſhould have any other effect upon perſons who gave the ſmalleſt attention to paſſing events, than that of exciting the utmoſt indignation at ſo groſs an attempt to impoſe on their underſtanding. But ſtrange as it may appear, they have proved highly uſeful to the cauſe they were meant to ſerve. They operated upon the weakneſs of that portion of mankind, (and a very large portion it is,) who, from indolence or prejudice, are ever ready to ſurrender their faculties, and to become the dupes of the moſt ſuperficial appearances, of the moſt unfounded pretexts, and of aſſurances which contradict the evidence of their own ſenſes, rather than take the pains of inveſtigating facts, or give credit to what they are unwilling to believe. Such perſons liſtened with eagerneſs to the profeſſions, by which the French Rulers ſought to lull mankind into lethargic ſecurity. Even Governments themſelves, unwilling to lay aſide the pleaſing hope that they might, at leaſt individually, eſcape the impending ſtorm without ſacrificing their preſent repoſe, ſuffered themſelves to be amuſed by the perfidious explanations and aſſurances of an enemy, who was determined upon their deſtruction. Thoſe explanations and aſſurances, however, derived their principal effect in this Country, from the importance which was attached to them by perſons actuated by party views. Such perſons, ſacrificing every conſideration of national honour, prudence and ſafety to their own conſtant and invariable object, the ſupplanting of the exiſting Adminiſtration, not only ſuppreſſed, in their reaſonings upon the ſubject, all the atrocious acts and audacious menaces of Revolutionary France, but vouched her inſidious proteſtations to prove that ſhe was diſpoſed for Peace, and to fix upon their rivals the imputation of being eager for

War. And although nothing could be more falſe and unjuſt than theſe concluſions, yet numbers, even of well-affected perſons, accuſtomed to hear the queſtion frequently ſtated in that manner, and inclined to view with jealouſy the conduct of every Adminiſtration, have, by dint of repetition, been induced to give credit to ſuch ſtatements, and at length to raiſe their voice againſt their Government and their Country; and thus, by favouring domeſtic diſſenſions, to afford the enemy his beſt chance of effecting his deſtructive purpoſes.

It has been ſhewn, however, by indiſputable evidence, that the French Republic, notwithſtanding her inſidious profeſſions, had placed herſelf at the very commencement of her exiſtence in a ſtate of univerſal hoſtility with all Monarchs, and not only proclaimed her intention of deſtroying Monarchy, but, by public and ſolemn Decrees, tendered her aſſiſtance to every people to overthrow their Government, and even declared herſelf their enemy, if they would not join in her plans of Revolution. It is an inadequate deſcription of ſuch conduct to ſay that it amounted to a Declaration of War againſt every eſtabliſhed Government. No example of ſuch proceedings had occurred in the hiſtory of the World, and no expreſſions were to be found in any language which could convey an adequate idea of their injuſtice and atrocity. They were not only acts of open hoſtility, but the moſt miſchievous that could poſſibly be conceived. They were infinitely more dangerous than a ſudden and unprovoked attack of a country by military force; for ſuch an attack would but unite a people the more firmly in their defence, and arm Government with the public indignation againſt the common foe. But the ſyſtem of France was to begin by diſuniting Government and people, by exciting ſedition and revolt, by preparing the torch of civil War, (without, however, omitting the military preparations which were intended to aſſiſt inſurrection,) and actually, by the Decree of December 15, preſcribing the manner

ner in which her Generals ſhould proceed in the "ſup-
"preſſion of all exiſting authorities." Nor was it a common War which ſhe excited by theſe moſt daring and hoſtile acts. It was not merely an unjuſtifiable and unprovoked attack on other Powers of which ſhe was guilty—room might then have been left for accommodation. If her arms could not have been repelled, her fury might have been appeaſed by conceſſions, her ambition, her avarice, her rapacity might have been ſated by ſacrifices, and a chance, at leaſt, might have remained for other States, in more propitious times, to reſtore the balance which is neceſſary to their common ſafety. But ſhe proved, as well by her early declarations, as by her ſubſequent conduct, that ſhe would be ſatisfied with nothing leſs than the total deſtruction of thoſe whom ſhe attacked—that ſhe was inflexibly determined not only to cruſh all exiſting Kings, but to exterminate Royalty itſelf, and with it all the inſtitutions of ſociety—that her purpoſe was entirely to aboliſh Ariſtocracy, which was in effect to threaten the overthrow of Republics, as well as Monarchies; for there was no Republican Government of which Ariſtocracy was not an eſſential part, and moſt Governments of that denomination were entirely Ariſtocratical.

Is there a man among the advocates of France who, after a review of theſe tranſactions, will venture to deny that every State in Europe was fully entitled to employ its whole force in the moſt prompt, active and energetic manner, againſt ſo malignant, ſo dangerous, ſo irreconcileable a foe? Is there one who will dare to aſſert, that after ſuch flagrant, ſuch inſolent, ſuch deſtructive acts of hoſtility on the part of France, War, though it had been begun at once by all the other European Powers, would not on their parts have been in the ſtricteſt ſenſe defenſive; ſo much ſo indeed, as to ſuperſede the neceſſity of a Declaration? Nay, is there one who will deny that it was alike the intereſt and the duty of all States to unite their forces, for their common preſervation, by the

overthrow of a Republic which aimed at univerſal anarchy? The right to form ſuch a confederacy, for ſuch a purpoſe, is not only founded in the ſupreme and irrevocable law of ſelf-defence, but is expreſsly recognized in the Law of Nations, although that law could not poſſibly anticipate ſo groſs an inſtance of univerſal and injurious aggreſſion, as that which had been manifeſted by France. It is declared by a Writer on the Law of Nations, whoſe authority on that ſubject has been recognized by Mr. Fox, that "If "there be any where a nation of a reſtleſs and miſ-"chievous diſpoſition, always ready to injure others, "to traverſe their deſigns, and to RAISE DOMESTIC "TROUBLES, it is not to be doubted that all have a "right to join in order to repreſs, chaſtiſe and PUT IT "EVER AFTER OUT OF ITS POWER TO INJURE "THEM*." The caſe above deſcribed falls very ſhort of that which has actually occurred, and which affords an inſtance of a nation which ſought not merely to injure others but to deſtroy them, not merely to raiſe domeſtic troubles, but to make inſurrection the inſtrument of total ſubverſion and of univerſal revolution. All the Powers of Europe would therefore have been juſtified in confederating for their ſecurity againſt the French Republic, and as that Republic had openly declared that ſhe ſought nothing leſs than their deſtruction, they were entitled to combine in order to effect her overthrow and utter extinction as a Republic. —That no ſuch confederacy was formed, that the Powers of Europe, inſtead of combining in vigorous and well-concerted hoſtility againſt their implacable foe, ſought only to avoid taking a part in the War, while deſtruction was advancing with haſty ſteps on every ſide, is perhaps the moſt wonderful circumſtance of this eventful period, and is to be aſcribed only to

* See Vattel, b. ii. c. 4. § 53. It may be allowable on this occaſion to correct a miſtake which, by means of an error of the preſs, appears in a quotation of the above paſſage in a tract publiſhed by the Author in 1793, and inſerted in the Retroſpect. The quotation there appears to refer to b. i. c. 4. See Retroſpect, p. 154.

the

the operation of thoſe moral cauſes which, as has been already noticed, conſtituted the chief ſtrength and furniſhed the moſt formidable reſources of the new Republic. But France did not permit thoſe Powers to enjoy the perilous ſweets of treacherous repoſe. Making War ſubſervient to her ſyſtem of general ſubverſion, ſhe forced them ſucceſſively, but at her own time, to diſſolve their pacific enchantment; and of all Europe, but two States, favoured indeed by their remote ſituation, have been able to preſerve their exiſtence, without engaging in actual hoſtilities. But her vengeance was particularly directed againſt Great Britain, which ſhe juſtly conſidered as the great obſtacle to her plans of univerſal revolution. She ſaw clearly that nothing would ſo much facilitate the accompliſhment of thoſe plans as the ſubverſion of the Britiſh Monarchy, and to effect that ſubverſion was the object of her moſt ſtrenuous endeavours. In the purſuit of this object ſhe employed her whole magazine of frauds, falſehoods, perjuries and revolutionary arts. She ſpared no pains to amuſe the Government, to inſpire it with hopes of maintaining Peace, to deceive it by falſe proteſtations, and to furniſh its domeſtic opponents with pretexts, for obſtructing it in the timely adoption of vigorous and preſervative meaſures. But notwithſtanding all her efforts to lull vigilance and to blunt ſuſpicion, ſhe diſplayed, (and without diſcouraging thoſe on whom ſhe principally depended for ſucceſs, ſhe could not but diſplay), the moſt glaring proofs that ſhe was labouring all the while to foment an inſurrection for the purpoſe of overturning the Conſtitution, and ſhe even manifeſted the utmoſt confidence in the ſpeedy ſucceſs of her labours. She did not confine herſelf to thoſe ſecret excitements to revolt, which, by her emiſſaries and agents, ſhe has moſt plentifully employed in every country of Europe; ſhe did not keep within the bounds of a private intercourſe with Britiſh conſpirators, to whom, in common with all other conſpirators, ſhe had, by her public decrees, promiſed aſſiſtance; but ſhe did what was even new

and ſtriking in the daring and rapid progreſs of her revolutionary career—She publicly received thoſe conſpirators with open arms and with cordial embraces, at the bar of her ſupreme aſſembly, the National Convention; ſhe heard with approbation and applauſe their aſſurances that Britons embraced her cauſe, and were determined to follow her example—that revolution was making a rapid progreſs in their country—and that in an incredibly ſhort ſpace of time France would "*ſend* "*addreſſes of congratulation to* A NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND." Nay, ſhe even returned, by the mouth of the Preſident of her Convention, an exulting reply to theſe aſſurances, and—at the very moment when ſhe was endeavouring to convince the Britiſh Monarchy of her reſpectful ſentiments and peaceable intentions—ſhe addreſſed the ſeditious ſubjects of that Monarchy by the endearing term of "Generous Republicans," and declared her confidence that the moment was approaching, "in which the "French would ſend congratulations to the National "Convention of Great Britain;" while, to give ſtill more publicity to theſe unprecedented proceedings, the Addreſs and the Anſwer were ordered to be printed and ſent to her eighty-three departments, and even *to be tranſlated into all languages.*

Thus was Great Britain, after receiving her full ſhare of the inſults and injuries which France had heaped upon all eſtabliſhed Governments, diſtinguiſhed by an inſult and an injury which infinitely ſurpaſſed all that had gone before, and which completed the climax of French Revolutionary aggreſſion. Without the aid of the new lights, which have recently blazed out upon mankind from the Gallic meridian, it would have been impoſſible to conceive any thing ſo atrocious as the conduct of France on the above occaſion. To give open countenance, in a Legiſlative aſſembly, to ſubjects conſpiring againſt a Government with which *ſhe profeſſed to be at peace*—to hear them, with exultation and applauſe, announce the ſpeedy downfall of that Government—and to promiſe them her congratulations

gratulations upon the ſucceſs of their Treaſon—ſuch conduct was a political Phenomenon which nothing but the French Revolution could have produced. To act in ſuch a manner was to declare, not only that the Decree of Fraternity had a direct reference to Great Britain, but that the fraternal intercourſe between the two countries had already made a great progreſs—it was to proclaim that Britiſh inſurrection, foſtered by French Fraternity, was conſidered as invincible—that the Britiſh Government, menaced and bullied from abroad, and undermined at home, was reduced to a ſituation ſo critical and embarraſſing, that it would not dare to reſent the groſſeſt treatment, but muſt conſent to hold the remainder of its exiſtence at the ſufferance of the Republic; and that it could only hope, by patience and ſubmiſſion, to delay a ruin which was irrevocably decreed by the rulers of the Great Nation.

The confidence which was thus diſplayed in the near approach of a Revolution in England, though happily very far from being warranted by the ſtate of things in that country, was, doubtleſs, inſpired by the ſtatements of thoſe who were moſt active in promoting ſuch an event, and who were impatient for a rupture, which would enſure to them the powerful reſource of Gallic aſſiſtance. And it muſt have been with boundleſs joy that they witneſſed ſo deciſive a proof that their Republican patrons were determined to keep no terms with a Government whoſe overthrow was the grand object of their joint-labours.

To contend that the proceedings, by which the French Republic had placed herſelf in a ſituation of avowed and implacable hoſtility with every exiſting Government, and particularly with every Monarchy, were not directed againſt the Britiſh Monarchy, would be no leſs abſurd than to aſſert that the whole does not contain all its parts, or that an endeavour to deſtroy all Governments in the aggregate is not an attack upon each individual Government. But to maintain that a cordial and encouraging reception of deputies

from

from traiterous Clubs, who plotted the deſtruction of the Britiſh Government, was not a diſtinct and complete act of aggreſſion againſt this country, would exceed the utmoſt bounds of ſophiſtry, and require the front and audacity of Jacobiniſm itſelf. What would have been the danger and the malignity of the moſt wanton, unprovoked and violent military hoſtility, when compared with ſuch acts of Revolutionary hoſtility—acts as much more heinous than the moſt unjuſt employment of open force, as it is more atrocious to excite the ſervants in a family to rob and murder their maſter, than to endeavour to break into the houſe in order to commit thoſe horrid crimes.

It is not true, however, that the military force of France was not, at that very time, employed in ſeconding her Revolutionary attempts againſt Great Britain. The War, which was then raging upon the Continent, was undertaken, as we have ſeen, with the view of deſtroying Royalty, not only in France, but *throughout the world.* It was, therefore, a War againſt every country in which Royalty exiſted, although every ſuch country was not aſſailed in military form at the ſame moment. And to ſay that in ſuch a War, any Monarchical State was not attacked, becauſe it did not ſee the ſtandards of the Republic or hear her cannon, is no leſs abſurd than it would be to contend that, when a country is invaded, a particular province or country is not moleſted, becauſe it is not the actual theatre of hoſtilities. The warlike operations of France, however furious and unjuſt, were, as has been ſhewn, the leaſt atrocious of her proceedings. Her machinations, her decrees, her excitements to univerſal revolt, her attempts to ſcatter the Revolutionary fire throughout all Europe, were infinitely the worſt of her aggreſſions. But even the forms of War were not long wanting to complete thoſe aggreſſions againſt this country, which were themſelves incapable of aggravation. She had, indeed, for ſome time, been making preparations which clearly indicated a hoſtile attack; but, even after the proceedings of the

28th

28th of November, ſhe ſtill ſought to amuſe the Britiſh Government, in order to prevent it from taking meaſures to repel ſuch an attack. Her Jacobin Rulers directed their confidential agent, M. Chauvelin, (for he was no more than *their* agent, although he had been the Ambaſſador of their King) to make profeſſions and explanations, which were at direct variance with indiſputable facts. Finding that they could not deceive by falſehood, they ſought, as their laſt reſource, to intimidate by threats; and they concluded a correſpondence*, carried on through M. Chauvelin, by menacing open War, if Great Britain did not conſider as ſufficient, explanations which ſhe knew to be falſe, and if ſhe did not diſcontinue preparations, which were not begun till ſome months after France had been preparing for a *naval* War. This inadmiſſible *ultimatum* had been preceded by a public letter of the Miniſter of the French Marine, M. Monge, to the ſea ports, announcing an intended deſcent, with fifty thouſand caps of liberty, in this Iſland. But theſe threats, not inducing the Britiſh Miniſters to lay the country which they were bound to protect, at the feet of the French Republic, the latter, by an unanimous Decree of the Convention, declared War againſt Great Britain and Holland; and, in the true Jacobinical ſtile, accompanied that declaration with an open invitation to Britiſh ſailors to bring the veſſels in which they ſerved into French Ports.

To examine, minutely, the queſtion of aggreſſion, as it *diſtinctly* concerns Great Britain, did not enter into the plan of this publication. Much more, indeed, than is neceſſary to ſolve the above queſtion, even in that point of view, has been here noticed†. But the deſign

* Jan. 13, 1793.

† If it were poſſible ſtill to entertain a doubt upon this ſubject, ſuch doubt muſt be removed by attending to the following very conciſe ſtatement of the queſtion. The War was declared by France againſt Great Britain, and the former country became the aggreſſor by that Declaration, unleſs ſhe had received ſome injury or offence for which ſhe

deſign of the preſent diſcuſſion was to trace the War to its origin—to inveſtigate its motives—to unfold its objects—and to detect and expoſe the fallacious ſtatements of thoſe perſons, who have aſcribed it to cauſes

endeavoured in vain to obtain ſatisfaction. Before the War a correſpondence took place between the two countries relative to all the grounds of difference, which exiſted between them, and was continued till within a few days before the Declaration of War. But in that correſpondence France did not aſk compenſation for any one injury—ſhe did not demand ſatisfaction for any one act of Great Britain—on the contrary, the whole of the correſpondence, and particularly the latter part of it, which was neceſſarily the moſt important, conſiſted entirely of explanations, reſpecting her own conduct, by which ſhe endeavoured to blunt the ſuſpicions, and ſtifle the alarm, with which her decrees and other acts had inſpired the Britiſh Government—and at laſt, when ſhe concluded the correſpondence by an *ultimatum*, denouncing War, ſhe threatened hoſtilities, not if Great Britain refuſed to redreſs her wrongs, for ſhe had not complained of any, but only in caſe her explanations of her own conduct ſhould appear inſufficient, or the Britiſh Government ſhould continue preparations, which were begun only in purſuance of her own example.

Neither have the advocates of France, to this hour, pretended that they are able to charge this Country with a ſingle act, which, according to the Law of Nations, has ever been conſidered as a juſtifiable cauſe for War. Their omiſſion to do this amounts to the moſt complete exculpation of Great Britain from the charge of aggreſſion. But it may, nevertheleſs, be ſatisfactory to know what Neutral Countries think upon this ſubject, and the opinion of America cannot fail to have conſiderable weight with a Britiſh Oppoſition. That opinion has been formally given, and has been acted upon. For as, by the treaty of 1776, between France and the United States, the latter are obliged to aſſiſt the former in defence of the French Weſt India Iſlands, in any ſubſequent War in which France ſhould *not* be the *aggreſſor*—when the preſent War broke out, it became a ſerious queſtion with America, whether France or Great Britain was the aggreſſor.

On the 18th of April, 1793, the Preſident, Waſhington, aſſembled thoſe Officers of State, whom it was the cuſtom to conſult on important occaſions; to wit, Mr. Jefferſon, the Secretary of State; Mr. Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treaſury; Mr. Knox, the Secretary at War; and Mr. Bradford, the Attorney General. To the council thus formed, the Preſident put the following queſtion:

"Does the War, in which France is engaged, appear to be *offenſive* "or *defenſive*, on her part? Or of a mixed and equivocal cha-"racter?"

It was determined, that the War was, on the part of France, an *offenſive* War; and, upon this ground, the Preſident, without waiting for any information from France, iſſued a Proclamation, declaring to all the world, that America *would take no part in the War*.

In this opinion France herſelf acquieſced. For though entitled to call for the aſſiſtance of America, in defence of the French Weſt India Iſlands, (which were never before in ſuch danger), in caſe ſhe was not the aggreſſor, ſhe did not claim ſuch aſſiſtance, nor pretend to be entitled to it, although ſhe ſought by all the means in her power to involve America in the War.

Thus

[redacted]es which had no ſhare in its production. This analytical mode of inveſtigation leads, it is conceived, to the moſt clear, ſatisfactory, and infinitely the moſt uſeful comprehenſion of the ſubject. For the War, thus conſidered, appears to have been, in the firſt inſtance, an attack made by France upon all eſtabliſhed Governments—upon a civilized Society. It was begun in aid of an avowed ſyſtem, which has ever ſince been unremittingly purſued, and which had for its object the ſubverſion of all lawful authority, and the deſtruction of all ſocial inſtitutions. It was not, at its firſt breaking out, nor has it been, in its progreſs, directed merely againſt any particular Sovereign or Country, but it was, from the firſt, and is ſtill, directed againſt every Sovereign and every Country. It is an injuſtice to the cauſe, in which all are engaged, to ſeparate their provocations, their inſults, and their injuries, to conſider apart the attacks made by France againſt their individual honour and ſafety. Where is the State which has not, on its private account, and detached from the reſt of the world, numberleſs and intolerable grievances to allege againſt the new Republic! But what are thoſe grievances, compared with the atrocious endeavours of that Republic, to lay all civilized Society in ruins, and to oppreſs the whole world by her blood-ſtained Sceptre of Anarchy! The War has ſpread, indeed, from Country to Country, as its firſt projectors have found means to extend its progreſs, until it has made three quarters of the Globe experience the ravages of Jacobinical Revolution—but it has, throughout the whole of its career, preſerved its unity unbroken—it has been in England, in Italy, in

Thus America and France have, by their deliberate conduct, given the beſt poſſible proof that their opinion is in favour of this country, upon the queſtion of aggreſſion. No doubt can exiſt reſpecting the opinion of any other country upon that queſtion; and thus the whole world admits that the war is juſt and neceſſary, on the part of Great Britain, excepting only thoſe Britiſh ſubjects, who ſeem determined to think it impoſſible for their country to be right, in any inſtance, unleſs they be permitted to change its Government; or which, in effect, would be the ſame thing, to chooſe the Miniſters by whom the affairs of that Government are to be directed.

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Switzerland, in Egypt, in Syria—thſame War, wh[illegible] was commenced, in the year 1792, inconſequence of a determination to ſet fire to the fourcorners of Europe, and to deſtroy Royalty throughout the world. In its courſe to diſtant Regions, it n more loſes its identity, or changes its nature, tharthe overwhelming torrent, which carries devaſtationwherever it can force a paſſage, or the conflagration, hich purſues its ravages in every direction, until all vithin its reach exhibits one deplorable ſcene of ſmking ruins. In ſuch a War all States have but oe intereſt—one duty. In ſuch a War but one alernative attends all civilized Society—either to triumh over its implacable enemy, or to be cruſhed beeath his unappeaſable fury.

THE END.

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